

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: THE NDEA, LOYALTY, AND COMMUNITY:
RESISTANCE AT TWO LIBERAL ARTS
COLLEGES

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As part of the effort to supply “brainpower” for the American cold war effort, the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 provided a loan program to aid under-resourced postsecondary students. Elements of the NDEA story—the increased federal financial support for higher education; the rhetorical and practical affiliation of schooling, national security, and patriotism; and the easy relationship between an irresistible military-industrial complex and a compliant academic culture—seem to support conventional narratives of post-World War II society and higher education. These narratives hold that the combined forces of research funding and a cold war discourse which demanded conformity often co-opted and reshaped the institutional purposes of American universities.

Rejecting the shorthand that “higher education” in the twentieth century was synonymous with the experience of elite research universities, and that significant American institutions generally complied with and even promoted cold war security and defense policies, allows stories unaccounted for in traditional historical narratives to emerge.

In the case of the NDEA, two small liberal arts colleges—Swarthmore and Haverford—took a leading role in refusing federal monies offered by the legislation, in protest of an attached disclaimer affidavit. This affidavit was part of a loyalty provision in the legislation which required aid recipients to disclaim membership in or support of “subversive” organizations. From the first, this provision was a point of controversy among collegiate faculties and administrators, who saw in the affidavit a political test that imperiled nascent concepts of academic freedom, and also established dangerous precedent that could influence the direction of future education bills. While resistance eventually galvanized among many schools nationwide—and though higher profile institutions such as Harvard and Yale would ultimately emerge as its public faces—much of the initial example of dissent was promulgated by the non-participation of Swarthmore and Haverford.

The example of the purpose and community identity articulated by these two schools during the NDEA controversy suggests the possibility of reclaiming narrative space for the residential liberal arts college in the history of cold war higher education, and perhaps in the present day as well.

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ARTS COLLEGES

by

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Introduction: Liberal Arts Colleges and the Bounds of Historiography

This dissertation tells the story of Swarthmore and Haverford, two Quaker liberal arts colleges in suburban Philadelphia, both of whom resisted the loyalty provisions of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958. During a period of American history marked by institutional commitments to cold war rhetoric and uncertainty surrounding the concept of academic freedom, both Swarthmore and Haverford drew upon clearly articulated collegiate missions, strong senses of community, and traditions of ethical discourse to oppose the tests of belief required by the NDEA. In so doing, the two colleges enacted a vision of institutional purpose, moral identity, and democratic practice that was too often inaccessible, ignored, or dormant in the American higher education community throughout the cold war period.

The history of American higher education has engaged writers since the eighteenth century. From Thomas Jefferson's arguments in favor of a national university for an intellectual aristocracy, to nineteenth-century polemics by university presidents on the need for funding, to post-bellum memoirs of collegiate life, publications on the subject were broad in scope, purpose, and quality.¹ The true roots of the historiography of American higher education, however, can indeed be discovered in the first half of the past century, with the publication of works that did not simply celebrate college life or lobby alumni and philanthropies for financial support, but instead offered a critical examination of the historical antecedents and philosophical underpinnings of postsecondary learning in the United States. In 1918, for example, Thorstein Veblen offered a satirical yet trenchant look at "the higher learning," while twelve years later Abraham Flexner

¹ For a collection of representative works, see Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith, eds., *American Higher Education: A Documentary History*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

published his comparative study of contemporary university systems. Robert Maynard Hutchins followed both of these in 1936 with a thorough defense of liberal education at the collegiate level.² These authors were attempting to address a more serious audience, one that craved something more than voyeuristic accounts of campus life, naïve hagiography, or appeals to support the alma mater.

It was on the foundation of these early scholarly efforts that later academics began a truly committed, systematic inquiry into the nation's history and system of higher education in the decades after World War II. There was growing interest in the field, an interest doubtless spurred on by the increased presence that collegiate and university attendance had claimed in American life and conversation; with the GI Bill (1944), the Truman Commission Report on Higher Education (1947), and the National Defense Education Act (1958), postsecondary education was making its journey from elite institution to mass phenomenon in the popular mindset, and it experienced a concomitant increase in academic attention. As two analysts observed in 1968: "When we began studying higher education more than a decade ago, the number of scholars in the field was small enough so that we could know almost all of them personally and keep up a correspondence with them. Today this is no longer possible."³

As interest and participation in the field broadened, however, the scope of its argument did not necessarily follow suit. Historians and analysts working at mid-century and shortly after tended to articulate a shared sensibility, one which described the two

²Thorstein Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men* (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1918); Abraham Flexner, *Universities: American, British, German* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930); Robert Maynard Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1936).

³ Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, *The Academic Revolution* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968), xii.

decades before and after the coming of the twentieth century as a period of crucial transition and growth in American higher education.⁴ The hero of this emerging narrative was the turn-of-the-century university, an institution launched by benefactors to champion research and create new knowledge. To historians, the dissimilarity between the dominant school type of the antebellum period, the small (and often denominational) college, and the modern research university was striking; indeed, in contrast to the perceived parochialism, paternalism, and crude vocationalism that historians saw in the nineteenth-century college, the modern research university seemed an epiphany of scholarly advancement, academic freedom, and administrative innovation. Schools like the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, and Cornell, born into this zeitgeist, joined older yet modernizing schools such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia in leading the “university movement,” with an attendant emphasis on advanced study, faculty autonomy, non-sectarian missions, and curricular expansion.⁵ In the writings of mid-century historians, the schools leading, participating in, and inheriting this movement became the central actors in what would become the traditional narrative—the “conventional wisdom”—of American higher education history. This wisdom proclaimed the early twentieth century the “Age of the University,” a great leap forward from the retrograde nineteenth-century intellectual landscape and its parochial, anti-academic colleges.

⁴ For representative works, see Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University: A History* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1962); and Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

⁵ Hofstadter, “The Revolution in Higher Education,” in *Paths of American Thought*, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Morton White (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 269-90.

The mid-century fascination with research universities also generally involved a dismissal of earlier small liberal arts colleges as sites of meaningful historical inquiry; indeed, the traditional narrative increasingly saw such schools through one of two interpretive lenses. First, the nineteenth-century college was, in general, presented as an unsophisticated, anti-intellectual, and archaically moralistic place, especially when compared to the progressive, scholarly, and professional ethos embodied by post-bellum universities. Second, a very select few liberal arts institutions remained within the historical conversation, but these schools were outliers distinguished both by their period of founding (the Colonial, rather than the Jacksonian) and their ability to express the progressive and academic values of the nascent universities. While marginally more inclusive, this theme nonetheless made the tacit assertion that a school could only embed itself in the higher educational mainstream by resisting the liberal arts model central to most nineteenth-century small colleges.

Taken together, these two themes have tended to point historians in a very understandable research direction: toward the modern university. The most influential scholars and works of the two decades after World War II had pronounced the small liberal arts college model either a nineteenth-century relic or an institution made relevant by only a handful of “prestigious” schools. While those inheriting this narrative tradition were not as critical of the twentieth-century version of the “old time college”—the modern liberal arts college is seldom held up as anti-intellectual or sectarian, *per se*—neither did they stray from the assumption that the experience of research universities best relayed the meaning of American higher education. This fidelity to the traditional narrative was likely galvanized by an explosion of activity in the middle of the twentieth

century, whereby new legislation, resource allocation, and campus construction helped inaugurate what many have termed the “golden age” of the university.⁶ Within such a context, the “old time college” model, even updated from its nineteenth-century roots, must have seemed shockingly extraneous as politicians and educationists clamored for more laboratories, new research, and sprawling campuses to produce human capital for modern world. In short, most historians have asserted that themes of expanded access, government funding, research orientation, credentialism, and student activism told the story of American higher education in the twentieth century, and assumed that the campuses and the archives of large, comprehensive research universities, be they public or private, were best places to investigate this story.⁷

While this approach has inspired thoughtful and provocative narrative, it has also exiled the modern liberal arts college to the margins of historiographical conversation. To be sure, there have been attempts to revise understandings of this institutional model, both in its nineteenth- and twentieth-century forms.⁸ As the revisionist historians demonstrated, the liberal arts college during the “Age of the University” was actually not

⁶ Louis Menand, *The Marketplace of Ideas: Reform and Resistance in the American University* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 63-70, 73-77.

⁷ For representative works, see Jacques Barzun, *The American University: How It Runs, Where It is Going* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Roger L. Geiger, *To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of Research Universities, 1900-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Idea of the University: A Reexamination* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Roger L. Geiger, *Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Jonathan R. Cole, Elinor G Barber, and Stephen R. Graubard, *The Research University in a Time of Discontent* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Hugh Graham and Nancy Diamond, *The Rise of American Research Universities: Elites and Challengers in the Postwar Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); John A. Douglass, *The California Idea and American Higher Education: 1850 to the 1960 Master Plan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Wilson Smith and Thomas Bender, eds., *American Higher Education Transformed, 1940-2005*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Jonathan R. Cole, *The Great American University* (New York: Public Affairs, 2009).

⁸ For representative works, see James Axtell, “The Death of the Liberal Arts College,” *History of Education Quarterly* 11, no 4 (Winter 1971); Colin Burke, *American Collegiate Populations: A Test of the Traditional View* (New York: New York University, 1983); W. Bruce Leslie, *Gentlemen & Scholars: Colleges and Community in the “Age of the University,” 1865-1917* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1993).

a fixed entity, but rather a creative, vibrant institution that continually reinterpreted how best to enact its project within historically-contingent circumstances. The place of such schools in the traditional historiographical narrative, however, has been confounded by analytical lassitude; indeed, the conventional story has generally imputed stasis and intractability to the antebellum college, ignored the continuities between the liberal arts college model and the new research institutions of the time, and overstated the small college's fidelity to a narrow sectarianism and outmoded pedagogy.⁹

Despite the efforts of revisionists seeking to save the historical reputation of the small college, however, theirs has been a limited scholarly revolution; indeed, no "Age of the College" or "Golden Age of the College" narrative has emerged to supersede or challenge the prominence of the conventional historiographical approach. As a consequence, the historical account of American higher education in the past century tends to exclude the possibility of small, residential liberal arts colleges as sites of meaningful inquiry or experience. What scholarly consideration the twentieth-century iteration of such schools does receive from historians tends to come in the form of institutional or "house" histories, which many analysts see as academically slight.¹⁰ In addition, those social scientists which have analyzed the small liberal arts college in the

⁹ Axtell, "The Death of the Liberal Arts College," 341, 346, 347.

¹⁰ In circles of educational historians, institutional or "house histories" have often been dismissed as facile "love letters" to chosen campuses. To be sure, some have been poorly written or insufficiently critical, and prominent historians have tended toward more comprehensive or synthetic histories of policies, social trends, curricular developments, and the like. There is, however, nothing necessary about this condition. Far from being vapid and of dubious utility, a thoughtful house history—particularly in an under-researched field—can inform contemporary policy, encourage the generation and preservation of historical records, promote more creative methodologies, and, most importantly, provide narrative elements crucial to the writing of more general, thematic histories of higher education. At present, though, entries in this genre are not sufficiently robust or respected to support meaningful inquiry into the twentieth-century liberal arts college. For exploration on the limits and possibilities of institutional histories, see Richard Angelo, "Review: A House is Not a Home," *History of Education Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 609-618, and W. Bruce Leslie, "Writing Postwar Institutional Histories," *History of Higher Education Annual* 20 (2000): 79-93.

post-World War II context most often proclaim the inexorable decline of the institution, with schools previously identifying as “liberal arts” increasingly incorporating more professional and practical curricula into their programs.¹¹

Both types of analysis—those which see post-World War II liberal arts colleges as either irrelevant or in decay—have neglected the lessons of the revisionists; that is, they generally ignore the possibility that these schools, like their turn-of-the-century forebears, function as dynamic, creative entities, not sites of passive ineffectuality or mindless, insipid aping of university examples. To be sure, universities in the “Golden Age” were profoundly affected by expanded enrollment, the growth of government-sponsored “Big Science,” and student activists championing civil rights and anti-war causes; at the same time, however, other institutions, including small liberal arts colleges, engaged with these trends and issues in ways which helped shape the meaning and practice of American higher education for significant numbers of students, faculty, and administrators. When these stories go untold, scholars miss opportunities to expand the bounds of the traditional historiographical narrative.

Scholarship surrounding the GI Bill’s encounter with American higher educational institutions provides a useful case in point. The 1944 law encouraged the development of human capital, stimulated expansion of higher education and, perhaps most importantly, popularized the idea that higher education was both a necessary and reachable tool of economic mobility for postwar Americans; accordingly, it has inspired three decades of historical review, with most of these studies having focused on legislative processes,

¹¹ David W. Breneman, *Liberal Arts Colleges: Thriving, Surviving, or Endangered?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Michael Delucchi, “Liberal Arts’ Colleges and the Myth of Uniqueness,” *The Journal of Higher Education* 68, no. 4 (July-August 1984): 414-426.

administration, and civic ramifications of the bill.¹² Attention was also paid to its effects on the nation's higher education, however, and while these pieces did not always share the same tone—though most heralded the law as a revolutionary social program, some argued that the myth of the GI Bill has outpaced its reality¹³—almost all articulated a core group of narrative themes: the veterans on campus were motivated and high academic achievers, took a range of classes but preferred those with a vocational/professional orientation, overwhelmed schools with unanticipated numbers, and refused to subscribe to traditional “collegiate way” mores. A typical example captured the perceived watershed nature of the program:

In many ways the impact of the successful college veteran drastically altered the traditional perceptions of the nature of the college experience, guiding the curriculum even more than in prewar years towards more practical and vocational applications. Due to these democratizing influences and the impressive attention they received, college appeared to be more accessible in the public imagination.... The common man had invaded the aristocratic campuses, not only changing the colleges, but also raising his own status by association and offering a model for emulation.¹⁴

Historians thus built a conventional interpretation which described the GI Bill as shaping the educational, political, and social discourse on campuses across the country.

¹² For representative works, see Davis R. B. Ross, *Preparing for Ulysses: Politics and Veterans During World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Michael J. Bennett, *When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America* (Washington: Brassey's, 1996); Suzanne Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens: The GI Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹³ Keith W. Olson, *The G.I. Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 109-110.

¹⁴ Daniel A. Clark, “‘The Two Joes Meet—Joe College, Joe Veteran’: The G.I. Bill, College Education, and Postwar American Culture,” *History of Education Quarterly* 38 (Summer 1998): 177.

In the hands of historians, however, these “campuses” included research universities, comprehensive state schools, or prestigious university colleges, but rarely residential liberal arts schools; indeed, of the considerable space dedicated to photographs of Quonset huts, surging enrollment figures, and analysis of curriculum adjustment, almost none of it involved the small college. For instance, in 1974 Keith Olson’s *The G.I. Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges* emerged as a concise and oft-cited description of the relationship between soldiers and higher education, but sections exploring on-campus effects were limited to institutional and social challenges faced at comprehensive state universities such as Rutgers, Syracuse and, most prominently, Wisconsin. Similarly, Helen L. Horowitz’s groundbreaking look at postsecondary student culture, *Campus Life*, used the venue of a larger university like Michigan and Northwestern, or a prestigious technical institution like Lehigh, to explore the outsized demographic influence of veterans on campus. Horowitz noted that “especially at the larger universities,” the former soldiers had “left institutions substantially different from the ones they had found;” the cultural effects of veterans at smaller liberal arts colleges, though, remained unexplored.¹⁵ Finally, Kathleen Frydl’s voluminous and assiduously researched *The GI Bill* dedicated its final chapter to the interplay between bill beneficiaries, campus culture, and higher educational leadership. More than her predecessors, Frydl folded the experience of the liberal arts college into her narrative, albeit with cursory discussions of the manner in which both Oberlin and Williams confronted the opportunities and challenges of veteran college attendance. In general, however, *The GI Bill* recapitulated the traditional approach of historians by illuminating the postwar obstacles faced not at

¹⁵ Horowitz, *Campus Life: Undergraduate Cultures from the End of the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (New York: Knopf, 1987), 187.

smaller colleges, but at Illinois, Rutgers, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New York University, California and, most thoroughly, Chicago and Harvard.¹⁶

That these scholars wrote significant history is not in question; each broke new ground within the discipline. At the same time, each hewed to a neo-conventional narrative of the GI Bill's effects, one which generally ignored the liberal arts college. If the GI Bill was indeed responsible for widespread institutional, curricular, and cultural shifts, thoroughgoing historiography must account for these shifts in a variety of higher educational contexts. The answers supplied about the interaction of the GI Bill and the university certainly occasioned related questions about veterans and the liberal arts college. Dickinson College, for example, doubled in size between 1941 and 1946. How did it and other colleges committed to a small scale and institutional intimacy deal with veterans spilling onto campus? At Holy Cross, the war effort brought recruits to campus for education as naval officers as part of the nationwide V-12 training program. How was the culture of this and like-minded small schools permanently reshaped by an environment of military discipline, a majority enlisted student body, and the first presence of non-Catholic students? In the wake of World War II, public relations materials issued by Mt. Holyoke, Smith, and Wellesley recommitted the schools to their tradition of single-sex education.¹⁷ How did other private colleges unlikely to experience an enrollment boom from the GI Bill attempt to adapt to their less propitious circumstances? These questions do not assert an argument for supplementing the extant

¹⁶ Frydl, *The GI Bill* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 303-349.

¹⁷ Michael J. Aquilina, *The Edel Years at Dickinson College* (Canonsburg, PA: Wise Eagle Publishing, 1990), 4; James Dempsey, "When the Navy Docked on the Hill," *Holy Cross Magazine* 41, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 20-25; Deborah M. Olsen, "Remaking the Image: Promotional Literature of Mount Holyoke, Smith, and Wellesley Colleges in the mid-to-late 1940s," *History of Education Quarterly* 40, no 4 (Winter 2000): 418-459.

narrative; rather, fuller study of the GI Bill necessitates a discursive shift, one which constructs the liberal arts college as a meaningful site of inquiry.

The point again is not that conventional historiography has done a poor job telling the story of American higher education in the twentieth century; rather, it is to recognize that interactions between liberal arts colleges and the century's significant political, social, and cultural movements provide a compelling rationale for expanding the boundaries of this narrative. Most histories of higher education during the cold war in America have focused either on the expansion of the military-industrial complex to include university research, or the impact of McCarthyism on the academic freedom of university faculty. While worthy areas of inquiry and analysis, leaning too heavily on such themes—and on such institutions—risks missing potentially valuable accounts of other issues and schools during the period. This research presented here attempts to expand the bounds of the historiography of American higher education by offering such an account.

Chapter 1: The National Defense Education Act—Beginnings and Ends

The National Defense Education Act of 1958 is conventionally described as emerging in response to Soviet aeronautical achievements. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched *Sputnik*, the first artificial satellite to successfully orbit the earth, a triumph that was thrust into the American consciousness by frenzied media coverage.¹⁸ *Life* magazine, an exemplar of mid-century mainstream print journalism, devoted the cover of its October 21, 1957 issue to the Soviet launch, under the headline, “The Satellite: Why the Reds Got It First, What Happens Next.” Inside, some twenty pages of photos and analysis were devoted to the Soviet space shot, pages which expressed despair, anger, and disbelief at the nation’s public shaming. The perceived “loss” to the Soviets was exacerbated by press reports regarding America’s competing Project Vanguard satellite, itself not scheduled to launch until the following year. Vanguard was reportedly decidedly inferior to *Sputnik*: it was eight times lighter, and had rocket boosters that were twenty times less powerful than *Sputnik*’s three-stage rocket. Furthermore, on November 3, the Soviets launched another satellite, *Sputnik II*, which was significantly heavier and not only measured the atmosphere’s radiation levels, but also carried a passenger, a dog named Laika, for medical monitoring.¹⁹ In the wake of this development, concern and pessimism about American ability to compete against its cold war enemy deepened. If the United States trailed the USSR in the realm of space, perhaps Communists would soon leave Americans behind on earth, as well—if they had not already.

¹⁸ For an excellent recent treatment of the intersection between governmental policy, educational philosophy, and national culture in the cold war era, see Andrew Hartman, *Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

¹⁹ Barbara Barksdale Clowse, *Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and the National Defense Education Act of 1958* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 7-14.

In his first news conference after the initial *Sputnik* launch, however, Dwight Eisenhower displayed relative indifference toward the Soviet achievement. While acknowledging the satellite as a feat of science and engineering, the President steadfastly refused to attach greater symbolic or military significance to the event. “Now, so far as the satellite itself is concerned,” said Eisenhower, regarding potential security concerns, “that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota.” Eisenhower thus attempted a muted, commonsensical response to *Sputnik*—a later scholar would note that the satellite had both “the size and lethal potential of a beach ball”—but the propaganda defeat the nation had endured simply could not be ignored. In his immediate, low-key reaction, the President failed to assure a disconcerted nation that it was safe from Soviet military might.²⁰ The mood of the nation’s media and citizenry was not reflected in Ike’s cool, detached demeanor; rather, the overriding sentiment seemed to be captured by C.C. Furnas, a leading scientist and the president of the State University of New York at Buffalo, who mused, “Let us not pretend that Sputnik is anything but a defeat for the U.S.” Furnas also suggested a method for assuring there would be no such defeats in the future: “We must give more aid and encouragement to our educational institutions in turning out more engineers and scientists.”²¹

In the wake of the *Sputnik* launch, Furnas was not the only analyst to draw a connection between international competition and national security on the one hand, and American education on the other. For those who had long argued that the national

²⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The President’s News Conference, October 9, 1957,” in *The American Presidency Project*, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10924>; Menand, *The Marketplace of Ideas: Reform and Resistance in the American University* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 66; Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Challenge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 183-205.

²¹ Furnas, “Why Did the U.S. Lose the Race? Critics Speak Up,” *Life*, October 21, 1957, 23.

education system was a shambles—the year *Sputnik* took flight, fewer than half of American high school students could be expected to graduate, and only 16 percent of high school graduates were even enrolled in college—the contrast between Soviet technical prowess and the lack of American scholastic attainment was both stark and frightening.²² This anxiety was felt in Washington; indeed, within two months, four separate House and Senate subcommittee hearings to study, among other matters, the apparent deficiencies in the way in which the United States trained students to become scientists and engineers. Not to be outdone, the governing board of the National Science Foundation sounded a strident tone in its statement on the initial *Sputnik* launch:

This event is dramatic evidence of the rapidly accelerating pace in the advance of science and technology. As such it challenges this nation's determination to strengthen its present scientific position, and to make provision for future scientific progress.... We must recognize that our nation's future rests in major degree based upon the soundness of our system of education and our people's respect for scientific endeavor, based upon an understanding of its importance in the modern world.²³

Similarly, Carnegie Corporation president John W. Gardner—who had long asserted the importance of education to American political and moral aims in the pre-*Sputnik* period—issued remarks of striking urgency in the wake of the Soviet satellite success.

²² George A. Kizer, "Federal Aid to Education: 1945-1963," *History of Education Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 83-84.

²³ Donald R. Wolfensberger, "Reorganizing Congress and the Executive in Response to Focusing Events: Lessons of the Past, Portents for the Future," presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association Meeting, New Orleans, LA, January 8-10, 2004, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reorgcong.pdf>; National Science Board, "Statement Regarding the Russian Satellite," October 1957, Official File, box 625, 146-F-1 Soviet Satellites, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, http://eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/sputnik/10_1957_Statement.pdf.

Surveying the state of cold war competition and education, Gardner concluded that the “plain fact is that never in our history have we stood in such desperate need of men and women of intelligence... The challenge is there—greater than any generation has ever faced.”²⁴ Among experts both governmental and private, then, the link between American survival and federal investment in its education system was clear; moreover, expert opinion had coalesced with a public expectation that the federal government act to correct the educational shortfall that had shamed Americans in the face of Soviet engineering and scientific prowess.

Aware of both expert and public belief, legislative leaders—some of whom had been advocating federal financial aid to education, including higher education, since the previous decade—used the rhetorical power of the security-education connection to drive passage of the NDEA. Alabama Democrats Lister Hill and Carl Elliott, building upon an agenda suggested by the Eisenhower Administration and HEW, put together bills for the Senate and House, respectively, that would authorize federal grant-in-aid at all rungs on the education ladder, from graduate and undergraduate study down to elementary schools. Monies would be allocated to strengthen elementary and secondary science, math, and foreign language instruction, and college and graduate students would receive funds to better develop intellectual capital for national security purposes. To justify such historically ambitious appropriations, supporters of the bill repeatedly and powerfully invoked the specter of the Soviet threat and the concomitant necessity of developing American brainpower for self-defense. In a typical rhetorical gesture, Hill’s bill proposition made explicit the national security imperative it carried:

²⁴ Clowse, 37; Gardner, *Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent, Too?* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1961), 153.

Recent events...have dramatically demonstrated that the education of our youth is a matter of grave concern to all... [including the federal government, which has] the responsibility, under the Constitution, for providing for the national defense. The needs of national defense require that the Federal Government act at this time to stimulate and encourage local and State agencies in efforts to increase the depth and broaden the scope of their educational programs.²⁵

While the *Sputnik* setbacks had opened the door for action on American educational policy, however, such action was far from an accomplished fact. As powerful and pervasive as national security anxiety was, it was by no means certain that it could provide the push necessary to surmount the obstacles which had traditionally blocked federal aid to education. Any federal legislation would fly in the face of the longstanding convention of localism in education; indeed, defenders of local autonomy had effectively blocked efforts to extend federal aid to American education for decades. Against Hill and Elliot, those who sympathized with localism, including President Eisenhower, would continue to contend that any aid from Washington would entail some sort of centralized control and planning, and thus threaten the very liberty that distinguished Americans from the Soviet enemy.²⁶ An offshoot of this concern for local control was centered on racial politics. Segregationists, still smarting after the *Brown v. Board of Education*

²⁵*National Defense Education Act of 1958*, S.3187, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* 104, pt. 1 (January 30, 1958): S 1322.

²⁶ Clowse, 45-60, 91-92. While generally heralded for his pragmatic style of leadership as President, Eisenhower took office as an implacable opponent to federal aid for education. Even when serving as president of Columbia University in the years following World War II, he used his position to decry the specter of national government intrusion into public schooling. In commenting on a federal aid bill before Congress, Eisenhower marshaled the cold war language typical of the day and warned that "unless we are careful, even the great and necessary educational processes in our country will become yet another vehicle by which the believers in paternalism, if not outright socialism, will gain still additional power for the central government." Philip A. Grant, Jr. "Catholic Congressmen, Cardinal Spellman, Eleanor Roosevelt and the 1949-1950 Federal Aid to Education Controversy," *American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia* 90 (December 1979): 3-13.

setback in 1954, viewed federal aid to education as a Trojan horse through which forced racial integration could be smuggled into the South.²⁷ In short, even in the face of an overweening cold war anxiety about the Soviet threat, those holding onto the tradition of local control were determined to stave off any attempts at establishing federal aid, which they saw as a bridge to federal domination.

During the Eighty-fifth Congress, the battle between the proponents of the ambitious education bills and the ideologues of localism ultimately produced a compromise between the warring factions. Conservatives resistant to federal control won a victory with the wording of the Act's Title I, which stated that despite the source of financial aid, no national agency or employee could "exercise any direction, supervision, or control" over any school or system's curriculum, instruction, or administration.²⁸ As a consequence, supporters of localism could celebrate a victory that would stand as a bulwark against progressive educational agendas, the establishment of content standards, or attempts to desegregate Southern schools, particularly colleges and universities. In addition, some of the most forward-thinking elements of the proposed bills were eliminated, including merit-based scholarships for higher education. Such scholarships were rejected as granting too much authority to the federal government; instead, the Act's Title II provided colleges and universities with 90 percent of necessary funds to

²⁷ Clowse, 41-49. Despite the disappointment of *Brown*, of course, segregationists had enjoyed an incredible run of success in protecting their project of white supremacy, even when the federal government had elected to extend its reach on educational matters. In the case of the GI Bill, for example, legislative maneuvering allowed segregationists to guarantee the distribution of grants and benefits through state and local agencies, rather than federal ones. This arrangement assured that the GI Bill's provisions would not offer equal opportunity for higher education to blacks in the South. For an exploration of the manner in which the GI Bill exacerbated educational inequality in the post-World War II South, see Edward Humes, "How the GI Bill Shunted Blacks into Vocational Training," *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education* 53 (Autumn, 2006): 92-104.

²⁸ Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Summary of Major Provisions of the National Defense Education Act of 1958*, 85th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1958).

guarantee low-interest loans to under-resourced students. Finally, the length of most programs was pared down to four years from a proposed six, as opponents of federal influence symbolically asserted that any governmental aid was a temporary measure. With these policy concessions, however, proponents of reform won passage of a major education bill. Never before had the national government provided such considerable financial assistance to a variety of realms within the American education system, nor had it ever extended categorical aid—in this case, money for enhancing national security—to higher education. When President Eisenhower signed the NDEA into law on September 2, 1958, he authorized a mechanism that would provide a billion dollars in loans and grants to American teachers and students.²⁹

On its face, then, the NDEA seems a rather revolutionary statute, one which used the energy of cold war anxiety to create a significantly different educational landscape. A more sober analysis, however, may call this conclusion into question. One might note that while occasioned by the launch of Sputnik, the NDEA was not really a drastic, reflexive policy reaction to Soviet space achievements; rather, the law may actually represent the logical culmination of more than a decade's worth of legislative maneuvering and compromise, policy analysis, and expert discussion.³⁰ After all, following the conclusion of World War II, both individual and institutional stakeholders from both private and academic sectors had pressed for the passage of comprehensive federal educational legislation, often with an eye toward higher education. Some figures,

²⁹ Clowse, 128-147.

³⁰ For a more definitive statement on the origins of the legislation, a revised understanding of its meaning, and a more expansive assertion of its influence, see Wayne Urban, *More Than Science and Sputnik: The National Defense Education Act of 1958* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010). For a deconstruction of the “myth” of Sputnik as the genesis of American educational reform, see Peter Dow, *Schoolhouse Politics: Lessons from the Sputnik Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 10-23.

like Carnegie's Vannevar Bush, demanded increased financial support for science and basic research in the name of international competition, a demand which helped create the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950.³¹ In the same vein, groups such as President Truman's 1947 Commission on Higher Education proposed a national goal of having one-third of American men and women graduate from four-year colleges.³² Similarly, though anxiety over the nation's educational achievement was amplified in the wake of Sputnik's success, it may be said that the satellite did not inaugurate this anxiety; indeed, all significant initiatives that would form the NDEA bill had been proposed separately prior to the Eighty-fifth Congress in 1958. For legislators and educationists alike, concerns about shortfalls in mathematics and science, inconsistent and tepid progressive pedagogy, and the inability of American schoolchildren to preserve the nation's intellectual hegemony all antedated the Sputnik launch.³³ Finally, it might be contended that the bombast surrounding the passage of the NDEA—in terms of perceived threats both from the Soviet Union and from creeping federal control over education—hid the degree to which the law followed the model of its predecessor in support of higher learning, the GI Bill. Even the concern from the Soviet menace would not allow proponents of federal aid to higher education to overturn the long-standing tradition of local control. Rather than attempting to create a permanent flow of funds to American

³¹ J. Merton England, "Dr. Bush Writes a Report: Science—The Endless Frontier," *Science* 191, no. 4222 (January 9, 1976): 41-47. In its pre-Sputnik iteration, the NSF endured budgetary struggles, and would not emerge as the primary government funder of basic science until the 1960s. For more on the NSF's early challenges, see David M. Hart, *The Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921-1953* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Dael Wolfe, "National Science Foundation: The First Six Years," *Science* 126, no. 3269 (August 23, 1957): 335-43; and Alan T. Waterman, "National Science Foundation: A Ten-Year Resume," *Science* 131, no. 3410 (May 6, 1960): 1341-54.

³² Richard M. Freeland, *Academia's Golden Age: Universities in Massachusetts, 1945-1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 70-77.

³³ Clowse, 33-34, 49; Herbert M. Kliebard, "Success and Failure in Educational Reform," in *Forging the American Curriculum: Essays in Curriculum and Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 106.

colleges in the name of social welfare, NDEA advocates assumed the approach of the GI Bill by arguing for aid as a national security imperative. In this way, the NDEA—like its predecessor—permitted the deferral of complaints about federal aid without actually dethroning them.³⁴ For a variety of government and collegiate constituencies, then, it could be argued that the passage of the NDEA in 1958 was not merely a sudden emergency measure, but rather the fulfillment of a protracted legislative campaign which built upon longstanding concerns and previous legislative techniques.

While both the legislative procedures and the policy roots of the NDEA may suggest that the law was, at bottom, the product of congressional “business as usual,” it would nonetheless be a mistake to downplay the fundamental importance of the law; to be sure, it carried fiscal, political, and symbolic importance that mark it as a significant episode in the nation’s educational, security, and cultural discourses. Historians seeking to understand the implications of the Act in totality must look beyond the parliamentary horse-trading and legal ancestry that marked its origins and come to terms with the material results the NDEA produced, the policy options it framed, and—most crucially—the political discussion it enlivened and sustained.

Often lost in the discussion of the process through which the NDEA came into being is consideration of what the law produced in terms of tangible consequences. In the realm of undergraduate higher education, the NDEA’s Title II created the National Defense Student Loan (NDSL) Program, which represented the first federal effort at a type of merit-based financial aid, with “merit” being defined within the discourse of perceived cold war security needs. The NDSL supplied low-interest loans to under-

³⁴ Michael S. Sherry, *The Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 228.

resourced students to open the doors of higher education, if the student wanted to enter the field of teaching—an area of supposed “manpower shortage”—or had demonstrated talent in the disciplines of science, mathematics, engineering, or modern world languages, all of which were deemed areas of American deficiency in its ongoing completion with the Soviet Union.³⁵ Those students eligible for Title II support could receive up to \$1,000 per year, and remained eligible for the program so long as they maintained good academic standing in their selected program. At a time when the average annual college tuition cost around \$1,500 for public schools and \$2,000 for private ones—that is, 30 to 40 percent of the average household’s median income—the assistance offered by the NDSL was considerable.³⁶ In fact, within two years of its creation, 40 percent of those utilizing NDSL funds came from families earning fewer than \$4,000 per year, and five of every seven borrowers were from families earning \$6,000 per year or less.³⁷ For some capable students in need, then, the passage of the NDEA was relevant not chiefly as a national security measure, but as a bridge to a world of academic exploration that otherwise would have remained inaccessible. On an institutional level, the Act proved popular as well. Schools were generally eager to

³⁵ The mechanism for distributing the funds was complicated. After Congress has determined the total amount of funding that Title II would receive in a fiscal year, each state was disbursed a percentage of this total, based upon a formula that compared the state's full-time higher education enrollment to overall enrollment on a national scale. Distributions to schools were based on institutional requests in each state, in proportion to the total number of applications in the state and nationwide, with the stipulation that institutions had to contribute 10 percent of the loan funds they used. States could receive no more than \$250,000 in a year, and students would repay their loans to the government within ten years, at an interest rate of 3 percent. The schools were given autonomy in determining which students would receive the aid, and seemed to use this autonomy to exercise some discretion about the purpose of the program; indeed, in the first year of the program, report data showed that one of every four Title II loan recipient was not studying science, mathematics, or foreign language, or in preparation to be a teacher. Urban, 2, 178-180.

³⁶ Pamela Ebert Flattau et al., *The National Defense Education Act of 1958: Selected Outcomes* (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses Science and Technology Institute, 2006), II-2; U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Reports: Consumer Income, 1957,” December 1958, <http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-030.pdf>.

³⁷ Flattau et al., II-6.

partner with the government's program: by 1963, over 1,500 institutions, approximately two-thirds of them private, were participating in the program, with NDSL Title II loans serving approximately 5 percent of these institutions' students. Beyond accepting federal funds, schools also began to explore the viability of establishing their own loan programs on the model of the NDSL system. The tangible successes of the NDEA in assisting individual students, encouraging institutional participation, and inspiring other loan programs can be seen in contrasting student borrowing immediately before and after the passage of the Act. During the 1955-56 academic year, 83,000 students were loaned an aggregate of \$13.5 million from all institutional sources, including private banks and the colleges themselves. Immediately following the enactment of the Title II provisions, over 115,000 students borrowed roughly \$55 million through the NDSL program alone. By 1962, NDSL loans were offered at about 700 schools which had previously refrained from any type of long-term student loans, while another 700 schools—who had previously made long-term loans available—were now more likely to offer an even broader array of financing options.³⁸ Though born of national security concerns, the NDEA's Title II was also, however insufficiently and unintentionally, an instrument of educational egalitarianism, as it supported previously neglected students in their college aspirations, and encouraged the colleges themselves to do likewise.

Where perceived policy influence is concerned, the GI Bill has traditionally been the *cause célèbre* of historians of twentieth century education, who have rightly observed the utility to which veterans put federal funds and the effects that the Bill had on both college enrollment and the academy's conception of itself. Compensating veterans for their service, however, was a necessarily limited policy venture, one that framed its purpose in

³⁸ Ibid., II-5-II-10.

specific economic terms—returning soldiers could ostensibly use a college education chiefly to find a profitable place in the American economy—and thus supported individual students with tuition and fee vouchers, rather than extend direct funds to postsecondary institutions.³⁹ The popularity of the GI Bill itself was not enough to catalyze additional legislative commitment. In terms of financial support for civilian students, specific disciplines, and higher education as an institution, the federal government maintained its traditional reticence in the decade after World War II; moreover, the financial support it did grant was episodic and parochial. As Robert Rosenzweig noted, even organizations such as the nascent NSF tended to allocate its funds to professors and graduate students at a narrow band of schools:

Prior to Sputnik, the federal government had no educational policy worthy of the name. Post-war support of scientific research was focused on universities and included funding for research facilities and graduate fellowships in the sciences. The government had little interest in higher education outside of the research universities and Land Grant colleges, and its interest in research universities was limited to the handful that were major research performers.⁴⁰

The NDEA did not create wholesale reform of the national government's pecuniary relationship to colleges and universities, but it did catalyze unparalleled government investment in American higher education and thus inaugurated the search for a federal policy "worthy of the name." Even in the wake of the improved higher educational access occasioned by the GI Bill, college attendance for non-veterans at mid-century was

³⁹ See Olson, *The GI Bill, The Veterans, and The Colleges*; Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens*; and Frydl, *The GI Bill*.

⁴⁰ Rosenzweig, "Remarks on Federal Support for University Research" (lecture, University of California, Berkeley, CA, October 1, 1998) <http://cshe.berkeley.edu/events/ndeaconference1998/rosenzweig.htm>.

largely governed by financial circumstance, as loan programs were often private, local affairs, and decidedly limited both in terms of funding and availability. The NDSL program, however, helped broaden acceptance of student loans as a method of financing postsecondary schooling to improve higher education access for those in need. This acceptance, in turn, increased the popularity of financial aid “packages” among individual schools, and offered a model for subsequent federal student loan and aid programs. More broadly, the NDEA’s attempt at financing specific academic initiatives and security needs—as opposed to the GI Bill’s rewarding the commitment of veterans—not only encouraged the development of new scientific research, but also provided a rhetorical device through which higher education advocates could attempt to normalize the federal government-higher education association. Though it neither dispelled the long-standing opposition to federal aid nor created permanent assistance to higher education, the NDEA did create political space and legal precedent for expanded federal policy actions, such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Higher Education Act, both passed in 1965. In creating a firmer relationship between federal dollars and the American university, then, the NDEA played a crucial role in the development of federal educational policy, perhaps the most significant role since the one played by the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890.⁴¹

Finally, the NDEA revealed the continued potency of a highly charged manner of political discussion and exchange, particularly within conversations about higher education. Debate over the law did not, of course, create cold war rhetoric; indeed, the language of Manichean moralizing that characterized so much of the era’s political

⁴¹ John A. Douglas, “A Certain Future: Sputnik, American Higher Education, and the Survival of a Nation,” in *Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite*, ed. Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith (London: Harwood, 2000), 335-342.

conversation borrowed heavily from the “democratic good v. fascist evil” that had animated the American World War II effort, and was updated to accommodate both a changed enemy and changed conditions. While wariness of the Soviet Union can be traced to the first “Red Scare” in the wake of the Russian Revolution, true cold war discourse began in earnest in 1947, as the Truman Doctrine, George Kennan’s “X Article,” and the Marshall Plan announced the foreign policy imperative of “containment,” and thus effectively placed the United States in a state of perpetual (if rhetorical) war against the Communist enemy. While technically at peace with the Soviet Union, the perceived existential threat it presented helped reinforce a manner of political talk—and, in turn, of thought—that sought to delegitimize anything that suggested a restriction on freedom or “American” values, that denied the possibility of compromise or diplomacy, that showed particular disdain for apostasy or dissension, and which couched ideological and practical disputes into an idiom of warfare.⁴² Subsequent events, both foreign and domestic, did little to inhibit this disposition of talk and practice. If anything, the Communist threat seemed to burgeon into the 1950’s, with the “loss” of China to Maoism and the Korean conflict abroad, and the trial of alleged spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg along with general suspicion of Soviet agents and sympathizers infiltrating crucial governmental, academic, and cultural institutions at home. The American response, which included NSC-68 (the National Security Council document which called for a peacetime military buildup in the name of containing global communism) and the expansion of the “Un-American” activity witch-hunting,

⁴² Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Exceptionalism and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 122-126.

accelerated both the availability and the energy of cold war rhetoric within foreign and domestic policy debates.⁴³

It is entirely conceivable that the Soviet threat described during this “Second Red Scare” by George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Joseph McCarthy and others was indeed insidious, and menaced American interests both distant and familiar.⁴⁴ In terms of political practice, however, the actual veracity of the Communist danger was in many ways beside the point, for the force of the prevailing discourse made the absence of a Soviet threat unimaginable to the majority of policymakers and citizens alike. Put another way, cold war rhetoric had become its own political reality, and American status simply could not be assessed absent a comparison with and a resistance to the Soviet Union. As a consequence, the anti-Soviet trope pervaded the policy talk and practice of laws and issues that seemed, on their face, fundamentally marginal to the competition between the globe’s superpowers.⁴⁵

This tendency could be seen in the passage of the NDEA, the debate over which gave both advocates and opponents ample opportunity to flex their respective rhetorical muscles. Absent the perceived national security imperative created by *Sputnik*, certainly, the bill put together by Hill, Elliott, and others would not have been signed into law; indeed, the persistent marshaling of the language of crisis by reformers testifies to the power such verbiage brought to the legislative effort. The House committee report on the

⁴³ For a general overview on twentieth century American concerns with disloyalty and subversion, and their concomitant demands for conformity and obedience, see Ted Morgan, *Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: Random House, 2003).

⁴⁴ For revised exploration of the presence of Soviet spies in the United States during the early cold war, see John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

⁴⁵ Robert L. Scott, “Cold War and Rhetoric: Conceptually and Critically,” in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, Ideology*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 7-11.

NDEA, in a typical example, urged passage of the bill in almost apocalyptic terms: “America is confronted with a serious and continuing challenge in many fields,” it cautioned, and noted that the challenge “stems from the forces of totalitarianism.” In response, the report continued, “American education, therefore, bears a grave responsibility in our times,” and thus concluded “that America’s progress in many fields of endeavor in the years ahead—in fact, the very survival of our free country—may depend in large part upon the education we provide for our young people now.”⁴⁶ It was, in part, on the wings of such weighty pronouncements that the NDEA ultimately ascended to the status of law.

The passage of the NDEA was a singular achievement for the Eighty-fifth Congress in a number of ways. While it did not initiate the relationship between the federal government and higher education, the law dramatically altered this relationship in terms both tangible and recognizable. Where once Washington provided aid in remuneration for service, or extended occasional grants to a select few research institutions, the NDEA now deepened the government’s material commitment to higher education through the extension of millions of dollars in merit-based, low-interest loans to “worthy” students. In the same vein, the law was a welcome sign to institutions of higher learning, many of which were contending with the challenges of an expanding appetite for their services. It was hoped that the NDEA would not only permit stronger students to find their way to campus, but also allow the schools themselves to both restructure their own aid policies and to transform what had been a scattershot association with the Congress into something more consistent and durable. In addition, the passage of the law provided a

⁴⁶ House Committee on Education and Labor, *National Defense Education Act of 1958*, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, H. Rep. 2157 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1958), 2.

symbolic step in further legitimating in the public mind the role that Washington could potentially play in assisting and shaping education in the United States, including its colleges and universities. For all its successes, however, the NDEA was very much a compromised product, both in terms of its content and the manner in which the bill became law. To give urgency to their legislation, of course, the authors and supporters of the NDEA had skillfully positioned the bill as part of the zero-sum game of the cold war: failure to deliver the bill would mean an unacceptable victory for the Communist enemy. In deploying such rhetoric, however, the supporters of education reform had made their political argument chiefly one about military defense, not education itself. By setting these terms of debate, advocates of the NDEA were able to guide their bill through a contentious legislative process; at the same time, however, these terms made the law subject to concerns traditionally associated with national security. Passage of the bill may have ultimately required loud proclamation of its instrumental necessity to defending the American way of life, but this proclamation, like so much anti-Communist rhetoric, would create unintended and, perhaps, undesirable consequences.⁴⁷ In this instance, lawmakers (whose use of the lexicon of anti-Communism was, if anything, more aggressive than that of the NDEA champions) moved to incorporate security provision into the final draft of the bill. The provision, Title X, introduced a loyalty oath and disclaimer affidavit for students receiving Title II funds. It was this provision which would inextricably bind the law to the political rhetoric and discourse of the cold war, and set the stage for conflict between the federal government and certain institutions of higher education.

⁴⁷ Norman Graebner, "Myth and Reality: America's Rhetorical Cold War," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 24.

This context for this conflict will be established in Chapter 2, which explores the state of American political and cultural discourse in the early cold war period, and the effects of that discourse on both the NDEA and the practice of higher education in the United States in the middle of the twentieth century. Chapter 3 examines the degree to which popular and academic interpretations of “higher education” were fixated on the experiences of prestigious national and flagship research universities, and which thus left unexplored significant activity on other campuses, including those of residential liberal arts colleges. Chapter 4 details how two such colleges, Swarthmore and Haverford, developed their institutional histories, values, and identities, from their nineteenth-century roots through the end of World War II. Chapter 5 reviews how these cultural qualities inspired the two schools lead resistance to the NDEA’s disclaimer affidavit, a cold war loyalty measure which violated the senses of mission and community at both colleges. Chapter 6 describes how both schools operationalized this resistance on both a local and national scale, through conversation and collaboration within their campus communities, and by way of outreach campaigns to awaken latent support for the resistance movement in both educational and political institutions. The efforts of Swarthmore and Haverford eventually catalyzed congressional action, which is illustrated in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 tells both of the disclaimer affidavit’s nullification, and of the respective methods Swarthmore and Haverford employed to ratify participation in the redefined NDEA program. Finally, Chapter 9 offers reflections upon what lessons the NDEA controversy might provide as we consider the place and purpose of the residential liberal arts college in contemporary higher education.

Chapter 2: Cold War Consensus—Loyalty, Conformity, and Acceptance

On August 13, 1958, the Senate debated the proposed NDEA in a lengthy session that would last more than fourteen hours. In the course of previous discussion, lawmakers had determined that the bill, which ultimately represented an attempt to bolster the American defense effort, would be subject to security provisions appropriate to such an endeavor; as a consequence, those students who would receive fellowships under what would become the Act's Title IV were required both to sign an oath affirming their loyalty to the United States and file a disclaimer affidavit that they did not support organizations that would favor or instruct the overthrow of the United States by anti-constitutional methods. During the August 13 marathon, Senator Karl Mundt, a Republican from South Dakota, proposed an amendment that would extend the loyalty and disclaimer requirements not only to graduate students—who had previously been subject to such oaths when taking direct aid from federal agencies—but also to undergraduates who would receive low-interest loans under Title II. Such a security commitment, Mundt suggested, was “in line with good American practice,” and would serve as a guarantor that qualifying students “shall be good Americans and not involved in Communist or other subversive organizations.”⁴⁸ Under Mundt's proposal, the NDEA was furnished with its Title X, Section 1001 (f):

No part of any funds appropriated or otherwise made available for expenditure under authority of this Act shall be used to make payments or loans to any individual unless such individual (1) has executed and filed with the

⁴⁸ *National Defense Education Act of 1958*, S. 4237, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* 104, pt. 13 (August 15, 1958): S 17320. For more on Mundt's legislative career and conservative commitment, see Scott N. Heidepriem, *A Fair Chance for a Free People: Biography of Karl E. Mundt, United States Senator* (Madison, SD: Leader Printing, 1988).

Commissioner an affidavit that he does not believe in, and is not a member of and does not support any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods, and (2) has taken and subscribed to an oath or affirmation in the following form: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America and will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all its enemies, foreign and domestic."⁴⁹

Mundt's amendment was passed without objection. The entire bill was accepted shortly before midnight by a roll call vote of sixty-two to twenty-six, and handed over to the House for final approval. While other elements of the Senate-approved bill were debated, no congressperson challenged the new security provisions.⁵⁰ This lack of dissent was unsurprising, both for political and cultural reasons. Those championing the bill saw its passage in the summer of 1958 as crucial, as the anxiety surrounding *Sputnik* had given them a long-sought opportunity, one which might not return in the near future. As a consequence, any lawmakers who might have had objections to the loyalty provisions viewed them as a necessary part of doing legislative business.⁵¹ Perhaps more significantly, there was nothing particularly abnormal about Mundt's interest in galvanizing the loyalty provision within the NDEA; indeed, while anxiety about *Sputnik* may have opened the door for more substantial federal aid to education, government and popular demands for loyalty demonstration antedated the satellite's launch by over a decade.

⁴⁹ *National Defense Education Act*, Public Law 85-864, *United States Statutes at Large* 71(1958): 1602.

⁵⁰ Clowse, 131.

⁵¹ Urban, 184.

Fear of “subversives” in American politics, education, and culture emerged immediately after the conclusion of World War II, as part of the shift from a “hot war” against the Axis powers to a cold one against the Soviet bloc. This fear was fueled by several interrelated factors, including deterioration in American-Soviet post-war relations, perceptions of increasingly “hard-line” Communist posturing, massive economic inflation and subsequent labor strikes in 1946, and attempts by some domestic conservative elements within the FBI, Catholic Church, and Republican Party to challenge the anti-Communist bona fides of President Harry Truman.⁵² In 1947, Truman responded in part by issuing Executive Order 9835, which established the nation’s first general loyalty program. Designed both to mute the criticism of national security conservatives and to root Communists out of government, the program screened all federal employees for indications of pro-Communist leanings or activities. The Truman order did not only help legitimate the idea of political tests as a condition of employment; in addition, it established at the federal level a loyalty-security model that could be emulated both by lower levels of government and also by private businesses. Soon after Order 9835, a variety of institutions, from Hollywood studios and local school systems to newspapers and universities, had established mechanisms to preclude Communists and their sympathizers from “destabilizing” their organizations. By the time the NDEA had been signed into law, in fact, one in five American employees was subject to some sort of loyalty-security review.⁵³

⁵² Robert Justin Goldstein, “Prelude to McCarthyism: Making of a Black List,” *Prologue* 38 (Fall 2006): 3-23.

⁵³ Ellen Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism* (Boston: Bedford Books, 1994), 37-40; Ralph S. Brown, *Loyalty and Security: Employment Tests in the United States* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958), 181.

Within academe, use of the loyalty oath and disclaimer affidavit control apparatus appeared as early as 1949, at the University of California's flagship institution at Berkeley. Here, it was not the government but the Board of Regents who demanded that all University employees not only affirm loyalty to the state constitution, but also deny membership or belief in organizations advocating overthrow of the United States government. The matter prompted a firestorm of debate about academic tenure, self-governance, employment criteria, and the necessity of national security, all of which turned the University system into a battlefield of cold war concerns. The issue was ultimately resolved through a compromise between the Board and faculty, but not before over thirty faculty members and a number of other University employees had been dismissed for refusing to participate in the loyalty program. In the summer of 1950, thirty-one "non-signer" professors—including internationally distinguished scholars, not one of whom had been charged of professional unfitness or personal disloyalty—and many other University employees were dismissed. In 1952, the California Supreme Court struck down the loyalty oath and ordered the reinstatement of the fired professors, but controversy persisted. Those who had resisted the oath on campus were far from vindicated by the court ruling, as many non-signers, university administrators, Regents, and California residents saw both the judicial decision and its beneficiaries as deleterious to the national security cause.⁵⁴

At about the same time, the federal government demonstrated its own willingness to demand the loyalty of those within higher education. Urged on by Vannevar Bush and other supporters of post-World War II science research, Harry Truman created the

⁵⁴ David P. Gardner, *The California Loyalty Oath Controversy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.)

National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950, for the principal purpose of promoting science research, especially that which would aid in national defense. Any applicants for federal grant money, however, had to take an oath of loyalty to the United States, and file a disclaimer affidavit similar to the one that had roiled the University of California system. Unlike the Berkeley program, however, the NSF oaths did not result in a widespread show of dissent. The government justified these security measures by noting that the NSF would award fellowships that regularly involved specialized research in the defense industry, and throughout most of the 1950s the measures went unchallenged by either researchers or lawmakers.⁵⁵

It is notable that in neither the Berkeley case nor the creation of the NSF was there general public outcry against the use of oaths. By the time the NDEA was passed into law, loyalty oaths and security tests had become *de rigueur* throughout the nation, and particularly in educational institutions. At the end of the 1950s, in fact, nearly two-thirds of state governments demanded that its teachers proclaim their loyalty through some sort of oath or test.⁵⁶ Over the course of a decade, the use of such security measures had become normalized.

It was not just prior use of loyalty oaths and disclaimer affidavits, however, that legitimated Mundt's amendment to the NDEA. For ten years before the law's passage, other congressional activity had worked alongside loyalty tests to embed anti-Communist rhetoric and an all-encompassing concern with national security within mainstream political and cultural discourse. Part of this activity included legislation. The 1940 Smith

⁵⁵ J. Merton England, "Cold War Thaw on the Home Front?: The End of the National Science Foundation's Loyalty Affidavit," *Society for the History in the Federal Government Occasional Papers* 2 (1999): 11-12

⁵⁶ "Do You Swear?", *The New Republic*, April 13, 1959, 4.

Act had criminalized advocating the violent subversion of the United States government, but as cold war concerns deepened, more laws were enacted both to root out Communists and to quell public anxiety. In 1950, Congress passed the Internal Security (McCarran) Act. This act established the Subversive Activities Control Board to investigate persons suspected of engaging in subversive activities, and also required all organizations and groups tangentially related to Communism to register with the attorney general. Four years later, with most Americans still persuaded that subversives were undermining their country, Congress established the Communist Control Act, which outlawed the Communist Party in the United States, and thus criminalized all membership in or support for the Party.

These acts of Congress gave momentum to—or perhaps simply tried to keep pace with—a consensus anti-Communism that Truman’s loyalty program had not quelled, but rather reaffirmed and galvanized. The 1947 decision of the federal government to involve itself in such tactics did not create the post-war Red Scare, of course, but it nonetheless lent plausibility to a phenomenon that would soon take on a life of its own. With a cue from the executive branch, a legion of government actors began to pursue more and more aggressive measures in the name of security, loyalty, and patriotism. Steadily and inexorably, anti-Communism was entrenched as the nation’s consensus and quasi-official ideology.⁵⁷ It was not simply oaths and legislation but increasingly inquisitorial investigations and hearings that characterized this period, and these methods would target education—particularly higher education—in a manner that put the academy on the defensive for the better part of a decade.

⁵⁷ Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism*, 20-21.

The attack upon higher education was propelled to prominence through a widespread attempt to investigate “un-American activities.” The national model for such efforts was established by the Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) of the U.S. House. Created in the 1930s to investigate subversive individuals and organizations, HUAC had led the way in exploring Communist infiltration in the days immediately after World War II; indeed, HUAC truly came of age in the post-war era through a series of dramatic, high-profile investigations and hearings into potential Communist activities among, especially, liberal intellectuals and elites. The committee’s *coup de grace* was the trial of Alger Hiss, a patrician New Dealer who had served in the upper echelons of Truman’s State Department until 1946. While not convicted of espionage, Hiss was convicted of perjuring himself in front of HUAC, and was sentenced to five years in prison in early 1950. When set against a series of contemporary foreign policy anxieties—including the end of the American monopoly on atomic weaponry, the “loss” of China to Maoism, and Communist incursions on the Korean peninsula—the Hiss trial served multiple functions. It represented a symbolic victory against the Red menace that threatened American interests everywhere, granted popular legitimacy to the methods of the government investigators, and helped galvanize the liberal intellectual as an archetypal subversive within the constructs of anti-Communist rhetoric and practice.⁵⁸

As the national un-American effort was realizing its coup in the prosecution of Hiss, the state of Washington attempted to achieve its own success by targeting an equal “suspicious” constituency—professors at the University of Washington. In 1948, Republican Albert Canwell’s Un-American Activities Committee began investigations of

⁵⁸ Gerald L. Gutek, *American Education, 1945-2000: A History and Commentary* (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2000), 95-99.

alleged subversive conspiracies at the state's flagship university; in this effort, he had the support of university president Raymond Allen, who announced his agreement with the burgeoning anti-Communist consensus:

The classroom has been called "the chapel of democracy." As the priests of the temple of education, members of the teaching profession have a sacred duty to remove from their ranks the false and robot prophets of Communism or of any other doctrine of slavery that seeks to be in, but never of, our traditions of freedom.⁵⁹

Canwell's investigation led the University of Washington to bring charges of subversion against six tenured professors, three of whom were ultimately dismissed by the university's Board of Regents.⁶⁰ Overall, the action taken against the Washington professors was an important step in further legitimating not only the investigations of anti-subversive groups, but also their targets: left-leaning, intellectual "elites," who were in ready supply on the nation's college campuses. The Washington case was the first significant clash between higher education's construct of academic freedom and the discourse of consensus anti-Communism, a clash in which the latter was the clear victor. Like HUAC's Hiss triumph, this victory is best understood not simply in terms of individual dismissals, but of propaganda. The Washington inquiry made heroes of Canwell and Allen among the broadening constituency of cold war hawks, and stimulated a national concern regarding—and, increasingly, a national dismissal of—the fitness of

⁵⁹ Raymond J. Allen, "Communists Should Not Teach in American Colleges," *Educational Forum* 13, no. 2 (May 1949): 440.

⁶⁰ Jane Sanders, *Cold War on the Campus: Academic Freedom at the University of Washington, 1946-64* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979).

Communists to serve as college teachers in particular, and as American educators in general.⁶¹

The rhetorical position of Canwell and Allen was not supported only by politicians and college administrators; indeed, it was also echoed by practicing academics. One of the clearest reverberations was offered during the crucial 1949 year, when noted Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. published *The Vital Center*, an apologia for liberal democracy that incorporated a robust anti-Communist argument and further legitimated the hawkish point of view among center-left intellectuals. Though Schlesinger took pains to advocate for a moderate and pragmatic democratic liberalism, and was himself no witch-hunter, his idioms bore the stamp of the era's obsession with internal security. For example, while notionally defending the right of academics to dissent, for example, Schlesinger also mused that "[n]o university administration in its sense would knowingly hire a Communist, any more than they would knowingly hire an anti-Semite or a Nazi."⁶² Other precincts of the American academy were even less congenial to the prospect of dissension from within. The same year that Schlesinger offered his remarks, the University of Pennsylvania's Conyers Read cautioned his fellow professionals at the annual gathering of the American Historical Association that they were called upon "to fight an enemy whose value system is deliberately simplified in order to achieve quick decisions," and concluded that the "liberal neutral attitude" would "no longer suffice.... Total war, whether it be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to assume

⁶¹ Ellen Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism & the Universities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) 104-105. For a contemporaneous exploration of the pernicious effects of political tests and mainstream distrust of professors and academics, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wayne Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958).

⁶² Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Right to Loathsome Ideas," *The Saturday Review*, May 14, 1949, 47.

his part. The historian is no freer from this obligation than the physicist."⁶³ By analogizing those with Communist sympathies to anti-Semitic fascists or by simply dismissing them as an aspect of a morally obtuse “enemy,” the cases of both Schlesinger and Read exemplify the readiness with which many academicians, however well-meaning, were drafted into the binary worldview that informed cold war culture.⁶⁴

Both the momentum and the targets of the various un-American activities investigations that prevailed in the late 1940s and early 1950s were, of course, captured, utilized, and ultimately extended by Senator Joseph McCarthy, the junior Republican senator from Wisconsin. Shortly after the Hiss verdict, McCarthy made his notorious statement in Wheeling, West Virginia that he possessed the names of 205 Communists employed by the State Department. With this flourish, McCarthy announced himself as the nation’s preeminent investigator of suspected subversives, a place he would hold until his censure by the Senate in 1954.⁶⁵ Though his name has in many ways become synonymous with anti-Communism, it is important to distinguish McCarthy’s eponymous movement from the efforts that immediately preceded it. The hunt for subversives in the post-war era was certainly normalized by the loyalty programs of Truman and the endeavors of various un-American activities committees, but McCarthy freighted this hunt with additional gravity by relentlessly couching national security concerns in terms of a traditional, almost Manichean moral worldview—subversives were not simply threats to be located, but evils to be eradicated.⁶⁶ During McCarthy’s ascendancy, the

⁶³ Read, “The Social Responsibilities of the Historian,” *The American Historical Review* 55, no. 2 (January 1950): 283.

⁶⁴ Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 58.

⁶⁵ Richard Rovere, *Senator Joseph McCarthy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), 143.

⁶⁶ K.A. Cuordileone, *Manhood and American Political Culture in the Cold War* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 40.

search for Communist influence in domestic spheres became more ardent through this language of “political demonology,” whereby the subversive threat was consistently embellished and dehumanized. Under such conditions, the range of legitimate political opinion, already narrowed by mainstream anti-Communism, became even more constricted, and footing for discursive resistance became harder to find. By reframing national security rhetoric in this fashion, McCarthy not only inflated both the significance and the immanence of the Red Menace, but also enabled a political context in which both the practices of genuine democratic debate and the institutions which supported them seemed progressively more like extravagances the American cold war effort could not afford.⁶⁷

Under such conditions, concerns about potentially subversive actors within the academy were magnified. Though McCarthy gained his notoriety chiefly in seeking Communists within the national government and armed forces, the mood of inquisition he championed was co-opted by those probing the nation’s colleges and universities. In the early 1950s, congressional investigators and local politicians alike drew from the script authored by Canwell and Allen locally and enlarged upon by McCarthy nationally to take aim at campus infiltrators that threatened the American way of life with the godless immorality of Communism. This furor generally took the form of congressional inquiries by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) in 1951, and the redoubtable HUAC in 1953. Unsatisfied with the now commonplace hiring screens and loyalty oaths, these agencies held public hearings to identify which instructors had slipped past institutional safeguards and displayed pernicious sympathies that would mark them as deviants unfit for campus teaching. As part of this activity, both SISS and

⁶⁷ Whitfield, 15-33.

HUAC subpoenaed hundreds of college teachers both to face questioning and to identify Communist colleagues; this process would continue throughout the decade, five years after McCarthy's ignominious fall, and even into the 1960s at some Southern colleges and universities.⁶⁸

Perhaps the greatest testimony to the irresistibility of the anti-Communist discourse comes from the reaction of academe to the McCarthy-era investigations. While their assailants rushed to portray colleges and universities as redoubts of leftism and subversion, their practices suggested that they were anything but; indeed, when faced with political investigation, the great majority of higher educational institutions demonstrated a greater interest in protecting their own reputation and financial viability according to terms set by cold war rhetoric than in defending individual faculty members and their right—both democratic and professional—to dissent. Time and again, the academic system legitimized the methods of congressional investigators through its ready collaboration. Outside of a fringe group of nonconformists, few faculty members actively challenged the eagerness of colleges to subject their employees to interrogation by the increasingly strident SISS and HUAC, to demand cooperation in unearthing subversive influences in their ranks, and to terminate the employment of scholars who were either associated with Communism or unwilling to provide information about Communist activity on campus.⁶⁹ The degree to which the higher education establishment acquiesced to the norms of anti-Communist discourse, including its insidious McCarthy-era manifestation, was best revealed by a collective statement offered by thirty-seven university presidents in 1953. After Rutgers University fired two

⁶⁸ Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 3-11; Stacy Braukman. *Communists and Perverts under the Palms: The Johns Committee in Florida, 1956-1965* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012).

⁶⁹ Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 23, 218.

tenured professors for invoking the Fifth Amendment in front of SISS—though the subcommittee itself had cleared the two men—the presidents explained that traditional academic freedom also carried the “obligation of candor.” Put another way, any professors called by congressional investigators had a professional duty to answer candidly, to “name names;” doing otherwise would stand as *prima facie* evidence that the teacher being questioned was suspect and unfit to teach.⁷⁰ In short, neither college faculty nor their administrators in the 1950s demonstrated a resolute interest in challenging the assumptions of consensus anti-Communism, or even those of its more pernicious cousin, McCarthyism. Faculty, who may have feared for their job security, supported the idea that Communists were a danger to the academy and the nation alike, or both, made little more than feeble efforts at resistance when their autonomy was imperiled by investigations; moreover, those who did challenge the increasingly authoritarian mores of their institutions encountered professional hostility and financial threat. Administrators, for their part, often chose patriotism and financial reward over intellectual independence. In a time of heightened political tension and with an interest in research patronage from the federal government, the academic administrative community often surrendered the integrity of academic freedom and democratic process.⁷¹ And if administrators gave their assistance, either grudgingly or readily, to a climate of investigation and suspicion, their trustees and governors did little to disabuse them of the idea. In seeking donations from alumni, boards found it advantageous to acclaim campus stability, convention, and patriotic unity. Similarly, most major schools had direct links to corporations which provided grants to the institutions. These

⁷⁰ Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism*, 83.

⁷¹ Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 311-312, 340.

institutions were, in turn, encouraged to share the traditionalism of the business community, a goal easily articulated and met, as collegiate board members often held executive positions at the same companies giving money to the schools. With these multiple pressures and incentives felt on every level of institutional participation, campus after campus capitulated to a popular mindset of distrust in an effort to accommodate both political consensus and corporate interests, and to win the monetary backing of both.⁷²

If the adults of colleges and universities did not distinguish themselves as opponents of anti-Communist and McCarthyite aggression, neither did the students in their charge; indeed, the inquisition of the American academy in the 1950s dovetailed with (and perhaps relied upon) a campus mood which when not politically apathetic tended toward a detached conservatism. While post-war American historical narratives often explore the idea of college students as activist and engaged, such activity and engagement lay dormant during the first decade of the cold war. On small private campuses and at large state universities alike, most full-time college students of the period showed little interest in challenging the political status quo, either locally or at a governmental level. Rather than exploring rule changes at school or attempting to influence legislation in Washington, the great majority of student government groups spent most of their policy energies concentrating on social event planning and organizing sports activities. When there were intramurals to run and dances to organize, policy issues related to civil

⁷² Kenneth J. Heineman, *Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities in the Vietnam Era* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 19-20; Lionel Lewis, *Cold War on the Campus* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988) 79-95.

liberties, student rights, or free speech tended to fall by the wayside.⁷³ Even issues of anti-Communism (or concerns about the tactics of the anti-Communists themselves) proved incapable of engaging student populations. Although there were campus rallies in support of the Hungarian uprising against the Soviets in 1956, they were sporadic and short-lived. Similarly, expressions of concern about the loyalty oaths and security tests increasingly required in national life in general, and academic life in particular, were muted; moreover, those who did raise such worries were almost always faculty or administrators, not the students themselves. Though student energy would become indispensable to the civil rights, feminist, anti-war, and counter-cultural movements of the next decade, by the end of the 1950s such enthusiasm was still latent. It was an era of relative prosperity and deference to the cold war consensus, both in the society at large and on the campuses that society produced; accordingly, rather than see urgency in issues of civic responsibility, political freedom, and social justice, the great majority of American college students in the late 1950s seemed content with more leisurely pastimes. In a typical piece about undergraduate concerns at the time, *Life* ran a feature on the fad of discovering how many of their number could be stuffed into a standard telephone booth.⁷⁴ With campus life governed largely by such social priorities, it is no surprise that the decade was home to the lowest level of American student activism in the twentieth century.⁷⁵

⁷³ Harry H. Lunn, *The Student's Role in College Policy-Making* (Washington, DC.: American Council on Education, 1957), 17-19.

⁷⁴ James P. O'Brien, "The Development of the New Left," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 395 (May, 1971): 16; "New Facets, New Fun as Fad Spreads," *Life*, April 6, 1959, 38-39.

⁷⁵ Philip G. Altbach, *Student Politics in America: A Historical Analysis* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 144.

Because of the bombast and archness of some cold war hawks, the broadened consensus regarding the necessity of increased national security measures, and the creation of so many government policies and activities to serve these purposes, at first blush the decades following World War II in the United States seem an era irretrievably hostile to individual conscience, expression, and difference. It would be a mistake, of course, to imagine that any era in the nation's history was neatly monolithic, devoid of countering voices, and run-through with blindly obeisant automatons in every corner of society; to be sure, the idea that anti-Communist discourse captured every American voice is overly facile and erroneous. Such a description leaves little room for nuance, and ought to be resisted.⁷⁶ During the Truman and Eisenhower years, the United States was not a totalitarian nightmare ripped from the pages of George Orwell. While the anti-Communist discourse and its particularly McCarthyist iteration provided dominant ways of political thought, talk, and practice, it did not render alternative conceptions impossible. To be sure, the prevailing cold war rhetoric was increasingly organized and institutionalized, and thus routinized, during the first two decades after World War II; still, discursive dominance is seldom absolute, and counter-narratives tend to persist.⁷⁷ Such was the case during the 1950s, where pockets of non-conformity endured in variety of realms in American life. This was an era where Beat poetry, rock 'n roll music, and Abstract Expressionism offered new patterns of cultural witness; Edward R. Murrow and Arthur Miller spoke (both directly and metaphorically) against political demonology; *Playboy* magazine and the birth control pill interrogated traditional social mores; and

⁷⁶ Alan Brinkley, "The Illusion of Unity in Cold War Culture," in *Rethinking Cold War Culture*, ed. Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 61-73.

⁷⁷ Teun Van Dijk, "Discourse, Power, and Access," in *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard (London: Routledge, 1996), 84-85.

both the civil rights and labor movements organized and challenged a prevailing mindset which privileged traditional understandings of racial and corporate power.⁷⁸

And yet initial intuitions—the ideas that this period was peculiarly antagonistic to those who would break from orthodoxy, especially where issues of anti-Communism were concerned—cannot be readily abandoned. With its overweening concern with security (and the concomitant loyalty tests this concern demanded), the easy acquiescence of the academic mainstream to narrow cold war political norms, and the inefficacy and disinterest of campus actors in resisting the consensus point of view, the 1950s represented a nadir in the tradition of American political dissent. Cold war conservatives were generally more adroit than their liberal counterparts in using anti-Communist verbiage and tactics, and thus may be charged with responsibility for the increasingly virulent tone of McCarthyism, but the concern with loyalty and security during the period was not the sole province of conservatives. Truman’s loyalty program, though prompted by concerns over political attacks on his right, represented a crucial step in the normalization of anti-Communism, a step that was in time with the “consensus” view of cold war liberals like Arthur Schlesinger. Intellectuals, traditionally the alienated critics of culture and politics, increasingly came to view American cold war imperatives as worthy projects, and thus lent their imprimatur (however tacitly) to the demands for conformity and acquiescence required by conventional political institutions and entrenched security interests.⁷⁹ With support from both conservatives and liberals, from

⁷⁸ For comprehensive social histories of the 1950s, see David Halbertstam, *The Fifties* (New York: Ballantine, 1993); Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Lary May, ed., *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989); and Eric F. Goldman, *The Crucial Decade—and After: America, 1945-1960* (New York: Vintage, 1961).

⁷⁹ Christopher Lasch, *The Agony of the American Left* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 111-112.

politicians and academics, and from populists and elites, the mainstream anti-Communist discourse created a rhetorical tenor that gave its endorsement to coercive methods and severe policies rooted in fear of subversion. Such a context gave succor to the champions of political conformity and authoritarianism, and alienated and imperiled those who would seek to enact legitimate democratic dissent. Even with the repudiation of McCarthy in 1954, the allure of anti-Communism as a mindset persisted, and its concomitant assumptions about the desirability of loyalty, uniformity, and the necessary commitment of American institutions to national security endured. The Army-McCarthy hearings which ultimately disgraced the senator only demonstrated that the virulence of later McCarthyism had transgressed the baseline of acceptable civility in American politics; they did not demonstrate popular determination to reappraise anti-Communism in more realistic terms. While McCarthy ultimately passed from the scene, the residue of both his tactics and the aggressive anti-Communist agenda he galvanized continued to operate throughout the decade.

Under such conditions, then, the relative lack of opposition in 1958 to the NDEA Title X loyalty provisions was unsurprising. The lack of demurrals by Mundt's colleague in the Senate was mirrored by the acquiescence of American colleges and universities. Long denied steady government assistance, higher education in the main sought funds, not controversy, through NDEA and its Title II: after the bill's passage, over 1,300 schools applied for NDSL funds without registering formal opposition to the loyalty oath and disclaimer affidavit. There were, however, a tiny handful of schools—almost all liberal arts institutions—who immediately recorded their discomfiture with tying educational

funds and institutional missions to cold war political tests.⁸⁰ Most of the institutions who publically opposed the loyalty measures elected to apply for funds provisionally, while also formally lobbying for an appeal of the Title X provisions. Three schools in Pennsylvania, however, declined to participate in the NDEA at all. While the vast, vast majority of America colleges and universities either ignored the implications for free inquiry embedded in Title X or simply saw them as a legitimate tool of the cold war security apparatus, Swarthmore, Haverford, and Bryn Mawr Colleges resisted the strong financial and political incentives to join in the program. In refusing participation, these Pennsylvania colleges enacted a vision of the very meaning of college education—one which yoked together academic freedom, institutional purpose, and democratic practice—that the foregoing decade had nearly eradicated.⁸¹

⁸⁰ “Colleges Oppose U.S. Non-Red Oath: 6 Schools Denounce Pledge as Condition for Student Loan Under ’58 Act,” *New York Times*, January 22, 1959, 12

⁸¹ Though Bryn Mawr, Swarthmore, and Haverford were all vital actors in the initial dissent to the NDEA loyalty provisions, this analysis will focus on the latter two schools. The reason for this choice is prompted not by historical interpretation—Swarthmore and Haverford were not more obviously assertive in their resistance—or by ideological commitment; rather, it is grounded in practical reality. At present, Bryn Mawr simply does not have the archival resources to sustain an extended analysis. This is regrettable, for the college certainly has a worthy story to tell where the NDEA is concerned.

Chapter 3: Defending the Liberal Arts College

While it had become accustomed to aligning itself with the quasi-official ideology of anti-Communism in the 1950s, by decade's end some elements of the American academy had rediscovered, however haltingly, an interest in dissent. In the main, higher education's accommodation of some McCarthy era goals and tactics, its uncertain defenses of concepts like institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and its desire for federal financial support had radically curtailed its capacity for assuming the position of institutional gadfly in debate over national goals and priorities; still, while cold war consensus may have muted the critical power of colleges and universities as a whole, segments of academia demonstrated an increased willingness to challenge, at least rhetorically, the nation's anti-subversive and loyalty norms. If colleges and universities did not shout their opposition to political tests and intrusive security measures as the 50s drew to a close, neither were they completely silent.

This increased, if tentative, willingness to push back against the assumptions of the national security state was revealed shortly after the passage of the NDEA. Despite the general enthusiasm for the government's willingness to deliver unprecedented resources to university campuses, Section 1001 (f) of Title X was not met with universal approbation in higher educational circles. After the Act's passage in late 1958, the loyalty oath and disclaimer were debated throughout the following year at dozens of schools from Oregon to Massachusetts. The debate was entered with some urgency, as most institutions understood that the NDEA was potentially the model and foundation for any subsequent governmental aid to education, and thus saw the Section 1001 (f) loyalty provisions as having dire implications for academic freedom on campus. Under the

conditions of Titles II and X, institutions would provide one-tenth of the money for student tuition and would administer the disclaimer affidavit. Beyond providing criminal penalties for a false statement on questions of belief or opinion, the disclaimer affidavit both threatened to turn schools into arms of the government responsible for enforcing normative cold war beliefs while also tacitly endorsing the idea that student and faculty members of the academic community merited suspicion. Mindful of this, the faculty and administration at numerous institutions shook themselves from the slumber that had marked so much of academic politics during the decade and began to question the presuppositions of NDEA Title X and, perhaps, the entire cold war consensus.

Eventually, in 1962, the Mundt loyalty provisions would be stricken from the NDEA by a voice vote in the Senate. By then, thirty-one colleges and universities had either withdrawn or never entered into participation in the Title II loan programs; in addition, some 147 schools, through their leadership and boards, had stated their formal disapproval of the disclaimer affidavit requirements.⁸² It is thus tempting to view the rejection of both the disclaimer affidavit and the anti-Communist ideology as mass cultural movements in which all participants were equally active. One might also extrapolate that this movement was inevitable, which supposes that the end of the 1950s was the time when higher education as a whole was simply “due” to discover its voice. This voice, in turn, would find increasing expression in the tumult over civil rights, warfare, and lifestyle in the coming decade.

To adopt this viewpoint, however, both frames higher education as a monolith while also ignoring the difficulty involved in leading a community’s resistance to popular

⁸² “Disclaimer Affidavit: Non-Participating and Disapproving Colleges and Universities,” *AAUP Bulletin*, no. 4 (Winter 1962): 331.

policy, especially after a decade where that community's most prominent voices were silent. While dozens of schools eventually deemed Section 1001 (f) an actionable threat to academic integrity, and though a handful of schools reversed their initial course of participation almost immediately, these developments should not obfuscate the reality that, for however brief a period of time, two small, private, Quaker liberal arts colleges on Philadelphia's tony Main Line were at the vanguard of resistance to the prevailing cold war discourse and its associated loyalty-security policies.

Such a point may seem nugatory; after all, does it really matter if two boutique schools arrived at a position of opposition a few weeks or months before other institutions with greater prestige and higher profiles? Contemporary media accounts suggest that it did not. In covering opposition to the anti-subversion provision of the NDEA, *The New York Times* began its narrative in January 22, 1959 with the story of the formal protest by the three Philadelphia schools along with three liberal arts institutions (Bates, Bowdoin, and Colby) in Maine; the piece also noted that Swarthmore and Haverford had taken the additionally step of refusing to participate in the federal program at all.⁸³ In related articles soon afterward, however, the paper gave little focus to the leadership position established by the Philadelphia schools, and instead emphasized the rhetorical role played by the presidents at more recognizable institutions. On January 25, though their schools themselves had not yet withdrawn from the Title II program, the verbal protests of the presidents at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton were described at length; the activity of the Pennsylvania schools went unmentioned.⁸⁴ Five days later, in describing the nascent campaign by legislators to eliminate the Mundt provisions, the

⁸³ *New York Times*, "Colleges Oppose U.S. Non-Red Oath," January 22, 1959.

⁸⁴ *New York Times*, "University Heads Hit Loyalty Oath," January 25, 1959.

Times again downplayed the initial protest step and instead gave the Ivy schools the lead, at least in appearance, by stating that “[a] number of educators have criticized the oath requirement, among them the presidents of Yale, Harvard, and Princeton Universities and Bryn Mawr, Haverford, Swarthmore, Bates, Bowdoin, and Colby Colleges.”⁸⁵ Harvard and Yale Universities formally withdrew from Title II on November 17, 1959, a full ten months after the Philadelphia schools; still, a month later the *Times* entrusted A. Whitney Griswold, Yale’s president, to explain to the larger public why loyalty affidavits were anathema to academic freedom.⁸⁶ Around the same time, *The Nation* magazine explored the growing murmur against the Mundt amendment on college campuses—and an increasing unrest with an “oathism” that targeted higher education. The piece did acknowledge that several “smaller liberal arts colleges” had taken the lead in the protest though only Swarthmore was mentioned, alongside Amherst and Oberlin, who had withdrawn after the Philadelphia school. Nonetheless, the author also suggested that it was the refusal of Harvard and Yale to accept the funds they had been allocated that gave the protest real significance.⁸⁷

The treatment of Swarthmore and Haverford by outlets of print journalism during 1959 was almost certainly the result of the nation’s market-based approach to news; to be sure, though these two small schools were not unknown by print media which were largely eastern-based (and, perhaps, eastern-centric), they simply could not sell periodicals as effectively as “national” universities such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. In addition, it is difficult to quibble with awarding a rhetorical platform to the erudite

⁸⁵ *New York Times*, “Repeal is Sought of Loyalty Oath,” January 30, 1959.

⁸⁶ A. Whitney Griswold, “Loyalty: An Issue of Academic Freedom,” *New York Times*, December 20, 1959.

⁸⁷ Kevin Sullivan, “‘Oathism’ on the Campus,” *The Nation*, December 5, 1959, 416-419.

Whitney Griswold. (The Main Line liberal arts presidents did include a Rhodes Scholar and one of the nation's foremost academic experts on East Asia.) Though these approaches can be legitimated on economic or credential grounds, they may also reveal something about the manner in which popular writers in the middle of the twentieth century viewed liberal arts colleges. In relegating Swarthmore and Haverford to the margins of the NDEA resistance narrative, major media organizations like *The New York Times* and *The Nation* effectively mirrored a sensibility that contemporary analysts of higher education had developed, a sensibility which suggested that the “significant” institutional actors in American academe were almost always large public research and prestigious private universities.

By the time of the cold war, the United States had entered into a so-called “Golden Age” of higher education, an age which began roughly with the passage of the GI Bill and which would extend until 1970. This period was marked by profound expansion in terms of student populations—the number of undergraduates and graduate students grew by 500 and 900 percent, respectively—the acceleration of public and private investment in research, and increased enthusiasm for the practical achievements such investment could realize, particularly in the realms of science and technology that could be used to wage the cold war.⁸⁸ Though the collision between McCarthyism and academic freedom brought attention, as did the continuing cultural importance of college football, the most remarkable element of the cold war academy for writers in the national media was the expansion of the military-industrial complex to include university research. The NDEA was part of a revolution in financial support of higher education in the post-World War II era, with support coming from public and private sources alike. In particular, federal

⁸⁸ Menand, 64.

funding for university-based research jumped from one hundred sixty-nine million dollars in 1955 to around two billion dollars in 1968, and these federal dollars fueled the growth of institutional prestige and faculty prominence at the nation's signal research universities. In such a context, both private schools with outsized faculty resources and traditions of research scholarship (Harvard, the University of Chicago, MIT, Johns Hopkins, etc) and large public universities with booming student populations and taxpayer-supported facilities were poised to claim the preponderance of federal largesse, private donations, and popular attention. Outside of a good anti-Communist witch-hunt or a Rose Bowl-winning football team, it was participation in research useful to both the defense industry and the American consumer that conferred upon institutions of higher education popular and positive relevance.⁸⁹

Not all commentators were smitten with the American academy, of course, no matter what Promethean promise it seemed to hold. The hardness of the anti-Communist/McCarthyist discourse should not be underestimated, and throughout the cold war there remained strains of anti-intellectualism and anti-elitism that sought to frame the professoriate as alien, weak, impractical, aloof, and effete.⁹⁰ This tendency

⁸⁹ Geiger, *Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II*; Freeland, *Academia's Golden Age*; and Graham and Diamond, *The Rise of American Research Universities: Elites and Challengers in the Postwar Era*. In addition to these comprehensive works on the place of the research university in the twentieth century, the story of the relationship between applied science, the government, and higher education has been told by a number of historians and political scientists. Exemplars in the field have included: Stuart W. Leslie, *The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at M.I.T. and Stanford* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston, *The Fragile Contract: University Science and the Federal Government* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); Rebecca S. Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); R.C. Lewontin, "The Cold War and the Transformation of the Academy," in *The Cold War & the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Post War Years*, ed. Andre Schiffrin (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 1-35.

⁹⁰ For a classic view of this tendency, see Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (New York, Knopf, 1963); for more recent explorations, see Hartman, *Education and the Cold War*, and Aaron S. Lecklider, *Inventing the Egghead: The Battle over Brainpower in American Culture* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

notwithstanding, the cold war concern for international competition and a growing faith in science and technology gave a prominence and seeming importance to campus activity than in previous generations, and media observers and analysts thought the story of academia in the middle of the twentieth century one worth telling. In so doing, however, these scribes typically offered a tale of intersection between federal policy, student activity, and the campuses of public or “national” private universities. Within this narrative arc, its authors left little room for the small liberal arts school as an important character.

Such journalistic framing was not unreasonable; indeed, in terms of enrollments, resources, and visibility, public and “national” private universities in the post-war context seemed to tell the story of the American academy. Beginning with 1944’s GI Bill and through subsequent, unprecedented direct funding that facilitated student access and sponsored research in the middle part of the twentieth century, the federal government had committed to broadening both educational opportunities and knowledge applicable to the burgeoning military-industrial complex. While some of this commitment was made manifest in the spectacular growth of community college enrollment during the period, most obvious changes were registered on the campuses of large universities, both private and public, which experienced heretofore unseen enrollment surges, campus expansion, and research funding. Journalists readily told the tale of the returning GI whose presence was shaping the educational, political, and social discourse on campuses across the country. Most of these hagiographic narratives of service rewarded and revolutionary social mobility were situated on the grounds of research universities, comprehensive state

schools, or prestigious university colleges.⁹¹ Harry Truman's Commission on Higher Education reaffirmed the sensibility that university campuses told the story of the post-World War II enrollment most fully and satisfactorily. The so-called "Zook Commission" declared in 1946 that postsecondary institutions should refrain from the purported intellectual elitism that marked the traditional liberal arts college to undermine its "original aristocratic intent" and create a modern university system that would provide more general, practical education crucial to "the service of democracy."⁹²

It was not only in the areas of curriculum and enrollments, however, that the federal government encouraged the national media to view the liberal arts college as marginal. In making the American university its partner in the business of scientific research—the rise of so-called "Big Science"—the government helped assure that the large college campus would enjoy greater social and media prominence than ever before.⁹³ While media outlets noted the apparently democratizing effects of the GI Bill and the ascendance of "Big Science" (and its attendant funding) on the nation's large public research and prestigious private universities, they also described the small liberal arts school as an institution that increasingly recognized the necessity of altering its mission, lest it risk irrelevance; indeed, many journalists and social commentators went from paying the residential liberal arts college comparatively little mind to reporting on

⁹¹ Clark, "The Two Joes Meet—Joe College, Joe Veteran": 177; Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, *The GI Bill: A New Deal for Veterans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 92-98.

⁹² George Zook, *Establishing Goals*, vol. 1 of *Higher Education for American Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 103. Zook's opposition of "aristocratic" and "democratic" approaches to higher education reiterates a common and dichotomous understanding of American educational purposes, viz. that schooling can serve the ends of either liberal learning and patrician culture, or democratic equality and social fairness. See David Tyack and Larry Cuban, *Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

⁹³ Menand, 65-68.

anxious internal conversations within the institution.⁹⁴ A 1963 admonition in the pages of *Time* typified the conventional reporting wisdom:

The Displaced Pedagogue of U.S. education is the liberal arts college. Good high schools have improved so much in the last half dozen years that they turn out graduates who already know what they once would have learned as college freshmen. At the same time, many more college students go on to graduate schools—80% of all B.A.s at many a prestige campus—and they want specialized preparation for advanced work. The task of the liberal arts college, traditionally that of giving the common core of humane and scientific training that befits an educated man, is being undermined at both ends of the college time span....

Colleges all over the country are now redefining themselves in ingenious ways to meet the new circumstances. Their problem in essence is to defend humanities and arts from the space-age trend toward scientific specialization.⁹⁵

Whether getting caught up in “Golden Age” university triumphalism, taking their cue from obvious demographic and financial shifts, or simply assuming that large campuses were more likely to yield stories of interest to news consumers, the contemporary chroniclers of the post-war era generally did not make the small college a principal actor in their narratives of dynamism and progress in higher education.

To be sure, the purported marginality of the liberal arts college was not a phenomenon that had emerged solely from the pens and typewriters of journalists and opinion-makers

⁹⁴ Lauren B. Pope, “Liberal Colleges Seen Revising Aim; Carnegie Study Finds Them Changing Into Vocational Training Institutions,” *New York Times*, August 28, 1958; Pope, “Liberal Arts Colleges Seen Broadening To Include Professional Training,” *New York Times*, August 31, 1958; Fred M. Hechinger, “End of an Era?; Liberal Arts College Endangered By New Patterns of Education Confirmed Fact,” *New York Times*, December 15, 1963.

⁹⁵ “Saving Liberal Arts,” *Time*, February 15, 1963, 94.

during the cold war; indeed, academics themselves had interrogated the utility, relevance, and viability of the small college for decades, as the rapidly modernizing, industrializing, and professionalizing United States sprinted into the twentieth century. Small, often sectarian liberal arts colleges had stood as the paradigmatic higher educational institutions for almost 250 years, and by 1900 two-thirds of all students attending college were enrolled in such schools. With the founding of the Johns Hopkins University in 1876, however, the American version of the research university had been introduced, an introduction that would have significant consequences for the academic landscape. A rival postsecondary option was made available, and this option—with its emphases on a more professional faculty, the creation of new knowledge, and the specialization of graduate study—appeared to many observers vibrant and exciting, and the liberal arts college moribund and amateurish by comparison.⁹⁶ In an assessment typical of the period, the president of Stanford University, David Starr Jordan, in 1903 boldly predicted that “[a]s time goes on the college will disappear, in fact, if not in name. The best will become universities, the others will return to their place as academies.”⁹⁷ While Jordan’s prognosis was decidedly overstated, he nonetheless offered an archetype of the sort of assessment that would become conventional wisdom among analysts and chroniclers of higher education in the twentieth century, a conventional wisdom which invariably shoehorned the liberal arts college into some form of declension narrative.⁹⁸ In the hands of various authors the nature and extent of the decline may have differed, but

⁹⁶ Samuel Schuman, *Old Main: Small Colleges in Twenty-First Century America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 32-35.

⁹⁷ Leon B. Richardson, *A Study of the Liberal College* (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 1924), 15.

⁹⁸ Francis Oakley, “The Liberal Arts College: Identity, Variety, Destiny,” in *Liberal Arts Colleges in American Higher Education: Challenges and Opportunities* (New York: American Council of Learned Societies, 2005), 2.

few—whether mid-century or today—deviated from the idea that liberal arts colleges had become decadent, hypocritical, and/or unviable in the brave new world of the twentieth century. As a consequence, the liberal arts college was not wholly ignored in either scholarly accounts, but neither has it been seen as an institution with anything truly meaningful to contribute to educational and social discourse. For the lion’s share of the past century, the small liberal arts college has been read by a legion of professional academics as a social cipher at best, a misplaced dinosaur at worst.

This outlook began to gain especial momentum during the so-called “Golden Age” of academia during the quarter-century after World War II, particularly as leading scholars of higher education sought to define the twentieth century as the “Age of the University.” It was during this period that intellectual titans like Richard Hofstadter, Frederick Rudolph, and Laurence Veysey produced seminal works which would establish an enduring narrative regarding the comparative value of the liberal arts college.⁹⁹ In these canonical texts, one can see the genesis of the conventional historical wisdom which proclaims the “Age of the University.” This period was drawn in contrast to the purportedly retrograde nineteenth-century intellectual landscape and its small colleges, which were seen as parochial and anti-academic. Certainly, these writers did not blindly venerate all universities, nor did they cast a blanket condemnation on all small colleges. (The older schools of the Northeast, for example, tended to meet with their approval.) What they did help inaugurate, however, was a “darkness-to-light framework” that suggested the mores and practices of the nineteenth-century residential college were, at best, mere “foils to dramatize” the dynamism of the modern university and could thus be

⁹⁹ See Hofstadter and Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*; Rudolph, *The American College and University*; and Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University*.

“dismissed as subjects for serious inquiry.”¹⁰⁰ In this telling, the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries were the higher educational Dark Ages, and the institutions that dominated the period—the liberal arts colleges—mere anachronisms that had become hopelessly out of place in a dynamic era of educational modernity. Such an approach employed the small private college not so much as a subject of scrutiny as an outmoded association disdained for its archaism—a buggy whip in an automotive culture, a geocentric model in a Copernican universe. American higher education’s mid-century historiography thus tended to resemble “a morality play written in two acts,” with the backward and out-of-step liberal arts college finally being dragged off the stage with the turn of the twentieth century.¹⁰¹

The supposition of small liberal arts college obsolescence by scholars and observers was at least partially grounded in a sense that its traditional subject matter, and the mission that the subject matter purported to support, was hopelessly out of date. By stubbornly insisting upon teaching the broad, foundational curriculum that had been defined by the “Yale Report of 1828” [my italics], liberal arts colleges hamstrung themselves by committing to studies incongruent with an era that required scientific research, technological development, and international competition. For academics, this argument was best demonstrated in Laurence Veysey’s *The Emergence of the American University*. Writing in the first half of the 1960s, Veysey built upon the “darkness-to-light” metaphor Richard Hofstadter had inaugurated the decade before by tracing the ascent of the American university (and the concomitant decline of the small college) to

¹⁰⁰ Marilyn Tobias in “Conversation: Renegotiating the Historical Narrative: The Case of American Higher Education,” *History of Education Quarterly* 44 (Winter 2004): 583.

¹⁰¹ George E. Peterson, *The New England College in the Age of the University* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1964), 3.

curricular changes in the half-century after the Civil War. For Veysey, as colleges and universities began to break their ties to religious bodies and denominations in the late nineteenth century, embrace the secular principles of science, and adopt practices of research and academic freedom, they took an important step forward in redefining the purpose of higher education. Ultimately, this purpose was expressed in tripartite terms under the ideals of “utility,” “research,” and “liberal culture,” which sought to emphasize practical professionalism, the creation of new knowledge, and virtuous humanism, respectively. A fourth aim, that of “piety and discipline” and heretofore associated with collegiate institutional missions, was a relic of a previous age and inexorably perished during this period.¹⁰² Of the three ideas, liberal culture—the traditional bailiwick of small college curricula and teaching—was clearly the *bête noire* in the progressive idiom of modern higher education, for

it could not survive at the center of the academic map. It could flourish only on those campuses which possessed the traditions (or lack of resources) that enabled them to resist the clamor for the useful and the scientific. Concretely, this meant Yale, Princeton, and a scattering of the more prominent and vigorous small colleges... In a major university the advocate of liberal culture found himself protected to a certain extent by the prestige of the institution... [b]ut the small colleges lacked the buffer of security which could allow this kind of independence.¹⁰³

While Veysey did not overtly disdain the educational project of the small college, he was adamant that its influence on higher education had been decidedly co-opted by the

¹⁰² Julie Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

¹⁰³ Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University*, 233, 238.

new national universities. Save for some of the “more prominent and vigorous small colleges,” the teaching of liberal culture now belonged to universities, where—importantly—it stood third in line behind training for societal leadership and exploration of scientific research in terms of institutional priorities. In this milieu, the vast majority of small colleges were being made redundant and irrelevant, and “the only course of action which [college boosters] could urge was to hold on, perhaps making minor concessions, and hope that their institutions would survive.”¹⁰⁴ Historical revisionists in the decades following would eventually demonstrate that Veysey’s analysis had been a bit unfair to the small college, an institution which proved hardier, more dynamic, and socially responsive than he had assumed.¹⁰⁵ Still, these voices of reinterpretation were challenged by thoughtful academic efforts which amplified and elaborated upon Veysey’s principal arguments in subsequent decades; indeed, later historians noted the manner in which research universities gobbled up government dollars to lead the educational vanguard against Soviet competition during the cold war, and also reaffirmed the notion that such schools demonstrated their utility by creating new scientific applications throughout the twentieth century. By comparison, it seemed that the twentieth century had left the liberal arts college behind. From the point of even latter-day historians, the liberal arts college had become the “luxury good” of the higher educational marketplace, an elitist terrain on which materialistic families would elect to run their status competitions.¹⁰⁶ As *The Emergence of the American University* ensconced itself as

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 9.

¹⁰⁵ Axtell, “The Death of the Liberal Arts College;” Burke, *American Collegiate Populations*; Leslie, *Gentlemen & Scholars*; Allan O. Pfnister, “The Role of the Liberal Arts Colleges,” *The Journal of Higher Education* 55 (March/April 1984).

¹⁰⁶ Among the most trenchant and insightful of these historical critiques are David O. Levine, *The American College and the Culture of Aspiration, 1915-1940* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986),

conventional academic wisdom, then, by and large scholarly writers acceded to Veysey's assertion that higher education had been the purview of the modern university, not the outdated college, since the turn of the twentieth century. From the orthodox academic viewpoint of university triumphalism, the best small liberal arts colleges could seemingly do in the middle of the twentieth century was hope that the historical forces driving students to the large, well-funded university campuses would spare them from extinction.¹⁰⁷

Having been built for half a century and cresting during the cold war, the conventional wisdom that liberal arts colleges were being locked into societal and educational irrelevance found favor with the preponderance of analysts and writers, both academic and popular alike. In an era increasingly concerned with the modern, the measurable, and the competitive, it was the large public or prestigious national university that was poised to stand at center stage. This tendency to describe and think about higher education during the cold war in shorthand terms, with those schools that enjoyed the lion's share of federal funding, GI enrollment, and media attention serving as stand-ins for the American academy as a whole, pushed the small liberal arts college to the margins of scholarly and popular discussion. Such an assumption, however, tends to make resource allocation the *sine qua non* of higher education, and thus ignores the degree to which multiple missions both existed and succeeded on American campuses during the cold war era.

and Harold Wechsler, *The Qualified Student: A History of Selective College Admission in America, 1870-1970* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1977).

¹⁰⁷ Alvin Kernan, "Introduction: Change in the Humanities and Higher Education," in *What's Happened to the Humanities?*, ed. Alvin Kernan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 4.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, the conventional wisdom of scholars and journalists had either tacitly or overtly described the liberal arts school as an intellectual wasteland out of step with the demands for curricular utility and knowledge creation in the “Age of the University;” similarly, most chroniclers and historians of the post-war era suggested that because few small colleges had sought and fewer still had acquired federal research dollars, such schools were locked into insignificance during the age of “Big Science.” By the cold war, it appeared that the story of American higher education was marked by themes of expanded access, government funding, and research orientation, and that these themes were best investigated on the campuses and in the laboratories of large, comprehensive research universities, be they public or private. But just as the “Age of the University” in the early 1900s did not ultimately obviate either the need or the demand for liberal arts colleges, neither did the research funding revolution force small colleges to abandon their institutional missions and simply establish themselves as boutique halfway-houses for the intellectually pedestrian and the socially privileged. Though the function of the small liberal arts college may have differed from that of its bigger, wider-ranging brethren, that function was not made extraneous by the arrival of “Big Science” and the cold war; rather, the traditional goals and mores of the liberal arts colleges remained useful to the nation’s enduring (if challenged) understandings of democracy, freedom, and citizenship.

This usefulness was maintained through an institutional dynamism that the prevailing historical and media narrative too often ignored. Even in the early days of the “Age of the University,” the liberal arts college was resisting its identity as sectarian, paternalistic, and intellectually stultifying. While some small schools did hold fast to old mores,

methods, and missions, other liberal arts colleges of the early twentieth were not calcified relics of a bygone era, but protean, resourceful institutions that reoriented themselves according to the needs of a modernizing society. Rather than cling to old denominational ties and a rigid curriculum, small liberal arts schools like Swarthmore and Haverford broadened their appeal by embracing an ecumenical brand of their founding religious understandings, incorporating electives while retaining a focus on liberal undergraduate education, and forging social connections with wealthy benefactors who supported education of the “whole man” and the concept of a collegiate social life. The historical consensus that framed all *fin de siècle* small colleges as playgrounds of an intellectually vapid “collegiate way,” as narrowly sectarian factories of retrograde moralism, or as academically limited sites of unprofessional teaching and profane vocationalism thus drew upon too narrow a reading of the institution; indeed, this reading missed the degree to which early twentieth century liberal arts colleges resisted the university model and its governing emphasis on research, and instead settled upon a hybrid mission that promoted both utility and liberal learning. To be sure, the liberal arts college between the Civil and First World Wars was not an ideologically pure child of the antebellum model—to survive, it had accommodated some curricular moves toward professionalism, traded denominational identity for upper-middle class respectability, and emphasized its role as an arbiter of social distinction.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, however, these colleges fiercely protected a core sensibility regarding the identity of the residential liberal arts college. Whatever accommodations it made to retain its relevance, the institution continued to insist that integrated educational experiences, intimate communities of scholars and learners, and the social value of residential arrangements were essential to the principles

¹⁰⁸ See Leslie, *Gentlemen & Scholars*.

of liberal education: creative and critical thought, reflective wisdom, and the transmission of situated social and cultural norms.¹⁰⁹ In failing to recognize this balance between institutional development and obeisance to traditional mission, those who framed the liberal arts college as either capitulating wholly to university norms or dying a dishonorable death at the turn of the twentieth century ignored the capacity of these schools to chart their own courses in specific social and cultural milieus. From the beginnings of the “Age of the University,” liberal arts colleges could and did define themselves as more intellectually robust, more innovative, and more assertive institutions than the “darkness to light” scholars had imagined.

This capacity for intellectual growth, tinkering, and institutional advancement could also be seen during the mid-century years, when the GI Bill and the rise of “Big Science” seemed to guarantee the synonymy of “higher education” and “large university campuses.” Contemporary media accounts, the Zook Commission, and subsequent historical analysis suggested that liberal arts colleges could offer little to returning servicemen, who had little patience either for learning’s intrinsic values or the rites and rituals (athletics, Greek social organizations, dormitory life) that informed the campus social scene. Just as post-war “higher education” could not be described solely by the experiences of private universities like Harvard and Chicago, or flagship public institutions like Michigan and Berkeley, neither was the veteran fully explained by a narrative stressing a pragmatic and utilitarian outlook which could only be satisfied by the instrumental ethos of the modern university. Though GI Joes found homes at large state universities, they also repaired to selective residential liberal arts colleges, as

¹⁰⁹ Schuman, 5.

veterans sought entry to the strongest institutions their academic records would permit.¹¹⁰ These colleges, in turn, welcomed the new influx of adult students by tweaking their course offerings (in a replay of the turn-of-the-century gesture toward professionalism) and restructuring their facilities to accommodate their new, more mature enrollees. This dialectic not only familiarized servicemen with the values and norms of the residential liberal arts college; it also made the residential liberal arts college a participant in a societal process of greater democratic inclusion and upward social mobility, participation which further troubled the conventional reading of these schools as anachronistic purveyors of a retrograde elitism and moralism. The adjustments realized by liberal arts colleges enabled their emergence as attractive options for veterans of World War II and the Korean War, and reaffirmed for administrators and trustees the importance of harmonizing their traditional intellectual and social missions with changing demographics.¹¹¹

If the liberal arts college's relationship with the GI Bill was misunderstood (or at least underexplored), so too was the school's encounter with "Big Science." Just as small residential colleges brought in their share of veterans, these schools also benefited from the burgeoning research relationship between national government and higher education. While federal funding was undeniably salutary in educational, social, and financial terms at schools such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford, resource allocation did not tell the entire story of cold war learning. The conventional discourse that privileged the place of "Big Science" on university campuses neglected the crucial

¹¹⁰ Keith Olson, "The G.I. Bill and Higher Education: Success and Surprise," *American Quarterly* 25, no. 5 (December 1973).

¹¹¹ John R. Thelin, "Small by Design: Resilience in an Era of Mass Higher Education," *Meeting the Challenge: America's Independent Colleges and Universities since 1956*, ed. Laura Wilcox (Washington, DC: Council of Independent Colleges, 2006), 7-8.

elements of liberal arts colleges—smaller classes, emphasis on teaching, opportunities for undergraduate research—that larger institutions could not replicate.¹¹² Adherence to this mission of liberal undergraduate education allowed smaller schools to produce the type of students who later took advantage of the explosion in financing once they enrolled in graduate school.¹¹³ Though “Big Science” did not shape smaller colleges in the profound ways in which it marked the nation’s most prominent research universities, it nonetheless did encourage the type of robust intellectual preparation that the small-scale liberal arts college identity was positioned to encourage.

Participation in the GI Bill and “Big Science” was not the principal means through which the liberal arts college established its relevance within higher education during the cold war; rather, this participation illuminated the specific approach to postsecondary learning that these small residential schools deemed crucial to their institutional identity. Through the first half of the twentieth century, the liberal arts model had established and retained an important character as an arena of civic-mindedness, creative teaching, and normative conversation in an educational context that too often privileged specialization, scientism, and instrumentalism. It may be suggested that the liberal arts college actually lacks coherence or has betrayed its mission because of its willingness to countenance a creeping professionalism in its curriculum.¹¹⁴ Such a contention is misleading, however, for while what is taught at an institution is certainly germane to its mission, those scholars who would describe liberal arts schools solely in terms of the courses offered

¹¹² Priscilla W. Laws, “New Approaches to Science and Mathematics Teaching at Liberal Arts Colleges,” *Daedalus* 128 (1999): 223.

¹¹³ Robert Knapp, *The Younger American Scholar: His Collegiate Origins* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

¹¹⁴ Michael Delucchi, “‘Liberal Arts’ Colleges and the Myth of Uniqueness,” *The Journal of Higher Education* 68 (July-August 1984): 414-426

engage in a sort of curricular determinism that reduces such schools to sites of content delivery. This reductive tendency would further suggest that the “liberal arts experience” could just as easily be achieved on the campus of a large research university if the curriculum did not abandon “the continuance of the liberal and humane tradition.”¹¹⁵ Such outlooks ignore what distinguishes the small liberal arts college from its university brethren, both in historical and contemporary terms: a commitment to undergraduate teaching in an interconnected residential community. While the course of study has been a crucial element of small college projects, especially in an age marked by the emergence of the research university, the particular practices and relationships found on campus cannot be decoupled from curriculum. As one scholar has noted, the liberal arts college has always been, at bottom, a philosophy, one which has used the curriculum as a tool for building interpersonal associations, cultivating senses of social responsibility and leadership, and encouraging habits of mind and appropriately skeptical dispositions.¹¹⁶

These small schools, then, have been comprised not just of curricula to pass on “liberal learning,” but also of particular social dynamics, pedagogical practices, and philosophies of interaction. They are structured not principally to attend to “utility” or to produce research, but instead retain a human scale to promote community involvement, conversation, and relationships; indeed, bringing students to live and work alongside faculty in a small, residential context encourages the “linkage of educational ends and means” and asks the student body to serve as curator of “the ongoing civic life of its

¹¹⁵ *General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard Committee* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), viii.

¹¹⁶ Eugene M. Lang, “Distinctively American: The Liberal Arts College,” *Daedalus* 128 (Winter 1999): 133-149.

community.”¹¹⁷ Under such conditions, these institutions can define and defend a strong sense of educational purpose and vision that enjoys almost unanimous support among participants, be they students, faculty, or administration.¹¹⁸ In this way, the small liberal arts school seeks not to ape the norms of the large research university, but instead self-consciously describes itself as a community of learning.¹¹⁹

This capacity for institutional self-description, to which all community members could make a contribution, was what truly made the liberal arts college, in the assignment of sociologist Burton Clark, “distinctive.” At the same time that scholars were constructing the prevailing conventional wisdom about the primacy of the university in academic life, Clark asserted that the liberal arts college had retained (throughout the twentieth century and into the cold war era) an “impressive status in American society” and thereby remained “*the* romantic element in the educational system.”¹²⁰ Where a generation of historians had tended to dismiss the liberal arts college as an outmoded, static idiom, Clark saw such schools as vibrant communities possessed of a “saga,” an enduring and endearing narrative that represented an internalized mission that linked serial generations of students and faculty alike. For Clark, the saga offered “an educationally relevant definition of the difference” between a specific liberal arts school and all other learning communities, enhanced senses of institutional purpose, and created a sense of community (without compromising academic excellence) unlikely to emerge in the research university.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Schuman, 51.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 112-117.

¹¹⁹ Francis Oakley, *Community of Learning: The American College and the Liberal Arts Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 125.

¹²⁰ Burton E. Clark, *The Distinctive College: Antioch, Reed, and Swarthmore* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1970), 4.

¹²¹ Ibid., 256.

The tendency to describe and think about higher education during the cold war in shorthand terms, with those schools that enjoyed the lion's share of federal funding serving as stand-ins for the American academy as a whole, pushed the small liberal arts college to the margins of scholarly and popular discussion. As we have seen, however, this assumption tends to make resource allocation the *sine qua non* of higher education, and thus ignores the degree to which multiple missions both existed and succeeded on American campuses during the cold war era. From the beginning of the twentieth century, the conventional wisdom of scholars and journalists had either tacitly or overtly described the liberal arts school as an intellectual wasteland; similarly, most chroniclers and historians of the post-war era suggested that because few small colleges had sought and fewer still had acquired federal research dollars, such schools were locked into insignificance during the age of "Big Science." By the cold war, it appeared that the story of American higher education was marked by themes of expanded access, government funding, and research orientation, and that these themes were best investigated on the campuses and in the archives of large, comprehensive research universities, be they public or private. But just as the "Age of the University" in the early decades of the twentieth century did not ultimately obviate either the need or the demand for liberal arts colleges, neither did the research funding revolution force small colleges to abandon their institutional missions and simply establish themselves as boutique halfway-houses for the intellectually pedestrian and the socially privileged. Though the function of the small liberal arts college may have differed from that of its bigger, wider-ranging compatriots in higher education, this function was not made extraneous by the arrival of the GI Bill, "Big Science," and the cold war; indeed, the abiding relevance of

the institution's purpose finds demonstration in the story of the NDEA disclaimer affidavit. The interplay between liberal arts colleges like Swarthmore and Haverford on the one hand, and the discourse of McCarthyism that informed the NDEA on the other, articulates important historical suggestions: that notions of student freedom could be appreciated in significant terms on campuses dedicated principally to teaching undergraduates; that a special sense of cultural purpose and historical memory—Clark's "saga"—could inform and enable resistance to an anti-intellectual ethos; and that the discursive community of the small, intimate campus offers a site whereby collective discussion can most readily be translated into action in support of common purpose. The established aims and norms of the liberal arts colleges were not rendered irrelevant to the nation's appreciable (yet tested) conception of shared governance, liberty, and civic engagement during the cold war period; rather, these goals and mores retained profound utility, as the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy would illuminate.

Chapter 4: Swarthmore and Haverford—Senses of Place, Roots of Resistance

Understanding the potential influence available to the residential liberal arts college during the NDEA affidavit episode demands comprehension of the function, mission, and identity of such schools in general; appreciating the actions of those schools which *did* resist the disclaimer affidavit requires deeper consideration of the traditions, leadership, and cultural presence of those institutions in particular. Today, Swarthmore and Haverford Colleges both sit as wealthy, highly selective, academically renowned jewels in the crown of American higher education. In 2013, Swarthmore claimed an endowment of \$1.6 billion, placed thirteenth on *Forbes*' list of the nation's finest colleges, ranked third on *US News*' annual ranking of national liberal arts colleges, and admitted only 13 percent of its applicants.¹²² Similarly, in 2012 Haverford enjoyed an endowment of nearly \$400 million, and the following year placed forty-third on the *Forbes* list and ninth on the *US News* ballot, while admitting under one-quarter of those applicants who sought entry to the school.¹²³ Over the past century, Swarthmore alumni have claimed more than 30 Rhodes Scholarships, sixteen MacArthur "genius" grants, and five Nobel prizes, and nearly one in five alumni of graduating classes between 1995 and 2004 earned a doctorate.¹²⁴ Haverford boasts four Nobel laureates and twenty Rhodes Scholars of its own, and nearly 10 percent of the graduating classes between 1988 and 1997 claimed

¹²² "Financial Report, 2012-2013," Swarthmore College, http://www.swarthmore.edu/Documents/FinancialReport_2012-13.pdf; "America's Top Colleges: 2013," *Forbes*, <http://www.forbes.com/top-colleges/list/>; "National Liberal Arts College Rankings, 2013," *U.S. News*, <http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges>.

¹²³ "Factbook 2012," Haverford College, <http://www.haverford.edu/institutionalresearch/pdf/factbook/Factbook-2012.pdf>; "America's Top Colleges: 2013," *Forbes*, <http://www.forbes.com/top-colleges/list/>; "National Liberal Arts College Rankings, 2013," *U.S. News*, <http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges>.

¹²⁴ "Swarthmore Unspun," Swarthmore College, <http://www.swarthmore.edu/admissions/unspun/index.php>; "Doctorates Awarded," Swarthmore College, <http://www.swarthmore.edu/institutional-research/doctorates-awarded.xml>.

doctorates in science and engineering.¹²⁵ In terms of financial resources, institutional reputation, and academic achievement, Swarthmore and Haverford have emerged as industry leaders, designer labels in the marketplace of American higher education. They are internationally-known colleges whose talented student bodies, accomplished faculty, highly selective admissions rates, verdant Main Line campuses, and hefty endowments might suggest that their histories have been as grand and as protected as their present circumstances; the reality, however, is that this “brand name” status is comparatively new for both schools. While the present-day Swarthmore and Haverford have assumed a place near the front of the line in almost all quantitative and qualitative assessments of American postsecondary institutions, in 1958 this place—and the political and financial security it entails—was far from guaranteed.

Both Swarthmore and Haverford were founded in the nineteenth century by Quakers who were uncomfortable with both the missions and practices of local Pennsylvania colleges and universities in the mid-eighteen hundreds. Colleges such as Dickinson, Franklin & Marshall, and Gettysburg had been founded—some in the previous century—to educate ministers and clergy of various other religions, and had gradually enlarged their missions to include the children of upper class society in their student bodies; Quakers, on the other hand, believed neither in proselytizing nor in ordained clerics, and thus lagged far behind other denominations in establishing colleges. By the early part of the nineteenth century, however, Friends in rapidly transforming urban areas such as Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia worried that both denominational and common

¹²⁵ “Haverford College at a Glance,” Haverford College, http://www.haverford.edu/about/haverford/facts_and_statistics.php; Joan Burrelli, Alan Rapoport, Rolf Lehming, “Baccalaureate Origins of S&E Doctorate Recipients,” *National Science Foundation InfoBrief*: 6, <http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf08311/nsf08311.pdf>.

schooling (hastened by immigration and industrialization) threatened the Quaker way of life. Fearing the pressure to assimilate and concerned that their children would be educated by those outside their tradition, Quakers came to seek the establishment of schools to defend their particular customs. These schools would include postsecondary institutions, which were deemed necessary both to train Quaker teachers for primary and secondary schools, and to offer more sophisticated learning for those Friends whose secular pursuits would require it.¹²⁶ Swarthmore and Haverford, then, were born not out of an evangelistic fervor, but out of a tentative, uncertain disposition toward formal, institutionalized schooling. By the nineteenth century, Quakers valued education for its instrumental uses, but also feared its capacity—particularly in higher education—to threaten the values and mores of their distinctive way of life. Learning was to have utility in the modern world, but also had to be “guarded,” that is, it would protect students from the influences of broader society. For many within the faith, this demanded that all Friends’ schools admit and employ Quakers, and Quakers alone.¹²⁷

Complicating these halting steps towards formal embrace of higher education was the “civil war” roiling within Quaker ranks in the opening decades of the nineteenth century. In 1827, the “Great Separation” divided the American Friends, and the Society split into two competing groups, the Hicksites and the Orthodox. This fissure was the result of theological, cultural and political disagreement between the more liberal Hicksites—who emphasized the authenticity of inward spirituality and, in suburban Philadelphia, were generally resentful of what they considered the hypocritical inaction and complacent

¹²⁶ Richard J. Walton, *Swarthmore College: An Informal History* (Swarthmore, PA: Swarthmore College, 1986), 1.

¹²⁷ Thomas D. Hamm, “Introduction: The Search for the Quaker College,” in *Founded by Friends: The Quaker Heritage of 15 American Colleges and Universities*, ed. John W. Oliver, Charles L. Cherry, and Caroline L. Cherry (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2007), xii-xiii, xv.

“nouveau riche” attitudes of Philadelphian Quaker leadership—and the Orthodox, who were wealthy urbanites interested in imposing the doctrinal authority of scripture on the American Friends.¹²⁸ It was this divide which informed the founding of separate Quaker colleges on the outskirts of the city, with Haverford established as a secondary boarding school by Orthodox Friends in 1833 (and becoming a college in 1856), and Swarthmore created fewer than ten miles away by the Hicksites in 1864.

Unsurprisingly, the initial identity of both schools was shaped almost exclusively by the discourse of “guarded” education. At Hicksite Swarthmore—named for the home of George Fox, the English founder of Quakerism—liberal arts and natural sciences were taught in a coeducational setting, but this commitment to equal intellectual opportunity seemed to be the sole concession to “progressive” modernity, as the school’s projects of moral development, behavioral standards, and appropriate dress all hewed to traditional Quaker teachings. Weekly Friends Meetings were mandatory for Swarthmore students, and these meetings were shaped largely by the participation of the school’s faculty and administration. Safeguarding this academic, moral, and cultural program was Swarthmore’s Board of Managers, which for the first four decades of the school’s existence was composed entirely of Friends. In its early history, to be sure, Swarthmore was almost entirely “an agency of its parental religious body.”¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Leslie, *Gentlemen & Scholars*, 25-26. For a concise history of Quaker origins, doctrines, and practice, see Pink Dandelion, *The Quakers: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). The classic text in the field is Sydney V. James, *A People Among the Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). For a narrative review of the Quaker experience in the United States, see Thomas D. Hamm, *The Quakers in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), and *The Transformation of American Quakerism: Orthodox Friends, 1800-1907* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

¹²⁹ Christopher Densmore, “Swarthmore College,” in Oliver, Cherry, and Cherry, *Founded by Friends*, 57-62; Clark, 174.

As the twentieth century approached, however, there were indications that Swarthmore could and would assimilate some of the influences of the wider culture. The Hicksite Friends, who from the beginning had described themselves as more tolerant and open to religious questioning than their Orthodox counterparts, began to liberalize slowly in the years following 1870, and Swarthmore generally (if gradually) followed this pattern of doctrinal relaxation over the course of two decades. On campus, both sports and fraternities arrived, restrictions on student conduct were relaxed, and an early “Joe College” mindset began to compete with traditional Friends’ values as the college had increasing difficulty attracting and retaining Hicksite students. The faculty, for their part, showed greater interest in academic excellence for its own sake, not in the service of Quaker morality, and two-thirds of the junior and senior year curriculum was fully elective. While conservative members of the Board of Managers continued to advocate a “guarded” education, by the end of the nineteenth century Swarthmore was a school being pushed by social and economic forces to reconsider the meaning of its Friends identity.¹³⁰

This reconsideration was carried on in earnest both before and after the turn of the twentieth century; indeed, at Swarthmore the twenty-year period surrounding the arrival of the 1900s was particularly vibrant. While the Board of Managers remained fully Hicksite until just prior to World War I, the school faced increasing difficulty in maintaining a rigorous Quaker presence in the school’s student profile and academic program. The membership of the Hicksite Meeting in Philadelphia suffered huge denominational losses from the time of the “Great Separation” onward, and by 1900 its

¹³⁰ Hamm, “Introduction: The Search for the Quaker College,” in Oliver, Cherry, and Cherry, *Founded by Friends*, xix; Leslie, 47-49, 85; Walton, 13.

population had dwindled by 40 percent; moreover, these remaining Hicksites were not as wealthy as their Orthodox counterparts. As a consequence, the institutional tension between “guarded” education and modern liberal arts was exacerbated by financial constraints, and retaining a strong Quaker majority in faculty and student precincts became practically impossible. Swarthmore alleviated this tension through continued adjustment of the identity that gave it distinction among colleges, with a step again toward academic modernity and a gradual relaxation in its embrace of a thoroughgoing Quaker culture on campus. In order to keep enrollment strong and facilities updated, the Board of Managers placed less of an emphasis on attracting Hicksite students and successfully increased its efforts to attract moneyed elements in Philadelphia who saw college as a means to serve ends that were principally educational and social, rather than moral. While this shift in focus reduced the number of Quaker students—by 1907, only one in three students was a Friend—it also provided both a more secure enrollment pattern and improved momentum for fundraising. These changes at Swarthmore were in harmony with a general movement within Hicksite Quakerism to replace traditional insularity and simplicity with a dynamic approach to modern life, an approach which again sought to maintain denominational principles while reducing cultural defensiveness in encounters with all things secular. At the same time, Quakerism at Swarthmore was not abandoned, but instead channeled into emphases on service and dialogue. By the second decade of the twentieth century, the school’s willingness to reconsider and revise its institutional aims had given it financial security, made it more appealing to wealthy families in Pennsylvania and beyond, and elevated the school’s national academic profile while retaining both its small class sizes and elements of the Friends ethos.¹³¹

¹³¹ Leslie, 137-145; Densmore, 64; Clark, 178-183.

Swarthmore undertook further reconsideration and revision through the appointment of Frank Aydelotte, who began his ambitious twenty-year presidency in 1921. Outgoing president Joseph Swain, charged with finding his successor, was determined to find an educational leader who continue Swarthmore's emergence as a place of intellectual rigor. Swain thus selected as president a non-Quaker—a first for Swarthmore—who had made his reputation as an English professor at both Indiana University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Aydelotte immediately moved to continue the college's more toward greater academic purpose. While Swarthmore had expanded its institutional mission beyond “guarded” education in the fifty years since its founding, in 1922 Aydelotte set off in an even bolder direction by reining in the emphasis on “Joe College” elements of Greek social life and intercollegiate athletics (especially “big-time” football) that had emerged with easing of a traditional Quaker presence on campus. Rather than let Swarthmore's academic gains stagnate and see the school become what one student termed an “educational country club,” Aydelotte reasserted the necessity of scholastic seriousness and intellectual independence at the school. A Rhodes Scholar himself, Aydelotte gave even greater emphasis to intellectual and scholarly pursuits on campus through the implementation of a celebrated honors program patterned on the tutorial system at Oxford. By devoting financial and faculty resources in this direction—and with the deep-pocketed support of the Rockefeller family's General Education Board—Aydelotte created a laboratory of Oxonian teaching and learning in suburban Philadelphia, and the school's reputation as a home for the academic elite swelled through the two decades of his presidency.¹³² Where the school had originally distinguished itself principally through its Quaker identity, by 1940 Swarthmore had—

¹³² Schuman, 99-100; Walton, 25, 31-33; Clark, 185-208; Densmore, 68.

under Aydelotte's direction and initiative— become publicly recognized as a college that had been founded by local Friends, but was now home to intellectually gifted students from across the country.¹³³

Many of the same elements expressed in Swarthmore's saga could also be seen in the story of its collegiate neighbor, Haverford. Like Swarthmore, Haverford was a school that, over time, would gradually shed its insular denominational understandings for a more capacious articulation of liberal arts higher education in a modern age. Beginning life as "Haverford School," a boarding program for boys ages twelve and up, Haverford's educational philosophy initially emphasized a curriculum that was both traditional and humanistic, but delivered in "guarded" terms. Even when a Pennsylvania State Charter transformed the school into Haverford College in 1856, the academic mission of the school's leadership remained decidedly conservative, with the aim of providing to young men a higher education of liberal arts and a reaffirmation of Orthodox Quaker values. This required a commitment to a single-sex environment, plain dress, daily study of scripture, prohibitions against student trips into "secular" Philadelphia, and the aggressive oversight of an all-Quaker, all-male Board of Managers. All of these were integrated into

¹³³ Aydelotte emerged as a crucial figure not only at Swarthmore, but within American higher education in general. He conceived of his work at Swarthmore as something of a "bully pulpit" that could inaugurate a national experiment with curricular reform around honors colleges and programs at other institutions. Following the success enjoyed by Swarthmore, dozens of colleges and universities created their own programs, many of which have endured through the present day. For a thorough exploration of Aydelotte's influence, see Ruth Shoemaker Wood, *Transforming Campus Culture: Frank Aydelotte's Honors Experiment at Swarthmore College* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011). For a detailed examination of Swarthmore's curriculum at mid-century, see J. Roland Pennock, "The Swarthmore Honors System," *The Journal of Higher Education* 24, no. 2 (February 1953): 57-63. For a study of the history and variety of honors programs in post-secondary schools, see Clifford Adelman, *Starting with Students: Promising Approaches in American Higher Education* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985).

an attempt to bind Haverford men to the Orthodox branch of the Friends, and to prepare them to lead its distinctive society.¹³⁴

As had been the case at Swarthmore, at Haverford “guarded” education was increasingly challenged by social and intellectual worldliness in the second half of the nineteenth century. The 1856 decision to award baccalaureate degrees fueled a new scholarly ambition among students and faculty alike. New living quarters were built which allowed the young men of Haverford to live “on their own”—away from the supervision of residential faculty—for the first time in the school’s history. The language requirements for admission were relaxed (French and German were allowed, alongside the traditional Greek), and the liberal arts and natural sciences were given greater prominence in the required course of study. Finally, the school’s orthodoxy was eased as the divide between Hicksite and Orthodox Friends diminished in the late nineteenth century. Though still informed by Quaker principles, Haverford’s first fifty years revealed that it was not implacably opposed to assimilating certain influences from the broader intellectual and social world.¹³⁵

Like its Main Line neighbor, Haverford found itself attempting to balance accelerated institutional development with Quaker tradition as the twentieth century approached. Just as Swarthmore continued to reinterpret the meaning of a Friends liberal arts college during this period, so too did Haverford persist in readjusting its orientation to “guarded” education and Quaker orthodoxy. This readjustment, which had gained momentum in the

¹³⁴ Diana Franzusoff Peterson, “Haverford College,” in Oliver, Cherry, and Cherry, *Founded by Friends*, 1-2; E. Digby Baltzell, *Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia: Two Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Class Authority and Leadership* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 444-445.

¹³⁵ John F. Gunmere, “The Early Years,” in *The Spirit and the Intellect: Haverford College, 1833-1983*, ed. Gregory Kannerstein (Haverford, PA: Haverford College, 1983), 12-14; Densmore, 63. For a thorough exploration of Haverford’s development during its first century, see Rufus M. Jones, *Haverford College: A History and Interpretation* (New York: MacMillan, 1933).

decades after the 1856 decision to award baccalaureate degrees, found a stalwart ally in Isaac Sharpless, a mathematics professor and dean who assumed the presidency of Haverford in 1887. Though he did not develop a signature program like Aydelotte's honors curriculum, Sharpless presided over a period during which Haverford's academic reputation burgeoned. He prioritized the hiring of a first-rate faculty committed to teaching undergraduates in the spirit of liberal humanism, and established a system of entrance examinations which both improved the academic quality of incoming classes and enhanced Haverford's admissions selectivity. While Sharpless did not go as far as Swarthmore in liberalizing curricular choice among students, the Haverford course of study was adjusted to allow for elective courses in the final two years of study. Beyond these structural adjustments, the president also took some potentially risky steps to minimize the climate of partying and big-time football that threatened the character of small colleges seeking to remain intellectually relevant in the climate of scholarly seriousness and innovation that marked the "Age of the University." To this end, Sharpless expelled a number of wealthy yet under-motivated students, and—two decades before its neighbor, Swarthmore—refused to schedule football games against the era's large private university teams. Finally, though there was a brief period in the 1890's during which Haverford had a program for graduate students, Sharpless reemphasized the possibility of young people acquiring a valuable collegiate education on a small campus. In the emerging "Age of the University," Sharpless helped Haverford consolidate its niche as a place for academically accelerated liberal arts instruction in an intimate small-scale environment.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Edwin B. Bonner, "The Sharpless Years," in Kannerstein, *The Spirit and the Intellect*, 17, 19; Franzusoff Peterson, 6.

As with Swarthmore, these movements towards academic prominence were carried on within the context of Quaker tradition. Haverford relaxed the pursuit of Orthodox Quakerism in both its curriculum and its campus practices prior to and during the Sharpless presidency, but this did not imply a complete capitulation to secular norms. The Board of Managers was composed exclusively of Friends, the weekly Quaker meeting remained a compulsory part of student life, and Sharpless himself was a committed Friend. Sharpless's interpretation of the central principles of his faith, however, drew him to emphasize the Quaker concept of the value of each individual, and it was this emphasis that informed the campus climate he helped Haverford students create during his tenure. Having taken measures to improve the quality of the student body, Sharpless took the concomitant step of offering them greater responsibility for governing their own behavior. After several years of student debate regarding self-government, Haverford created an honor system for academic affairs in 1897, and elected its first president of the student body in 1901.¹³⁷ Though Haverford was certainly not the first school to introduce these elements into its academic and cultural programming, their inclusion is illustrative of both the college's fidelity to, and reinterpretation of, Friends' precepts. Having moved from the strictures of "guarded" education, Haverford's Quaker tradition was preserved by Sharpless' move to describe honor and student self-governance as the natural emanations of an institutional emphasis on the value of individual conscience and communal moral responsibility.

By the end of Sharpless' thirty-year term as president in 1917, Haverford stood as one the most prestigious colleges in the nation. In both its academic reputation and its financial resources, the school scarcely resembled the institution Sharpless had taken over

¹³⁷ Bonner, 18-19; Franzusoff Peterson, 7; Jones, 216-217.

in 1887. The school's endowment had increased tenfold, its enrollment had doubled while growing more selective in the admissions office, the physical plant had improved, and its faculty was staffed with first-rate professionals. In 1911, the federal government published an evaluation of the nation's colleges and universities, and Haverford was recognized as one of the 59 placed into the most select category of schools. The trends toward academic seriousness, financial stability, and refined Quaker practice that Sharpless either accelerated or developed during his tenure were maintained by subsequent school leadership as Haverford weathered two world wars and a Great Depression. By mid-century, the school—like Swarthmore—had transcended its regional roots and strict denominational origins to become a Friends institution that enjoyed a prominent place in the world of modern higher education.¹³⁸

It is important to recognize, of course, that Swarthmore and Haverford did not experience the same narratives from their respective geneses into the twentieth century. There are important differences between the two schools, differences which certainly informed their institutional missions and practices. Swarthmore was founded as a college alone, took its institutional cue from Hicksite tendencies toward the primacy of practice over doctrine, embraced coeducation, had a dalliance with “big-time” intercollegiate sports, and modeled its signature academic program on intense Oxford-style tutorials. Haverford, conversely, began as a preparatory school, experimented with graduate education, remained strictly a men's college, favored the more conservative Orthodox understanding of Quakerism, and ignored honors tracking in favor of general academic excellence for all Haverfordians. While both were founded by Friends and occupied the

¹³⁸ Jones, 80-81; Bonner, 20; Jonathan S. Quinn, “Haverford's Presidents,” in Kannerstein, *The Spirit and the Intellect*, 33-35.

same geographic region, these two schools did not march in lockstep in their development from founding to the middle of the twentieth century. On the eve of the NDEA disclaimer affidavit episode, Swarthmore and Haverford were not the same college.

That said, the similarities between both the journeys made and the destinations reached in the school's institutional sagas are instructive. Within decades of being established, both Swarthmore and Haverford had demonstrated a willingness to reconcile their denominational educational purposes with shifting understandings regarding the aims of higher education as the "Age of the University" burgeoned. Initially expressed through incremental acceptance of curricular innovation and social elements of the wider culture, these institutional interests in harmonizing academic modernity, economic reality, and traditional mission continued apace as the schools moved into the twentieth century. As a consequence, both schools were able to move from their origins as citadels of "guarded" Quaker education, negotiate a pathway between an emphasis on graduate research on the one hand and "Joe College" sociability on the other, and emerge as schools of serious intellectual and moral contemplation with student bodies, faculty, and national reputations to match. Within this largely shared story of advancement, a handful of themes common to both schools warrant further exploration.

First, the manner in which both schools managed the possible tension between Quaker tradition and secular progress was notable. The notion that the increasing emphasis on science and research around the turn of the twentieth century led to irresistible secularization within American higher education, particularly in its flagship universities and prestigious private schools often attends the "Age of the University" trope prevalent

in contemporary historiography. This thesis generally asserts that the Christian leaders of higher education ceded influence in curriculum and on campus in the name of educational modernity, with instruction in the humanities and social sciences being counted on to supply encounters with the moral and religious ideals which once animated institutional missions.¹³⁹ It is tempting to read the development of Swarthmore and Haverford in such terms, and certainly such an interpretation captures a great deal of these schools' stories: both schools were far more ecumenical in the twentieth century than they were in the nineteenth, had embraced a liberal curriculum that was increasingly elective and decoupled from scriptural reinforcement, and gradually articulated identities predicated on academic excellence rather than Quaker affiliation. What must not be lost, however, is the degree to which the discourse and practice of Friends tradition continued to inhere on both campuses throughout the first half of the twentieth century. While the presence of Quaker students diminished and the faculty found its principal function in cultivating intellectual dispositions, the influence of the founding religion could be seen in the leadership, organization, and publications of the two schools. At Swarthmore, for example, the Board of Managers would remain exclusively Quaker until 1938, and of all the school's presidents from its founding through 1969, only one—Frank Aydelotte—was not a Friend. (Aydelotte would later join the Society after leaving Swarthmore.) Additionally, throughout the century decisions of governance continued to be made within the Quaker tradition of consensus embraced by Swarthmore's founders. On campus, the Quaker meeting—while optional—claimed considerable cultural space for

¹³⁹ George Marsden, *The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University*.

students and faculty of the “modern age,” and until 1952 the college calendar followed the Quaker tradition of refusing to call the days of the week and months of the year names derived from “heathen” Norse and Roman gods. (Friends custom instead assigned numbers to days and months: Wednesday was Fourth Day, June was Sixth Month, and so forth.) Finally, even with the enthusiasm associated with Aydelotte’s honors program and its implication of primacy of secular learning, the Quaker emphasis on the importance of the individual conscience and the significance of hearing all sides of an argument continued to abide. This, in turn, provided a campus dialectic between community and non-conformity that enriched the intellectual and social climate for its students by reinforcing the necessity of open inquiry. This commitment, long the aim of non-sectarian academic projects, was qualitatively enhanced by the Quaker spirit that informed Swarthmore’s residential learning experience.¹⁴⁰ Though by the twentieth century the place of Quakerism was not as prominent as in the days of Hicksite “guarded” education, it retained a significant role in campus life throughout the twentieth century, and even into the present day, as Swarthmore’s course catalog indicates:

[Swarthmore] still values highly many of the principles of [the Friends].

Foremost among these principles is the individual’s responsibility for seeking and applying truth and for testing whatever truth one believes one has found.... The College does not seek to impose on its students this Quaker view of life or any other specific set of convictions about the nature of things and the duties of

¹⁴⁰ Walton, 47, 61-64; Lee Smith Ingram et al., “Consensual Decision Making by the Swarthmore Board of Managers: Report of the Swarthmore College Alumni Task Force,” Swarthmore College, February 15, 2003, www.swarthmore.edu/alumni/pdf/consensus/final_report.pdf; Jerome Kohlberg, “Lifelong Learning,” in *The Meaning of Swarthmore*, ed. Roger Youman (Swarthmore, PA: Swarthmore College, 2004), 31-33; Everett Lee Hunt, *The Revolt of the College Intellectual* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1963), 10.

human beings. It does, however, encourage ethical and religious concern about such matters and continuing examination of any view that may be held regarding them.¹⁴¹

The stamp of Quakerism was, if anything, more indelible at Haverford. Like Swarthmore, the school was committed to a strong Friends presence in the ranks of its leadership; indeed, the college maintained an entirely Quaker board until 1930, and would not have a non-Friend president until 1967, with the inauguration of John Coleman. (Later, Coleman would himself join the Society of Friends.) Also, Haverford employed consensus decision processes in its meetings of the Board of Managers, faculty, and student organizations. Student encounter with Quakerism could be seen in obvious ways such as organizational meetings (as well as the Fifth Day Meeting, which was required until 1966), but also in more subtle manifestations, such as the creation and development of the college's Honor Code. As has been seen, the origins of the Code in the late nineteenth century were informed by Quaker themes such as the necessity of an honest conscience, personal integrity, and obeisance to one's "inner light" rather than unthinking conformity to societal trends. In the extension of the Code to include elements of social behavior in the 1940s—an extension promulgated by administration and students alike—Haverford continued its tradition of moderating its once-Orthodox Quakerism to encompass concerns for practical justice and communal responsibility.¹⁴²

As with Swarthmore, by the middle of the twentieth century Haverford was no longer committed to "guarded" education and the ranks of Friends students and faculty had

¹⁴¹"Introduction to Swarthmore College," *Swarthmore College Bulletin* 111 (August 2013): 1, http://www.swarthmore.edu/Documents/academics/swarthmore_catalog_2013-2014.pdf.

¹⁴² Quinn, 37; David Potter, "Quakerism," in Kannerstein, *The Spirit and the Intellect*, 55-57; John T. Hough, Jr., and Joseph P. Quinlan, "Student Life at Haverford," in Kannerstein, *The Spirit and the Intellect*, 141.

thinned; nonetheless, the school retained an ethos which suggested that a Quaker spirit and an intellectual disposition served as cooperative elements in the school's understanding of higher education. As a philosophy professor observed in the 1930s:

The religious atmosphere at Haverford has been as much a quiet normal feature of its life as the beauty of the campus. Religion has been thought of not as something apart from life, something injected from the outside, but rather as complete spiritual health. It has been a simple pervasive spirit of reverence, of sincerity, and of aspiration for the highest values of life.... The college has aimed to bring the new learning of the age into vital relation with religion.¹⁴³

In short, despite their ascension to national prominence as schools of admirable intellectual character, neither Swarthmore nor Haverford lost connection with projects of their respective founders, projects that were largely moral in their orientation. While no longer the strictly denominational entities of their first days, these two colleges retained significant cultural and intellectual space for Quaker thought and practice in institutional programs.

The shift in curricular discourse in higher education around the turn of the twentieth century from creedal morality to scientific neutrality has generally been viewed as dividing institutions into two primary camps during the following decades: universities emphasizing graduate study and original research, and colleges evolving to meet growing demands for occupational training and acculturation necessary for social and economic mobility.¹⁴⁴ In addition, both sides of this institutional typology would have found themselves ill-equipped to address the day's moral and civic issues, as neither the

¹⁴³ Jones, 222-223.

¹⁴⁴ See Marsden, *The Soul of the American University*; Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University*; and Levine, *The American College and the Culture of Aspiration, 1915-1940*.

research focus of the university or the credentializing function of the college was readily compatible with social and political engagement beyond the campus. It was in this area of civic and moral obligation, however, that both Swarthmore and Haverford located space within the observed university-college dichotomy. In moving beyond the rhetorical embrace of Quakerism to enact real political commitments, the schools articulated a second commonality in their narratives.

Throughout the twentieth century, both Swarthmore and Haverford demonstrated that important qualities of their schools—an ethos animated by Quaker principles, small-scale residential communities, and seriousness of intellectual purpose—lent themselves to concern for, deliberation about, and engagement with political and moral issues both within and beyond their campus gates. Though there was student activity in Progressive Era social movements at Swarthmore, the century's first major encounter with larger political contexts came during World War I. As the war approached, traditional Quaker pacifism dominated campus discussion and the pages of the *Phoenix* student newspaper; gradually, however, student opinion rallied to defend liberal democracy. The Board of Managers initially rejected student hopes for the arrival of a Student Army Training Corps (SATC) on campus, but later capitulated over worries that students would drop out to serve: the SATC was allowed on campus, though without guns for training. While Swarthmore's admission of the SATC may have seemed a craven capitulation to market forces—and, to be sure, some Friends publications described it as such—what should not be lost is the degree of on-campus conversation and deliberation which preceded it. Rather than simply articulate an institutional stance, Swarthmore allowed its students to explore the dictates of their consciences, and this exploration helped inspire a new

activist spirit at the school.¹⁴⁵ This spirit could be seen in the willingness of Swarthmore students and faculty to attend to issues of larger political and moral concern, even if these issues were decades from capturing a popular mindset. In the realm of civil rights, for example, the students struck a blow against anti-Semitism in 1934, when Swarthmore divested itself of sororities in the wake of student newspaper editorials and petitions to protesting, among other things, the discriminatory admissions policies of certain chapters. (Curiously, fraternities were allowed to remain, but their social significance waned considerably after the dissolution of Swarthmore's sororities.) Similarly, in 1940 a Student Committee on Racial Relations was organized in the name of pushing for the admission of black students to Swarthmore, and the Board of Managers responded in 1945 by declaring that students should be admitted to the school irrespective of race or creed.¹⁴⁶ World War II also catalyzed campus activism, as once again the Quaker emphasis on the primacy of the dictates of individual conscience was realized: a professor established a conscientious objector camp at Swarthmore, the eventual admission of future officers as part of the V-12 Navy College Training Program was roundly debated in faculty meetings, student editorials supported both the war effort and "helping to win the peace," and faculty and students alike volunteered for war service by the dozens.¹⁴⁷ Neither blindly patriotic nor wholly pacific, the campus culture during the period was described by a student, who himself would later serve in the Navy, as "an oasis of civility" which humanely but assertively explored the connection between

¹⁴⁵ Walton, 24-28; Hunt, 46; Leslie, 143-44.

¹⁴⁶ Molly Yard Garrett, "Getting Out the Vote," in Youman, *The Meaning of Swarthmore*, 15-17; Walton, 37-38; Hunt, 58-67, 102-103.

¹⁴⁷ Walton, 50-55.

intellectual debate, Friends morality, and political activity.¹⁴⁸ From the turn of the century through World War II, then, the combination of the school's Quaker heritage, its institutional emphasis on intellectual exploration, and a campus whose size provided opportunity for authentic communal dialogue helped make social activism fundamental to the Swarthmore experience.¹⁴⁹

Haverford expressed a similar dynamic from the turn of the twentieth century through World War II. Prior to American entry into World War I, campus conversation was robust, as befitted a community versed in both intellectual and Quaker norms which valued open exchange and deep consideration of varied perspectives. Though always privileging the primacy of individual conscience, as an institution—perhaps owing to its roots in the Orthodox strain of Friends teaching—Haverford proved more willing to assert a definitive anti-war posture than its neighbor, Swarthmore. Haverford faculty spoke out against the war in public and in the pages of Philadelphia newspapers, President Sharpless debated Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood on the necessity of rearmament, and the college elected to weather an enrollment downturn rather than host an SATC unit. This non-violent posture did not, however, represent institutional quietism; indeed, upon American entry into the war Haverford began training its student to serve in ambulance units, and in 1917 the college helped found the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), which trained students to enter into war areas and carry out alternative service. At the same time, for a number of Haverford men loyalty to conscience necessitated active duty. Their call to service was not obstructed by either the administration or their peers, as campus climate proved capacious enough to sincerely

¹⁴⁸ Kohlberg, 32.

¹⁴⁹ Russell DeBurlo, Jr., "Two-Bluebird Nights," in Youman, *The Meaning of Swarthmore*, 43.

accommodate (if not entirely harmonize) potentially antagonistic points of view.¹⁵⁰ As had been the case at Swarthmore, the Haverford community captured the energy generated by political debate over World War I and carried it forward into subsequent decades. Debates, petitions, and demonstrations over issues as varied as immigration policy, racial justice, the League of Nations, and free speech marked the 1920s and 30s. Once more, while the principles of Quakerism may have promoted a certain view of these issues, the antecedent principle—respect for differing opinion—continued to triumph in the interwar period. This practice was further reified with the coming of World War II. President Felix Morley (1940-45)—mindful of potential student attrition—recommended that Haverford support on-campus training programs for noncombatant army assignments, which led to another series of debates over the tension between traditional Quaker pacifism and the value of serving the nation in wartime. Members of the student body, faculty, and Board of Managers alike engaged in extended debate on the issue in meetings and on the pages of the school newspaper. A cadet program for the army meteorological service was ultimately approved by the Board and applauded by many. (Ironically, Morley himself had deep reservations, as he noted that the unit represented “surrender to the steady advance of governmental encroachment on independent education.”) Other Haverford men honored their convictions by applying for conscientious objector status, or by serving in a Friends-sponsored campus training program to prepare relief units to serve in areas torn apart by the war.¹⁵¹ Like Swarthmore, Haverford in the first forty-five years of the twentieth century was neither a temple of political leftism nor willing to affix all its institutional decisions to the dictates of

¹⁵⁰ Stephen G. Cary, “Haverford in War and Peace,” in Kannerstein, *The Spirit and the Intellect*, 25-26; Jones, 173-180; Leslie, 143.

¹⁵¹ Cary, 26-29; Quinn, 34; Potter, 55.

conservative Friends doctrine; rather, emphasis on intellectual seriousness joined with Quaker belief in translating individual conscience into action to create a campus environment that resisted political and moral complacency.

Defining one's own Quaker practice and creating climates of free intellectual inquiry and political possibility demands a degree of institutional autonomy, and here a final commonality between Swarthmore and Haverford can be recognized. From their founding, both of these schools enjoyed a degree of relative financial security, thanks to the generosity of their early Quaker supporters. Because neither college had to rely on the yearly meeting of Philadelphia Friends as a whole for direct monetary aid, both were able to reduce the number of constituents to whom they had to answer, and thus were allowed, from the beginning, more freedom to explore and develop the meaning of their respective schools on their own terms.¹⁵² The narrative of conventional historiography—the “darkness to light” trope—has suggested that the nineteenth century college was a static, hidebound institution whose adherence to outmoded curricula prompted large-scale failure of the model between 1850 and 1900. Revisionists have since demonstrated that colleges did not, in fact, fail at a greater rate in this period than in any other.¹⁵³ Still, even revisionists have noted that the period around 1890 seemed to represent a hinge point of change in the structure of higher education, after which the large majority of small colleges had to alter their fundamental approaches to postsecondary education if they were to compete with larger schools in the “Age of the University.” In such circumstances, only the wealthiest of the residential liberal arts colleges would be able to retain something of their original denominational, curricular, and organizational

¹⁵² Hamm, xviii.

¹⁵³ See Roger L. Geiger, ed., *The American College in the Nineteenth Century* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), and Colin B. Burke, *American Collegiate Populations*.

essence.¹⁵⁴ Though there were assuredly periods of fiscal challenge for both colleges, both Swarthmore and Haverford were among the lucky coterie of schools whose financial well-being enabled them to maintain and refine their core sensibilities in the face of difficult market pressures.

At Swarthmore, the period from its founding through World War I was marked by a willingness of the Board of Managers (of the liberal, Hicksite cast) to refine the school's original commitments to "guarded" education and a Friends clientele in order to promote financial sustainability. In order to attract more students and guarantee institutional growth, the college's Quaker leadership—as has been seen—demonstrated its willingness to compromise with the shifting cultural mores of the non-Quaker world. While lamented by traditionalists, Swarthmore found ways to retain important commitments to Friends' teaching while modernizing its curriculum and allowing for a more casual student life. In relaxing its denominational distinctiveness, the school made itself attractive to a broader and deeper admissions pool, and was also able to connect to the philanthropy of the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations.¹⁵⁵ By the time of World War

¹⁵⁴ Roger L. Geiger, "The Crisis of the Old Order: The Colleges in the 1890s," in Geiger, 264-276.

¹⁵⁵ Leslie, 43-51, 138-144, 243. The classic work exploring the intersection of foundation activity and the growth of higher education is Merle Curti and Roderick Nash, *Philanthropy in the Shaping of American Higher Education* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965). The work has been read as an argument for the "Age of the University" thesis, claiming that philanthropy was a vital force in describing the "progress" realized in the creation of scientific and research enterprise at large-scale institutions. While Curti and Nash do explore this relationship, their work also attends to the substantial donations that Rockefeller and Carnegie made for curricular, cultural, and administrative innovations at smaller schools of "promise" such as Swarthmore and Haverford. The potential for a revised understanding of Curti and Nash is described in Andrea Walton's "Introduction" to a reprint of the book. See Walton, introduction to reprint of Curti and Nash (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Hauser Center, 2006), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers/hauser/programs/past_programs/philanthropy_classics/Curti_and_Nash.pdf. For a focus on the broader activities of the Carnegie Foundation in particular, see Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

I, Swarthmore sat on a sturdy financial base, and Frank Aydelotte used this base to refine the school's institutional purpose, through the introduction of his Honors Program. While this innovation was enabled by traditional sources of such as alumni and the wealthier Quaker precincts in and around Philadelphia, it also attracted monies from outside agencies such as Rockefeller's General Education Board. Again, while the school continued to give Quakerism an important on-campus presence, willingness to once more find room for advancement—here, independent learning of the highest quality—ultimately strengthened the school's financial position, and allowed the institution to explore further the potential nuances of its mission and meaning.¹⁵⁶ By World War II, Swarthmore had proven itself adept at this cycle of pragmatic give-and-take which did not necessitate abandonment of Quaker roots, but did reveal the long-term benefits of easing the requirements of denominational pursuits; as a consequence, the school was able to remain the principal descriptor of its own institutional identity.

During the same late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century period, Haverford was, perhaps owing to its more conservative Orthodox roots, less willing to redefine the meaning of its Quakerism to encourage financial growth. While the school, like Swarthmore, ultimately relaxed its commitment to a strictly “guarded” education and a predominantly Quaker clientele during its first century, it remained more reliant upon tried and true sources of fiscal support than its more adventurous Main Line neighbor. To be sure, under the presidency of Isaac Sharpless, Haverford committed itself to institutional growth; indeed, during his thirty-year administration, the college pursued financial and architectural advancement to complement improvement in its academic profile. By the eve of World War I, Haverford had increased its endowment tenfold and

¹⁵⁶ Clark, 200-203.

tripled the number of campus buildings under Sharpless's guiding hand. This growth was accomplished principally through the largesse of alumni and independent Quaker benefactors, whose capital gifts enabled scholarships and building programs which aided in Sharpless' project to improve the quality of teaching and learning at Haverford. This academic improvement, in turn, attracted more giving, and by the end of the World War I the school had enhanced its reputation both in terms of scholarship and financial security. This security allowed the school to stand on principle in 1915, when the Carnegie Foundation offered to provide \$150,000 if Haverford would demonstrate that it was a wholly secular college; however, the school's tradition of limiting the Board of Managers to members of the Society of Friends remained unaltered.¹⁵⁷ The decades after the war were not as successful in terms of financial growth, as the Great Depression hindered the capacity of traditional donors to maintain their level of generosity, and the Second World War prompted President Felix Morley to cooperate under controlled terms with the American war effort in order to protect the school's financial status. Though unpopular with some traditional constituencies, this compromise—when paired with the 1944 initiation of Haverford's formal alumni giving program—allowed Haverford to retain its place among the financially fortunate liberal arts colleges. As World War II was drawing to a close, the school could not claim coffers as deep as those of Swarthmore, but its endowment of over \$4 million would allow Haverford to express its institutional mission in the post-war climate with an authority approaching that which it had wielded during the Sharpless years.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Bonner 17-21, Jones 98-104.

¹⁵⁸ Quinn, 33-34; "Report of the Treasurer," *Haverford College Bulletin* 43, no. 3 (December 1944): 24-25.

What had once made these institutions unique was their adherence to their respective brands of Quakerism: Haverford stood as the first Quaker college in the nation, and Swarthmore derived its animating ethos from its Hicksite understanding of Friends practice. As the denominational college confronted the “Age of the University,” however, small schools wishing to retain their significance—or simply their enrollments—would need to revisit and, perhaps, re-describe their traditional missions. If “guarded” education could find little purchase in the increasingly secular context of academic modernity, successful schools would require a commanding and potent vision of what a good residential liberal arts college could be and do. At both Swarthmore and Haverford, development of these visions began in the late nineteenth century, and continued apace into the middle of the twentieth. Under the guidance of managers, deans, faculty, and—importantly—some dynamic presidents (such as Aydelotte at Swarthmore, and Sharpless at Haverford), the colleges were able to initiate innovations, both dramatic and incremental, that continued to define and redefine their organizations. Though there was inevitably resistance to proposed changes, both schools were able to use dedicated leadership and sufficient financial resources to overcome such opposition, and to institutionalize these visions into the structures of campus experience. Where Friends denominationalism once stood as their defining characteristics, Swarthmore and Haverford both used modifications in curriculum, professionalization of faculty, and relaxation of social controls to reinterpret the very nature of their schools. At the same time, they retained important aspects of their founding identities, such as a commitment to Quaker non-conformity and conscientiousness, a focus on undergraduate teaching, and dedication to small-scale residential community. As a consequence, both colleges were

animated by an internal narrative that gave purpose to their campuses, the narrative that Clark termed an institutional “saga.” For Clark, the saga

offers an educationally relevant definition of the difference of the group from all others. And salient elements in the distinctiveness become foci of personal awareness and of a sense of things held in common with others currently on the scene, those who have been there before, and those yet to arrive.¹⁵⁹

Both Swarthmore and Haverford developed strong institutional cultures which, while not identical, shared emphases on the importance of intellectual seriousness, Quaker moral heritage, political engagement, and open community conversation. These cultures were, in turn, reinforced by conditions specific to the residential liberal arts college, such as small size and an emphasis on undergraduate teaching and learning that was carried out not only in classrooms, but also in dormitories, student centers, and other social spaces. As a result, both colleges were able to resist capitulation to “Age of the University” norms, and instead assign important intellectual and civic purposes to the residential liberal arts college in the twentieth century. While begun as emblems of moral paternalism, by the end of World War II both Swarthmore and Haverford had become places which offered opportunity for all its community members to engage in serious intellectual and ethical inquiry and conversation. This opportunity, begotten by the particular narratives and contexts of each institution, would prove vital both to rejecting the consensus discourses of loyalty and conformity, and to enabling resistance to the NDEA’s disclaimer affidavit.

¹⁵⁹ Clark, 256.

Chapter 5: Fighting Oathism—Institutional Differences

In 1959, responses from colleges and universities to the NDEA loyalty provisions varied. At the University of Chicago, for example, the school elected to participate in the Title II programs; however, the institution did not reprimand its twenty-four students who received federal funds, yet refused to sign the disclaimer affidavit. At the University of Pennsylvania, the University Senate (comprised of faculty members) recommended that Penn decline to participate in the program while the disclaimer affidavit was in effect. Both the school's administration and board of trustees opted instead for a stance of urging repeal of Section 1001 (f) while still remaining eligible for Title II funding. After initially enrolling in the federal program, Brigham Young University announced that it would refuse the aid it was granted; instead, the school established its own program that would extend 500 loans of between \$100 and \$500 to its students. The regents of the University of Wisconsin declared the disclaimer affidavit "objectionable" and "purposeless," but nonetheless believed that students with no personal opposition to the loyalty requirements of the NDEA should be free to receive what funds they merited. President Julius Stratton of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology decried the political tests asserted by the law as "misguided" and "discriminatory," but the Institute itself refused to take a stand on the matter. At Dartmouth, President John Dickey inveighed against the loyalty provisions, which he thought imprudent and ineffectual, but also refused to withdraw his school's participation. In terms that seemed to capture higher education's ambiguous responsibility on the issue, Dickey admitted that he was "genuinely puzzled about whether it would be right for a college to deny this opportunity to those students who otherwise might be unable to obtain loans and are willing to sign the affidavit." The less

equivocal Chancellor Robert Johnson of Temple University trenchantly observed that it was difficult for him to sympathize with “the controversy that is going on among some of our leaders in education as to whether or not young people borrowing money from the federal government should be required ... to swear that they are not members of any organization striving to overthrow our country.” Harvard and Yale, on the other hand, made a joint announcement on November 18 declaring their withdrawal from the federal funding program after several months of internal debate by their respective faculties and administrations.¹⁶⁰

In the responses of these and other national universities and organizations to the NDEA disclaimer affidavit, three related themes can be identified. First, schools and associations generally evinced some concern about the meaning of the loyalty provisions from the inception of the program. The record does not allow for a neat, dichotomous narrative in which a small band of morally heroic schools reject the noxious overreaching of the government, while the great majority blithely accept whatever terms are necessary to acquire funds.¹⁶¹ In reality, college presidents and, in particular, faculties at numerous

¹⁶⁰ Caroline Neely, “McCarthyism and Academic Freedom on the University of Chicago Campus,” University of Chicago Humanities Division, <https://coral.uchicago.edu:8443/display/chicago68/McCarthyism+and+Academic+Freedom+on+the+University+of+Chicago+Campus>; *The University of Pennsylvania Almanac* 6, no. 3, (December 1959): 2 <http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/v06pdf/n03/120159.pdf>; Gary James Bergera and Ronald Priddis, *Brigham Young University: A House of Faith* (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1985), 246; University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, “Resolution Concerning Affidavit and Oath Provisions of National Defense Education Act of 1958,” December 3, 1959, <http://digioll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/UWBoR/UWBoR-idx?type=article&did=UWBoR.Dec31959.i0032&id=UWBoR.Dec31959&isize=M>; *The Tech*, “Stratton Denounces NDEA Loyalty Oath,” November 24, 1959, 1, <http://tech.mit.edu/V79/PDF/V79-N43.pdf>; *Harvard Crimson*, “Dartmouth Remains in NDEA Program,” November 11, 1959, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1959/11/19/dartmouth-remains-in-ndea-program-phanover/>; *New York Times*, “Loyalty Oath Backed by Temple Chancellor,” November 6, 1959; *Harvard Crimson*, “Corporation Vote Rejects Student Loan Funds,” November 18, 1959, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1959/11/18/corporation-vote-rejects-ndea-student-loan/>.

¹⁶¹ It should also be noted that the nature of institutional resistance to the NDEA loyalty provisions, both in terms of timing and degree, remains a matter of some confusion. As noted earlier, the *New York Times* announced in late January, 1959, that Bryn Mawr, Haverford, Swarthmore, Bates, Bowdoin, and Colby had led the earliest institutional opposition to the “anti-subversion provision.” In March, *Science* magazine

institutions were troubled by the implications of the Mundt Amendment for the practice of academic freedom. This faculty discomfiture was both anticipated and, perhaps, most robustly expressed by the stance taken by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in the nascent days of the controversy. Through the first half of the twentieth century, the modern university had increasingly distinguished itself from its collegiate forebears by emphasizing disciplinary attachments and departmental organization; as a consequence, it was unsurprising that many scholars looked to their professional organizations—rather than their institutional homes—to give voice to their concerns.¹⁶² As early as November of 1958, both the AAUP's president and general secretary had jointly written to members of both the Senate Labor and Public Welfare

reported that “five insitutions have gone a step further than public statements and have refused to accept educational aid funds until the act has been amended. This group includes Bryn Mawr, Haverford, Swarthmore, Princeton, and Reed.” Two months later, however, Senators John F. Kennedy and Joseph Clark stated in subcommittee hearings that “[a]t least seven colleges have refused to participate in the student loan program solely because of the affidavit requirement,” and went on to list Reed, Antioch, Goucher, Wilmington (OH), Swarthmore, Haverford, Bryn Mawr, and Sarah Lawrence as the schools in question. The next year, the Congress declared that eight institutions (Beloit, Bryn Mawr, Haverford, Mills, Princeton, Swarthmore, Richmond, and Wellesley) had “declined to participate in the student loan program because of the disclaimer affidavit.” Also in 1960, *Science* now held that six schools—Bryn Mawr, Haverford, Mills, Princeton, Richmond, and Swarthmore—had “refused from the beginning to participate in the Act’s [loan] program” because of the disclaimer provisions. Finally, the AAUP stated that “[a]s of March 8, 1960, 20 colleges and universities ha[d], on officially stated grounds, refused to participate in or had withdrawn, in whole or in part, from the National Defense Education Act program because of the disclaimer affidavit requirement.” Broad research suggests that four schools—Bryn Mawr, Haverford, Princeton, and Swarthmore—were the only ones who stood as non-participants from the very beginnings of the program, with Reed almost immediately withdrawing its application in early 1959. That said, there seems little profit in trying to ascertain “who did what first,” as though examining the results of a horserace; rather, the aim is to tell the story of the institutional differences between schools (in this case, Swarthmore and Haverford) which resisted immediately and fully, and those schools whose organizations, histories, financial circumstances, or policy positions made resistance a slower, fractionated, and/or lukewarm expression. See *New York Times*, “Colleges Oppose U.S. Non-Red Oath,” January 22, 1959; “Loyalty Provisions of National Defense Education Act Meet Opposition from Educators and Congressmen,” *Science* 129, no. 3349 (March 6, 1959): 625-626; Senate Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Amending Education Act of 1958: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 819*, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 1959, 2-3; Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Amending the National Defense Education Act to Eliminate the Affidavit of Disloyalty: Report to Accompany S. 2929*, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 1960, S. Rep. 1347, 4; “Repeal of the ‘Non-Communist’ Affidavit in the Education Act To Be a Lively Issue in Congress,” *Science* 131, no. 3399 (February 19, 1960): 488-489; Louis Joughin, “Repealing the Disclaimer Affidavit,” *AAUP Bulletin* 46, no. 1, (Spring 1960): 55.

¹⁶² Veysey, 317-332.

Committee and the House Education and Labor Committee to recommend removal of the loyalty provisions. Their letter railed against the anti-subversive measures (calling them “vague,” “unconstitutional,” and “invidious”), and complained that teachers and students of higher education were being unfairly singled out as suspicious. The AAUP effort would later achieve an even greater prominence with the general secretary’s appearance before the Senate’s education subcommittee, where he would announce that 112 local chapters of his organization had pledged their support in the repeal effort.¹⁶³ Neither presidents nor faculty, then, were wholly or even largely passive when considering the repercussions of the NDEA’s test oath.

Second, though these general concerns about the Mundt Amendment were widely shared, they nonetheless did not prompt a consensus, assertive response from the flagship institutions and organizations of American higher education. Schools like Chicago and Wisconsin left the choice of participation up to individual students, Pennsylvania and Dartmouth made public statements against the loyalty provisions while remaining enrolled in the Title II program, and Harvard, Yale, and BYU ultimately withdrew their grant requests and sought to supplement student aid from their own institutional means. In the same vein, the AAUP’s political campaign, though crucial in keeping the concerns of academe in front of legislators, ultimately saw its early rhetoric tempered by some tactical caution. This reticence was best captured in a statement emerging from the association’s annual meeting in 1960:

¹⁶³ Bentley Glass and William P. Fidler, “Disclaimer Affidavit Requirement: Association Officers Express Disapproval of Title X, Section 1001 (f) (1) of the National Defense Education Act of 1958,” *AAUP Bulletin* 44, no. 4 (Winter 1958): 769-771; Senate Subcommittee, *Amending Education Act of 1958*, 89. For the definitive history on the development and activity of the AAUP in the second half of the twentieth century, see Philo A. Hutcheson, *A Professional Professoriate: Unionization, Bureaucratization, and the AAUP* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000).

The Forty-sixth Annual Meeting urges all chapters of the Association to intensify their efforts towards the elimination of the affidavit requirement of the Education Act. It expresses the earnest hope that Congress will soon repeal it. *Since the needs of higher education are very great, it is most reluctant to suggest any drastic steps which will reduce the amount of available federal aid. Our colleges and universities require more aid, not less* [my italics]. Nevertheless, the Association cannot reconcile itself to this invasion of academic freedom.¹⁶⁴

In fairness to both flagship institutions and the AAUP alike, NDEA was passed during a period marked by anxiety about American intellectual preparedness to meet cold war challenges, persistent use of loyalty oaths and anti-communist tests in public discourse, uncertainties about the meaning of academic freedom, and evidence of an increasingly successful financial partnership between the federal government and research universities. In such a context, the matter of how an academic institution or professional association could and should respond to the disclaimer affidavit was open to a breadth of interpretation, and that interpretive latitude allowed for more conservative expressions of resistance.

The absence of a consensus of assertion was the by-product of the third, and most significant, shared characteristic of these schools. In all cases, the negotiation of the moral and practical murkiness surrounding the NDEA disclaimer affidavit was made more difficult by the transformation of institutional structures and purposes that had been inaugurated during the “Age of the University” and continued throughout the first half of the twentieth century. By 1950, large universities, be they public or private, had

¹⁶⁴ Joughin, “Protesting the Disclaimer Affidavit; the Association, the Colleges, and the Universities,” *AAUP Bulletin* 46, no. 2 (Summer 1960): 205.

expanded their enrollments, their attachment to federal funding, and their missions, all of which conspired to slow and complicate their reactions to instances of ethical uncertainty. The monumental campuses built through land-grant dollars and private philanthropies at the turn of the twentieth century had prompted accelerated enrollment in the interwar years, and the GI Bill helped swell the campuses (and engender further construction) by mid-century; indeed, in 1950 flagship public universities and even Ivy League schools such as Harvard and Yale boasted campus enrollments of well over 5,000 students each.¹⁶⁵ As these schools grew larger, they generally sought institutional prestige not only through the traditional means of selective admissions, but increasingly through the achievements of disciplinary research by their faculties. As a result, attracting external grants—from both federal and private sources—emerged as a more significant priority in high-profile institutions. This increasing reliance on federal research grants and private foundations, however, inevitably necessitated an expanded university administration, opened up the possibility of peripheral intrusion into campus concerns, divided faculty loyalties between institution and profession (the AAUP claimed 41,000 members by 1959, for example), and invited headaches not endured by schools with more traditional means of support.¹⁶⁶ By expanding their customary ambit, the highly visible schools (and the professional organizations which grew up around them) functionally described a discourse of higher education that bore little resemblance to either their denominational forebears or the contemporary small residential colleges at mid-century. While schools

¹⁶⁵ John Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 205-208, 245-249, 260-268; Kirsten G. Studlien, "1946-1950: Harvard and Beyond," *Harvard Crimson*, June 5, 2000, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2000/6/5/1946-1950-harvard-and-beyond-bpfont-size21946fontbpbseptemberbbr4/>; George Pierson, *A Yale Book of Numbers: Historical Statistics of the College and University 1701 – 1976* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1983), A-1.7.

¹⁶⁶ Jencks and Riesman, *The Academic Revolution*, 155-198, 267-270; Thelin, 277; Senate Subcommittee, *Amending Education Act of 1958*, 89.

such as Swarthmore and Haverford continued to emphasize the undergraduate liberal arts tradition on a small scale, the physical and academic “largeness” of national private and flagship public universities was, however unintentionally, promoting the replacement of community with bureaucracy, common function with compartmentalized aims, and a coherent narrative of institutional mission with an emphasis on winning public prestige. These schools, which had relinquished sole authorship of their institutional narrative, were susceptible to what Ernest Boyer would later term a “crisis of purpose,” and the very size and variability of their enterprises rendered the process of engaging with questions of moral and professional propriety potentially unwieldy and ineffectual.¹⁶⁷

In 1959, the year’s highest profile and most publicly documented encounters with the issue, perhaps unsurprisingly, were held at Harvard. Then as now, Harvard University was the wealthiest and most culturally significant institution in American higher education; therefore, its experience should not be made to stand as surrogate for the entirety of major private and research universities at mid-century. Nonetheless, the manner in which the school wrestled with the implications of the NDEA loyalty provisions can still offer a useful example of the challenges faced by educational institutions that were forced to reconcile difficult ethical choices with large-scale research and funding enterprises. In 1958, Harvard had formally applied for \$700,000 in Title II funds, and \$385,000 was granted by the program in early 1959. By the autumn of the same year, however, Harvard’s faculty and administration was wrestling with the implications of the loyalty provisions embedded in the program, and in late September the school froze the funds after the U.S. Senate refused to consider repealing the Mundt

¹⁶⁷ Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 14-15; Ernest Boyer, *Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990), 55.

Amendment. The school's Committee on Education Policy submitted a resolution to the faculty in mid-October of 1959 calling for withdrawal from NDEA participation, and in early November the full faculty voted to advise the Harvard Corporation (President Nathan Pusey and the executive board) to reject the Title II loan funds. On November 18, 1959, in a joint announcement with Yale, Harvard withdrew from the federal funding program.¹⁶⁸

Three years later, after the Senate repealed the Mundt Amendment by voice vote, the *Harvard Crimson* described the school's leadership on the NDEA matter:

Led by President Pusey's continued opposition to the loyalty provisions, the University has refused NDEA loans since November 18, 1959. At that time the Corporation [Pusey and the board of executives] voted to reject \$357,873 of Federal funds assigned to Harvard. Following suit, Yale, Princeton, Haverford, Swarthmore, Amherst, Reed, and other colleges withdraw [sic] from the program.¹⁶⁹

By 1959, Pusey had indeed become a vigorous opponent of the disclaimer affidavit. Early in the year, he had been in correspondence with Senator John F. Kennedy, HEW Secretary Arthur Flemming, and President Dwight Eisenhower, and had urged them all to take a public stand against the disclaimer affidavit in the Title II language. That November, Pusey shared his concerns with his presidential colleagues on the Association of American Universities (AAU), an invitation-only organization of the nation's leading

¹⁶⁸ Alan H. Grossman, "University Suspends Use of NDEA Loan Funds," *Harvard Crimson*, September 30, 1959, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1959/9/30/university-suspends-use-of-ndea-loan/>; Craig K. Comstock, "CEP Urges Withdrawal from NDEA Until Congress Repeals Affidavit," *Harvard Crimson*, October 16, 1959, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1959/10/16/cep-urges-withdrawal-from-ndea-until/>; Peter J. Rothenberg, "Faculty Votes to Ask Refusal of NDEA Funds," *Harvard Crimson*, November 4, 1959, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1959/11/4/faculty-votes-to-ask-refusal-of/>.

¹⁶⁹ *Harvard Crimson*, "Senate Vote Approves Repeal of NDEA Disclaimer Provision," September 28, 1962, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1962/9/28/senate-vote-approves-repeal-of-ndea/>.

doctorate-granting institutions, and followed up with a tour of Washington congressional offices to plead his case. In 1960, Pusey would go on to testify before Congress on behalf of the AAU, where he would describe the disclaimer affidavit as "futile, ineffective and unnecessary" and contrary to "some of the basic elements" fundamental to the practice of democracy and emerging understandings of academic freedom in the United States. Using the bully pulpit of the Harvard presidency, Pusey ultimately emerged as an eloquent and persistent spokesperson for the values of open academic inquiry and student freedom from government-imposed political oaths.¹⁷⁰

Pusey's personal efforts notwithstanding, however, it is not wholly accurate to characterize Harvard as leading the vanguard of anti-NDEA resistance. While Pusey had been a longstanding advocate for the protection of academic freedom—before coming to Harvard, he had stood against McCarthyism as president of Lawrence (WI) College—when the NDEA became law in 1958, he applauded the law's passage. Though he established his disdain for the loyalty provisions immediately by terming them "rude" and "unworthy," Pusey also commended the Congress for seeing the virtue of a general subsidy for higher education, and Harvard applied for nearly three-quarters of a million dollars in government funds.¹⁷¹ In applying for NDEA support, Harvard was hardly acting alone, certainly, but its application also contradicts later hagiography which suggested schools like Swarthmore and Haverford were "following suit" when they refused participation in the Title II program. Like the great, great majority of American

¹⁷⁰ Eisenhower to Pusey, June 1, 1959, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, vol. 20, *The Presidency: Keeping the Peace*, ed. Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 1505; Geiger, *To Advance Knowledge*, 18-19; Urban, 185-186; "Student Affidavit," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 16 (Washington, DC.: Congressional Quarterly, 1960), 238-39.

¹⁷¹ Schrecker, 202-203; Beth E. Braiterman, "NDEA Grants Ignite Debate Over Cold War Loyalty," *Harvard Crimson* May 21, 2012, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2012/5/21/ndea-grants-loyalty-oath/>.

colleges and universities, Harvard's resistance to the Mundt Amendment was decidedly rhetorical in 1958 and 1959.

This gulf between the articulation and the practice of principles during the cold war era at Harvard University did not originate with the NDEA disclaimer affidavit. During the McCarthy era, the school stood alongside its Ivy League compatriots and other distinguished universities in its willingness to cooperate with congressional investigations into their faculty ranks. These high-profile schools often made public proclamations regarding the necessity of protecting faculty rights, only to give halting defense to dissenting colleagues when inquiries were made. When Harvard physics professor Wendell Furry was indicted in 1950 for refusing to cooperate with a congressional subpoena, the school refused to fire him; at the same time, however, it refused to hire lawyers to assist in Furry's defense. While Furry enjoyed considerable support from his physics department colleagues, and though the government's case against him was eventually dropped, Harvard did place the scientist on three-year probation for seeking protection under the Fifth Amendment during the investigation. Shortly after the Furry episode, in 1954, Harvard was once again embroiled in issues of loyalty and dissent in the case of historian Raymond Ginger. After having receiving an anonymous tip that the scholar and his wife were about to be brought before the Massachusetts Commission to Investigate Communism, school officials asked both the Gingers to sign an anti-Communist loyalty oath. When the pair refused, Ginger was quietly forced to resign. A colleague would later describe Harvard's approach to the era's loyalty witch hunts as

“discreet collaboration with McCarthyism with the primary concern of avoiding criticism.”¹⁷²

As with its initial acquiescence to the stipulations of Title II, Harvard’s institutional association with the forces of McCarthyism represented a typical approach within a political discourse that had normalized the primacy of loyalty, consensus, and conformity. In both episodes, that is, Harvard was not an outlier within the realm of American higher education, and thus should not be singled out for special reprimand; indeed, students and faculty throughout the 1950s, as with their contemporaries in the broader American polity, seemed content to avoid dispute of the potentially vital political issues of the day.¹⁷³ At the same time, the school should not be commended for establishing resistance to these anti-academic crusades, for it did not provide original leadership in this regard. In both instances, Harvard was something of a house divided, as various campus stakeholders took up contrary positions—often divided along faculty and Corporation lines—on matters of societal status, political obeisance, and academic freedom.

The school was not only split on how to engage politically, but also on the virtue of engaging at all. Though Pusey established himself as an ally of the anti-NDEA position and Harvard’s faculty was generally active in its opposition to anti-Communist purges and political loyalty tests throughout the 1950s, the students themselves offered little in the way of dissent. During the McCarthy area, Harvard undergraduates were described

¹⁷² Jonathan R. Cole, *The Great American University* (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 360-362; Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 195-205; Lewis, *Cold War on Campus*, 69-76; Michael Sletcher, “The Loyalty of Educators and Public Employees: Opposition to Loyalty Oaths in Twentieth-Century Massachusetts and the U.S. Supreme Court,” *Massachusetts Historical Review* 12 (2010): 48; Robert N. Bellah, letter to the editor, *New York Review of Books*, February 10, 2005.

¹⁷³ Robb Burlage, “The Silent Faculty,” *The Nation*, May 16, 1959, 444.

as a “Silent Generation” who, like the majority of students nationwide, tended to refuse political commitments while their teachers were being put on trial. Those who did choose a path of activism usually opted to affirm the period’s embrace of conformity and loyalty; indeed, in 1953 Harvard students rescinded a speaking invitation to *Spartacus* author and Communist Party member Howard Fast, with the declaration that to continue on with the program would “embarrass” the university.¹⁷⁴ Five years later, the NDEA debate was met with similar student apathy, as the issue which had become a hot-button topic for faculty remained largely uninteresting to their charges. Not all students were unconcerned: a heated *Crimson* editorial in late April of 1959, concluded that “[t]he affidavit requirement is not only ineffective. It is invidious, and Congress should repeal it without delay.” Later, Harvard would report that a joint student-faculty letter-writing committee had moved some 2,000 students nationwide to join their campaign in sending cards and letters to their legislative representatives.¹⁷⁵ In the main, however, the debate gained little footing in undergraduate precincts. The paucity of student engagement with the issue is perhaps best captured by an article in the student paper written in the midst of the faculty uproar over the loyalty provision in the autumn of 1959. Entitled “A Blow for Freedom,” the piece celebrated an act of student dissent—forgoing coffee and substituting an extra fruit juice, in violation of the school breakfast plan, at the Harkness Commons dining hall.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 92-93; Nathan J. Heller and Jessica R. Rubin-Willis, “In the Red?”, June 2, 2003, <http://www.thecrimson.harvard.edu/article/2003/6/2/in-the-red-when-alan-l/>.

¹⁷⁵ “Repeal of the ‘Non-Communist’ Affidavit in the Education Act To Be a Lively Issue in Congress,” 488-489.

¹⁷⁶ Braiterman, “NDEA Grants Ignite Debate Over Cold War Loyalty”; *Harvard Crimson*, “Misguided Patriotism,” April 28, 1959, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1959/4/28/misguided-patriotism-prefusing-to-accept-federal/>; Jules Novick, “A Blow for Freedom,” *Harvard Crimson*, October 16, 1959, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1959/10/16/a-blow-for-freedom-ptthis-is/>.

While Harvard ultimately found the costs of NDEA participation unacceptable and eventually used its high profile to oppose the loyalty provisions, in 1958 the school—along with hundreds of others—enrolled in the program, at least for a short period of time. This does not mean that academic freedom was an unimportant construct at Harvard and other participating schools, or that college administrators were so addled by the prospect of government subsidy that they rushed into agreement without thinking. The reality, at Harvard and at other ambitious, visible schools, was more complicated. In the name of institutional growth (or merely institutional survival), both public and private universities had partnered with government offices and private foundations throughout the first half of the twentieth century; moreover, a number of schools had developed a working relationship with state and federal governments during the McCarthy period. By 1958, the notion of seeking reasonable compromise with external agencies in order to enhance or protect status, both financial and social, was hardly unknown in the circles of elite higher education. To be sure, the nation's universities did not walk in lockstep in the way that they responded to external pressures for conformity and internal drives for faculty autonomy; indeed, local pressures, degree of status anxiety, and type of campus leadership helped shape the manner in which schools encountered the discourse of loyalty and conformity that had been normalized in American cold war-era politics.¹⁷⁷ The idiosyncrasies of individual schools notwithstanding, general acceptances of the Mundt Amendment were not a radical departure from standard administrative practice at the preponderance of research and high-profile universities during the cold war.

These standard practices, in turn, revealed the degree to which many universities were beset by confusion regarding the proper and legitimate responsibilities of academic

¹⁷⁷ Freeland, 3-12.

institutions to both its constituents and society at large. Though a great many were seemingly free of the financial peril that attended smaller, more parochial schools, “name brand” schools often found themselves in positions of philosophical incoherence regarding their principal aims and mission. Clear, shared understandings regarding the purpose of higher learning had been eroded by the twentieth century pushes for research funding, campus expansion, and faculty autonomy, and further battered by the political pressures and financial opportunities specific to the cold war. While the modernization of the American university had enabled higher-order research, expanded access, and reduced denominational parochialism, it failed to protect on-campus structures and cultures which could nurture and protect institutional missions shared by a community, or the “saga” specific to a given school.¹⁷⁸ As a consequence, when institutions paused to reflect upon the meaning of the NDEA loyalty provisions, they often found themselves lost in a sea of competing narratives about the rights, obligations, and functions of various campus constituencies. Under such strained conditions, institutions of higher education found it difficult both to articulate and to defend moral norms in a timely, decisive, and reliable fashion.

In contrast to the balkanized sense of mission and community that often prevailed at large-scale public and private research universities by 1958, Swarthmore and Haverford had retained a strong sense of identity and purpose to which the great majority of community members seemed to subscribe. In general, the small size of residential colleges can enable more nimble, more visible responses to opportunities for change and action, as they are not burdened with the varied commitments and bureaucratic

¹⁷⁸ Lewis, *Cold War on the Campus*, 273-276.

infrastructure that attends large universities.¹⁷⁹ In the case of Swarthmore and Haverford at mid-century, this rule was enacted in full. As they had in the first half of the twentieth century, both schools had managed to retain a clear and understood appreciation of what made each institution distinctive within the world of American higher education, and it was this appreciation—along with the conditions which enabled it—that allowed the two Main Line colleges to react more quickly, assertively, and consistently when encountering the NDEA loyalty provisions.

Part of Swarthmore and Haverford's success at defending an enduring and coherent institutional mission in the decades following World War II rested upon their commitment to remaining small-scale, residential campuses. Immediately after the war, many small private colleges confronted uncertain financial times, as post-war inflation sent campus costs spiraling upward and traditional budgets were strained. In the wake of the GI Bill, the relative accessibility of higher education had increased demand for it; accordingly, liberal arts colleges could seek to meet their fiscal needs simply by expanding enrollment and bringing in more tuition revenue. Those colleges wishing to preserve both a sense of distinction and a scale compatible with their customary educational philosophies resisted this option, and instead chose a path of increasingly selective admissions within the expanded applicant pool in the post-war period. While this solution did not directly help the schools' balance sheets, it did reaffirm their commitment both to smallness and to a cohesive sense of community, and allowed them further discretion in choosing a student body compatible with their institutional norms.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Schuman, 2.

¹⁸⁰ Thelin, "Small by Design: Resilience in an Era of Mass Higher Education," in Wilcox, *Meeting the Challenge*, 8-9.

Certainly, schools with healthy internal narratives and comparative wealth were best positioned to chart this course. Rather than answering potential financial concerns with expanded enrollment, a revolutionized mission, or massive increases in tuition, reasonably secure schools like Swarthmore and Haverford were able to lean on private support from foundations, alumni, and Quaker donors. For example, the capacity of small liberal arts schools to adhere to traditional missions was strengthened by the creation of the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education (FAE) in 1951. Ford's new enterprise was designed to combat trends toward narrowness and specialization in higher educational curriculum and teaching, as well to supply colleges with financial resources to aid more (or different kinds of) students. Like the NDEA, the Ford monies were offered as part of a larger political project; rather than privileging national defense, however, the FAE articulated a connection between liberal arts learning, expanded access, and democratic citizenship. To this end, Ford granted over \$200 million to more than 600 private liberal arts college in 1955.¹⁸¹ Both Swarthmore and Haverford applied for these Ford Foundation gifts, and the awards granted were used to enhance faculty salaries. Swarthmore received a grant of \$707,000 from Ford, while the gift Haverford received helped the school raise faculty salaries by 40 percent from 1951 to 1957. These foundational grants not only allowed the schools to retain quality teachers, but also freed those teachers to focus on liberal arts teaching and interaction with students, rather than the pursuit of research funding.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Thelin, "Small by Design," 14; H. Rowan Gaither, *Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program* (Detroit: Ford Foundation, 1949), 37-43. For a more thorough treatment of the historical influence of the Ford Foundation, see Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

¹⁸² Walton, 65; Gilbert White, "Report of the President," *Haverford College Bulletin* 55, no. 2 (October 1956): 6; Hugh Borton, Howard M. Teaf, and Aaron Lemonick, "Guide for Planning the Future Size of

With the comparative financial security that these schools enjoyed and cultivated in the post-World War II period, both were able to maintain powerful institutional narratives that stressed deep involvement in the college community by its members, free intellectual inquiry, and pursuit of moral ideals rooted in the Quaker tradition. For example, though it did not necessarily claim the popular profile that attended national universities such as Yale, Chicago, or Stanford, in the two decades after World War II, Swarthmore maintained its reputation in educational circles as a place of academic excellence, communal sensibility, and ethical purpose. The honors tutorial program, inaugurated by Frank Aydelotte, continued to provide a singular intellectual experience to the school's most ambitious men and women, an experience unavailable to the lion's share of even the most talented undergraduates at the nation's top research universities. Beyond scholarly exploration, the arrangement promoted a collaborative approach between students and faculty, rather than the standard hierarchical (and sometimes adversarial) relationship that prevailed in typical undergraduate classes.¹⁸³ Tutorial teaching was a mechanism that reaffirmed the notion that Swarthmore existed to serve the learning of its students, not the research of its faculty.

The sense of empowerment, partnership, and purpose that students felt in the Swarthmore classroom seemed to promote similar tendencies in the realm of socio-political awareness and activism. During a period often generalized as a time of student disengagement and complacency, Swarthmore was, by contrast, the site of considerable civic activity. On campus, the 1950s saw movements of anti-McCarthy petitioning, support for the Vietnamese suffering under French imperialism, and even a challenge of

Haverford College," minutes of Haverford college faculty, November 19, 1959, <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/3715/1954-1955.pdf?sequence=1>.

¹⁸³ Jencks and Riesman, 62-63.

mandatory student attendance at Collection, a weekly gathering of the school community.¹⁸⁴ With its involved undergraduates and its recurrent commitment to student political activity, Swarthmore stood out among institutions in American higher education in the era before the more widespread youth movements of the later 1960s. The shared sense of civic virtue and political consciousness did not, of course, emerge by happenstance; rather, it was an intended outcome of a collegiate project that charged students “not only to search for hidden truths but, having found them, to assess them in terms of their moral implications.”¹⁸⁵

For their part, Swarthmore faculty seemed to understand and welcome the role required of them by the institution’s saga. While still devoted to their disciplines and to colleagues within academia, their principal community was that of the campus itself, and this community received their attention and support. For example, Swarthmore professors embraced the mutual pursuit of knowledge required of the honors program; indeed, a 1963 survey showed that seven of eight faculty believed that the majority of their colleagues were interested in the academic problems of their students. By contrast, only 34 percent of faculty at a top research university—the University of California, Berkeley—believed the same about their counterparts on campus. In addition, Swarthmore faculty members were five times more likely to describe their colleagues as “strongly interested in students’ lives outside the classroom” than those teaching at Berkeley.¹⁸⁶

The importance of a community mindset was further avowed for the faculty by the prevailing approach to decision-making on policy matters. In committee and general

¹⁸⁴ Carl Levin, “Speaking Truth to Power,” in Youman, *The Meaning of Swarthmore*, 63-66.

¹⁸⁵ O’Brien, 17; Jed Rakoff, “The Ghost Lives,” in Youman, *The Meaning of Swarthmore*, 84.

¹⁸⁶ Clark, 212, 268.

faculty meetings in the post-war period, the traditional Quaker practice of “the sense of the meeting” still obtained, with its assumption that solutions to concerns of the college would emerge from collective dialogue and deliberation. The committee chair or faculty dean would not call for votes or balloting on particular issues, but rather guarantee a climate in which a shared explanation would emerge from individual self-examination and reasonable discussion. Such an approach, of course, was, as now, exceedingly rare in American professional life, and stood in especial contrast to the method of policy-making in mid-century universities, where private or factional interests and parliamentary procedures reigned in faculty and administrative governance. Where faculties of other, larger institutions tended to balkanize along disciplinary lines or according to bureaucratic functions, Swarthmore’s small group of professors tended to find unity, both in the context of the “sense of the meeting,” but also in the broader account of their school’s purpose, character, and virtues.¹⁸⁷

Throughout the post-war period, then, Swarthmore continued to situate its students and faculty within a narrative that insisted upon both respect for individual conscience and truth-seeking, while also demanding mutual care for and interest in community members. By foregrounding this mission in both cultural and rhetorical practice, Swarthmore maintained its traditional concern with social and moral issues at a time when the still-active forces of “academic revolution” continued to push larger schools toward increasingly utilitarian and/or research-focused missions.¹⁸⁸ The sense of distinctiveness that Swarthmore retained throughout the period was captured nicely by a visiting committee which evaluated the school on behalf of the Middle States Association

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 214-215.

¹⁸⁸ Jencks and Riesman, 328

of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Remarking on its findings in the 1957-58 academic year, it noted:

In the judgment of the Committee, Swarthmore is achieving its stated objectives with marked success. Its reputation for superior academic training and wholesome student life is well deserved. High goals of intellectual attainment, moral discipline, and bodily fitness are set and adhered to. The College is characterized throughout by a concern for excellence. The Committee finds it hard to name a friendlier or more unified institution.¹⁸⁹

Like Swarthmore, Haverford had emerged in the first half of the twentieth century as an institution which allowed room for students and faculty alike to pursue weighty academic and moral issues, while still honoring Quaker traditions of respect for and obligations to community. The school continued to adhere to its time-honored institutional verities throughout the post-World War II period, both in the articulation of its vision and the practices which underpinned it. For example, the *Haverford College Bulletin* proudly proclaimed in 1956 that

[a]s a Quaker college, Haverford stresses in its educational policy the importance of personal and social ideals.... The College is not satisfied with scholarship and intellectual expertness alone, though it values highly these qualities... Haverford will stress increasingly the importance of sound ethical judgment based upon clear perception of individual and social aims.¹⁹⁰

This pledge, given in the abstract, was supported in practice through a community marked by a dedication of all its members—administration, students, and faculty—to the

¹⁸⁹ “Report of the President,” *Swarthmore College Bulletin* 56, no. 4 (January 1959): 13.

¹⁹⁰ *Haverford College Bulletin* 55, no. 1 (July 1956): 19.

institution's fundamental mission. President Gilbert White, who led Haverford from 1946 to 1955, proved himself a relentless champion of higher education that sought to harmonize intellectual achievement, social awareness, and moral application. A devoted Quaker himself, White took several dramatic steps during his presidency that helped reaffirm the institutional identity that marked Haverford as its own kind of "counter-culture" during a period of university expansion and political conformity. One of White's first actions upon assuming his office was the introduction of Friends' business procedure—"the sense of the meeting"—to faculty and committee meetings on campus. Unlike Swarthmore, parliamentary procedure had been the rule in Haverford's faculty gatherings for decades, and its professors expressed an initial reluctance to part with a known practice; after a trial period of a year, however, the faculty voted to make the Friends' approach permanent, and White had won an important victory for the school's senses of community and Quaker heritage.¹⁹¹

Such commitments were further strengthened through public stands White took on the behalf of both students and faculty during his tenure. For example, he provided explicit and assertive backing for those undergraduates who selected the path of conscientious objection during the Korean War. In January 1951, he appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness as part of hearings on the Universal Military Training and Service Act. During the height of cold war anxiety, White used his testimony to oppose the draft, and instead called for the leadership of educational institutions in developing moral and intellectual awareness, dispositions suited for a war against poverty and discrimination, not other nations and people. Similarly, the president once eschewed a ceremonial program where he was to be lauded so that he could testify on behalf of a

¹⁹¹ Potter, 55-56.

student in front of the young man's draft board.¹⁹² White also ardently defended faculty members subjected to the slander and tactics of McCarthyism, most notably Ira Reid, Haverford's first black professor. Reid, a sociologist and scholarly expert on racism, had been hired by White in 1947, and his activism for world peace often brought accusations of fellow-traveling. When Reid's passport was confiscated under suspicions of disloyalty, Haverford—led by White—refused to dismiss him, and instead fought successfully to have Reid's right to travel restored.¹⁹³

Like Swarthmore, Haverford sought to continue encouragement of a morally competent community not only through support of social and political engagement, but also by way of faculty-student interaction and attentive teaching. Having reached a post-war crest of nearly 560 students in 1948, the college assiduously worked to shrink its enrollment over the course of the next decade, while at the same time hiring more members of the faculty. These steps, taken to create conditions congenial to meaningful teaching, learning, and dialogue, signaled a step resistance to the trend toward expansion and research that marked so much of mid-century higher education. This resistance was further annealed by a post-World War II revision of the college's curriculum, a revision emphasizing general courses, taught in small classes, in order to encourage "the breadth of outlook necessary to sound judgment." This respect for student experience, rooted in the college's self-understanding as a Quaker enterprise, helped sustain an undergraduate culture marked by enthusiastic self-government, concern for the welfare of the

¹⁹² Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Committee on Armed Services, *Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951: Hearings Before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on S. 1*, 82nd Congress, 1st sess., 1951, 1007; *The Fractured 40s: The Women and Men of the 1940s Tell Their Stories* (Haverford, PA: Haverford Alumni Association, 1996), 34.

¹⁹³ Kevin Foley, "Social Science," in Kannerstein, *The Spirit and the Intellect*, 82-83.

institution's members, and activity in pursuit of common goods.¹⁹⁴ At Haverford, then, the tradition of taking students seriously as both moral and intellectual agents persisted, and was reinforced not only by the allocation of appropriate resources, but also by the participation of the students themselves.

The Haverford faculty members, like their Swarthmore counterparts, were also visible exponents of their institution's cultural mores, even if these tenets did not fall comfortably within the nation's larger political and educational discourse. In 1954—more than four years before the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy began in earnest—the school's professors appointed a group to report on “the kind and the possible consequences of information regarding individual students at Haverford... which Government agencies have on several occasions sought from faculty members.”¹⁹⁵ This group produced a statement that would run in the pages of the AAUP *Bulletin* in 1955, and was notable not only for its defense of free inquiry in the academy during an era of oaths and loyalty tests, and also its conception of this defense as a *community* issue, rather than merely a professorial one. The declaration expressed support for the academic liberty of adults, to be sure, but pointedly focused on the intellectual needs and moral status of students as well, with its assertion that

there must exist a special relationship among students and faculty in their professional association. Members of the college community should feel confident that expression of their ideas will be regarded as a strictly professional

¹⁹⁴ Quinn, “Haverford's Presidents,” in Kannerstein, *The Spirit and the Intellect*, 34-35; Jencks and Riesman, 58.

¹⁹⁵ Howard Comfort, Edward Snyder, and Philip Bell, Report of the Temporary Committee on Campus Security Checks by Federal Agencies, minutes of Haverford College faculty, December 6, 1954, <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/3715/1954-1955.pdf?sequence=1>.

matter. We believe that this relationship of trust is indispensable to a college community if it is to serve its proper function in society.¹⁹⁶

This was a view of higher education as an endeavor shared between students and faculty, a conversation demanding autonomy and respect for all its participants. It was articulated at a time when the meaning of academic freedom was very much in question, and on the occasions when it was summoned, it was generally to protect the research interests of faculty, not the inquiries of undergraduates. Haverford's pronouncement reflected the spirit of a faculty that had, at mid-century, inherited a tradition of Quaker inclusion, privileged both the trust and the expectations that properly belong to members of a community, and which saw higher education's fundamental purpose as affiliated with the exploration of the significance of ideas and the interrogation of values, and not merely with the creation of new knowledge through research.

In general, both Swarthmore and Haverford expressed a singularity and clarity of purpose at mid-century and beyond that schools of greater profile and prominence could not provide, and this difference was never more evident than in the ways various institutions tried to make sense of the NDEA loyalty requirements. In October 1961, for example, the *Harvard Crimson* offered an acerbic interpretation of the role that had been played by the university in the resistance to Section 1001 (f). It chided President Nathan Pusey for his equivocal approach to the law two years' prior, when Pusey had both "applaud[ed] the high motives which prompted Congress to pass the... Act" while at the same time characterizing the attendant loyalty provision as "odious." Likewise, a student editorial observed that while Harvard had erroneously fancied itself "as a glorious leader"

¹⁹⁶ "Government Security Checks: Statement of the Haverford College Faculty," *AAUP Bulletin* 44, no. 2 (Summer, 1958): 402.

in the effort to lead “other, less powerful, less enlightened schools” in the fight against governmental overreach, a more honest assessment would see the university’s efforts as “quixotic” and tardier than those of the eleven schools that had opposed the program before Harvard had “made up its mind.”¹⁹⁷ By the time of NDEA’s passage, Harvard—like so many other universities—had become a site of competing purposes, and its student newspaper laid bare some of the difficulties the school had in juggling multiple identities—undergraduate college, research university, industry leader, profitable corporation, and so on.

In contrast, Swarthmore and Haverford occupied a humbler plane of American higher education, one which focused on reconciling a traditional collegiate mission—and also, for these two schools, a Quaker heritage—with the nation’s changing cultural and political circumstances. Their institutional missions were not, of course, somehow “better,” on some absolute moral scale, than those of larger, national research universities, and certainly the two colleges endured periods (both prior to and during the post-World War II era) where support for these missions was far from unanimous among key campus constituencies. Nonetheless, both Swarthmore and Haverford had maintained campus cultures, structures, and narratives which made them distinctive within post-World War II American postsecondary education, and it was these very cultures, structures, and narratives which ineluctably shaped their distinctive response to the NDEA disclaimer affidavit.

¹⁹⁷ “NDEA Loyalty Provisions Brought Fruitless Battle For Educators Since 1958,” *Harvard Crimson*, October 4, 1961, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1961/10/4/ndea-loyalty-provisions-brought-fruitless-battle/> ; Michael S. Lottman, “On the Other Hand,” *Harvard Crimson*, October 3, 1961, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1961/10/3/on-the-other-hand-pithe-following/>.

Chapter 6: “The College Has Confidence in Its Students”— Days of Dissent

By the late 1950s, Swarthmore and Haverford bore more than a passing resemblance to one another in terms of mission, culture, and heritage. They were not identical institutions, of course: the former expressed Hicksite Quakerism, co-education, and a celebrated honors tutorial system; the latter favored the Orthodox Friends tradition, an all-male campus, and a more traditional (while still rigorous) approach to the liberal arts tradition. The two schools were readily and obviously affiliated, however, in terms of the narratives they articulated regarding the centrality of community, engagement, and moral discourse to their institutions. These institutional stories left Swarthmore and Haverford uncommonly well-prepared (when compared with other organizations in higher education) to resist the federal disclaimer affidavit, and this preparation was both encouraged and utilized by Courtney Smith and Hugh Borton, the presidents of Swarthmore and Haverford, respectively, during the five-year period of contesting NDEA loyalty provisions.

While the power of institutional history, culture, and identity to catalyze political action cannot and should not be neglected, neither should the role that can be played by effective presidents of residential liberal arts colleges. One need not subscribe to a “Great Man Theory” of history or organizational studies to appreciate the outsized influence small college presidents can have on the character, hopes, and values of the schools they lead, especially when compared to their counterparts at larger, less coherent and nimble research universities with exponentially more stakeholders.¹⁹⁸ At mid-century, the leaders at Swarthmore and Haverford were charged with telling the stories of their schools, and they did so with enthusiasm.

¹⁹⁸ Schuman, 99.

In 1953, thirty-seven year-old Courtney Smith became Swarthmore's second post-Frank Aydelotte president. Arriving from Princeton, where he had served as English professor and director of the American Rhodes Scholarship Committee (the direct successor to Aydelotte himself in the position), Smith immediately proclaimed his fidelity to Swarthmore's mission of both scholarship and ethical reflection. In his inaugural address, Smith unequivocally defended his new school's time-honored sensibility:

We have no intention of relinquishing our academic excellence.... But it is not enough to develop intellect, for intellect by itself is essentially amoral, capable of evil as well as good. We must develop the character which makes intellect constructive, and the personality which makes it effective.... A balanced community requires more than the valedictorian and salutatorian...¹⁹⁹

Though holding a doctorate from Harvard, where he had completed his undergraduate degree as well, Smith had also been a Rhodes Scholar, and the well-roundedness demanded of such an honorific was apparent in his views on teaching and learning. Smith held that higher education should promote development and activity in the social and moral realms, as well as the intellectual, and he was thus an outspoken champion of the small liberal arts college environment. Though Swarthmore was renowned for the academic rigor of its honors program, Smith was most pleased with its seminar-style approach to learning, an approach which emphasized dialogue, encouraged freer thought, and demanded that students take a stand behind their ideas. A large part of collegiate curriculum's aim, he believed, was to prepare students to embrace a life of service, leadership, and critical encounters with the moral and political issues of the day. This

¹⁹⁹ Hunt, 9.

required not only a talented, inquisitive student body, but also a faculty that had developed and could model intellectual and moral virtues, as well as the vocabulary to share them fruitfully with their charges. At bottom, Smith conceived of undergraduate education as a type of ongoing discussion, and when deployed by teachers and students who enjoyed close relationships, this exchange would both support and interrogate conventional ideas and culture, encourage evaluation and reevaluation, and cultivate dispositions of curiosity and conviction. The liberal arts, properly done, were for Smith less a series of subjects than the product of an inclusive community dialogue.²⁰⁰ This view was entirely congruent with Swarthmore's longstanding educational approach and, despite his status as a born Presbyterian and Harvard alum reared in Iowa, in Smith's personal and educational values "he was squarely in the Swarthmore tradition, more of an insider than many at the college."²⁰¹

As Courtney Smith was establishing himself as the inheritor of Frank Aydelotte's philosophical project, Hugh Borton was finding his way back home. Borton had graduated from Haverford in 1926, before entering into a career as an academic and expert on East Asia. He started his career at Columbia University as a professor of Japanese, and then joined the State Department during World War II, and ultimately served as one of the principal architects of the post-war Allied plan for Japan. After concluding his work in Japan, Borton returned to Columbia, where he eventually rose to

²⁰⁰ Darwin H. Stapleton and Donna Heckman Stapleton, *Dignity, Discourse, and Destiny: The Life of Courtney C. Smith* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 76-84.

²⁰¹ Clark, 217.

the post as director of the school's East Asian Institute, which he led until his appointment at Haverford in 1957.²⁰²

Though he may have appeared, at first glance, to be the perfect candidate to lead Haverford—he was, after all, both an alumnus and a life-long Friend—Borton's first days in office were not greeted with enthusiasm. Where Swarthmore's Smith exhibited an almost irresistible sense of youthful vigor and accomplishment, his counterpart at Haverford, Borton, seemed more diffident and cerebral by comparison. Not as young as Smith had been upon taking office (Borton was 54 when he was inaugurated), he did not project the same aura of inspiration and dynamism that both Smith and Borton's Haverford predecessor, Gilbert White, made essential parts of their presidential personas. Though he had lived in such cosmopolitan environs as New York City and Japan, Borton's personality was in keeping with the strict moral code of Quakerism under which he had been raised. His had been a childhood of family Bible study, hours of silent worship, and a friend and family circle populated almost exclusively by Quakers. His formal secondary and undergraduate schooling was completed at Friends institutions, and it had been the American Friends Service Committee which initially brought Borton to Japan in 1928.²⁰³ While far from sheltered, Borton's upbringing and early career had emphasized quiet service and introspection, and it was not immediately clear to his campus constituents that he could provide the out-front leadership that would preserve the distinctive institutional culture that had emerged at Haverford during the first half of the twentieth century.

²⁰² Eric Pace, "Hugh Borton, 92, Expert on Japan and Ex-College President, Dies," *New York Times*, August 9, 1995. For a lengthier exploration of Borton's life and work, see Hugh Borton, *Spanning Japan's Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).

²⁰³ Borton, 2-5, 13-15.

This concern was, for some, exacerbated by Borton's inaugural address on October 19, 1957, when he stated his interest in gradually expanding the school's enrollment to meet the rising demand for higher education in the wake of the successes of the GI Bill. He gently admonished the tendency of old Haverfordians to assert that "the college was of ideal size at the time of their graduation," and instead countered that "[t]he ideal size of any institution is relative to both internal and external factors."²⁰⁴ Though the expansion that Borton proposed was actually rather moderate, and would allow for an enlarged and diversified faculty, apprehensions about the direction the new president favored thus persisted.²⁰⁵

On the eve of the passage of NDEA, then, the two Main Line schools both enjoyed traditions that privileged community, respect for individual conscience, and the pursuit of both scholarly and ethical ideals. At the same time, however, their respective presidents seemed to be striking different tones. Courtney Smith had use his inaugural address to outline an educational philosophy that appeared to epitomize the Swarthmore ethos, with its emphasis on values, responsibility, and the free pursuit of truth; on the other hand,

²⁰⁴ *Haverford College Record* (Haverford, PA: Haverford College, 1958), 28.

²⁰⁵ Potter, 56. In his subsequent pursuit of his proposal—pursuit which began in earnest *after* the NDEA situation—Borton effectively demonstrated the depth of his understanding of and commitment to Haverford's intellectual and ethical mission. In April of 1959, he began a collaborative study of the issue with two faculty colleagues, and presented the findings to the entire faculty to gain the "sense of the meeting" in November. The report represented a triumph of Haverford's long-held ideals, as it suggested that any pursuit of expansion had to be compatible with "an atmosphere in which every student acquires a clear insight into unchanging moral values of life, a quickening awareness of the life of the spirit within in him, and a deepening faith in God and that of God in everyone." For Borton and his co-authors, this atmosphere required that students could "identify themselves with such a small group and feel they are not insignificant parts of it. The student's feeling of participation as a full member of the community, which is the college, is very much more easily fostered in a small college where students share a common over-all experience. In a small college this of [sic] common experience is founded on and reinforced by a single liberal-arts curriculum and by the significant possibility for the gathering of the entire college body for meals, to hear a speaker or a concert, or to participate in group worship." For Borton, expansion could not and would not be pursued if it compromised the college's capacity to propose moral values and personal ideals, to create a community where members knew and cared for each other, and to give students a legitimate chance to participate in the shaping of campus culture. The faculty ultimately supported this proposal for expansion, and its application began in 1961. See Borton, Teaf, and Lemonick, *Guide for Planning the Future Size of Haverford College*.

Borton's opening speech raised eyebrows on campus, and some wondered if this Friend and alumnus was attuned to the culture to which he was returning. While events would soon demonstrate that Smith was indeed an appropriate spokesman for his community's needs, they would also give Borton the opportunity to re-establish himself as an ardent defender of Haverford's best traditions.

The NDEA disclaimer controversy that would eventually trouble both schools did not, initially, cause profound consternation at either college. Having been deliberated upon over the summer and passed in early September of 1958, NDEA was not attuned to rhythms of the collegiate calendar; as a consequence, campus reaction to the law was restrained at both Swarthmore and Haverford, as students and faculty channeled their energies into more parochial concerns. At Swarthmore, the student newspaper focused on campus building projects, a poison ivy epidemic, and the possibility of playing "intellectual" football; Haverford's opening faculty meeting, meanwhile, saw consensus approval of the addition of the assistant director of admissions to the list of those eligible for health benefits through the college.²⁰⁶ Such understandable focuses on the niceties and necessities of everyday college experience and administration would soon have conversational competition, however, as the potential implications of NDEA came into sharper relief in administrative, faculty, and student circles.

At Swarthmore, consideration of the disclaimer affidavit truly began in earnest in November of 1958, and within the community there existed no clear consensus on how to proceed. In the presidential office, the issue had become an area of especial concern after one of Courtney Smith's informal semi-monthly presidential meetings with Hugh Borton

²⁰⁶ *Swarthmore Phoenix*, September 19, 1958, 1-6; minutes of Haverford College faculty, September 22, 1958, <http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/3711/1958-1959.pdf?sequence=3>.

and Katherine McBride of Bryn Mawr, shortly after the law's passage. McBride had pointed out that the loyalty provisions seemed to constitute a threat to both academic and moral conversation on college campuses.²⁰⁷ While full non-participation apparently was never explicitly advocated, McBride did move that the three Quaker schools publicly oppose the disclaimer and offer loans to those students not wishing to sign it. Borton agreed, but Smith, however, did not; whatever his sympathies, he sought broader conversation on the issue.²⁰⁸ Proceeding deliberately but patiently, Smith wrote Theodore Distler, Executive Director of the American Association of Colleges (AAC), an advocacy group composed principally of small colleges and dedicated to advancing the aims of liberal education. Smith queried Distler about the general level of concern among his presidential colleagues regarding the disclaimer affidavit—or if they were even aware of it. When Distler noted that a regional AAC meeting on the NDEA held in early November had produced no opposition to Section 1001 (f), Smith probed further. He took the issue to Claude Smith, chair of Swarthmore's Board of Managers, constitutional scholar, and one of Philadelphia's most esteemed lawyers. A Swarthmore alum, Claude Smith immediately recognized the assault against the college's sensibility that the disclaimer represented, and he indicated an openness to pursuing a repeal of the measure, though he sought the support of the broader college community in so doing.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ This position represented a reversal of thinking for McBride, who had recommended to her board in October that Bryn Mawr apply for \$45,000 in NDEA funds under Title II. Minutes of Trustees and Rectors, October 16, 1958, Special Collections Department, Bryn Mawr College Library.

²⁰⁸ Borton, 254-55.

²⁰⁹ Smith to Distler, November 24, 1958, "NDEA Correspondence 1958" folder, box 55, Courtney C. Smith Papers, RG6/D09, Swarthmore College Archives, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College (hereafter cited as Smith Papers); Distler to Smith, November 25, 1958, "NDEA Correspondence 1958" folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Claude C. Smith to Courtney C. Smith, November 28, 1958, "NDEA Principles 1958" folder, box 56, Smith Papers.

In his ongoing attempt to find “the sense of the meeting,” Courtney Smith brought the issue before the college’s faculty on the first of December. Among the ranks of the professoriate, disapproval of the disclaimer affidavit was unanimous; however, there was division regarding the question of Swarthmore’s participation in the NDSL, with many faculty members contending that it would be unfair of the school to deny students the considerable benefits of the federal program. A week later, on the other hand, the Swarthmore student council proclaimed its undivided opposition to the NDEA loyalty provisions. The council drafted a resolution affirming that section 1001 (f) infringed upon academic freedom and open inquiry, and mailed the statement to presidents, student body presidents, and newspaper editors at nearly 150 colleges nationwide. Swarthmore’s student newspaper, the *Phoenix*, offered an editorial on December 9 which supported those opposed to the disclaimer affidavit, yet also refused to prescribe the form that opposition should take. “It must be resolved,” claimed the editors, “whether the College can assume responsibility for [non-participation in NDEA] or should leave the choice to individual applicants.”²¹⁰

The task of finding this resolution at Swarthmore fell to an ad hoc committee on the disclaimer affidavit, a working group proposed by Courtney Smith and subsequently approved by the Board of Managers.²¹¹ As might be expected at a school that emphasized the dignity of all campus members and invited authentic and thoroughgoing community deliberation, the committee was ecumenical in composition. The committee included Smith; two deans of the college; two additional professors (with a third added for the

²¹⁰ Memorandum by Howard M. Jenkins to Courtney Smith, December 2, 1958, “NDEA Correspondence 1958” folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Joan Heifetz, “Council Opposes Oath Provisions,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, December 9, 1958, 1; “Loyalty Oath,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, December 9, 1958, 2.

²¹¹ Charles Miller, “Loyalty Oath Creates Conflict,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, December 9, 1958, 7.

final two committee meetings); three members of the Board of Managers, including Claude Smith, the chairman; and two students. Over the course of three meetings in the winter of 1958 and 1959, this group would describe the college's response to the NDEA controversy.

At the first meeting on December 18, President Smith noted that the committee would, in the Quaker tradition, attempt to achieve consensus on the matter, though the tight government timetable (NDEA funds would be disbursed in February) might hasten the need for compromise. A sense of campus opinion was offered by Chuck Miller, senior at the college, who reported that Swarthmore students generally opposed the disclaimer affidavit, but that a majority also favored participation in the program nonetheless, with views on student autonomy, the relative mildness of the loyalty statements, and concerns about financial need marshaled in defense of the stance. The group seized upon the theme of financial resources, and noted that Swarthmore had \$30,000 in available loan funds. The school could use these funds, members contended, as a limited short-term surrogate for the monies offered through the NDSL—that is, Swarthmore students who petitioned the school for Title II aid would instead be loaned funds directly from the school.²¹² Finally, the group articulated a general sense of the arguments for and against NDEA participation. Propositions in favor of participation focused upon the value of students and families making their own choices, as well as the foolhardiness of spurning the government's more-or-less direct financial aid to institutions of higher education. Opposing points of view emphasized the sacred nature of private belief, the nearly unanimous opposition of the Swarthmore community to the disclaimer, the superordinate

²¹² This meant, of course, that Swarthmore would bear the full cost of the loan, rather than the one-tenth required of schools by NDEA Title II. In addition to the \$30,000 in available funds, Swarthmore also enjoyed an endowment of \$15 million in 1959. Clark, 165.

relationship of safeguarding academic inquiry to that of student choice, and the invidiousness scapegoating of “eggheads” as particularly susceptible to disloyalty.²¹³

The committee was supplemented prior to its next meeting by mathematics professor Phillip Carruth, who Courtney Smith had asked to join to assure better representation of those faculty members in favor of NDEA participation. When the group gathered on January 19, 1959, Carruth began the meeting by emphasizing the consistency of receiving monies with the universal disapproval of the disclaimer affidavit among the faculty. The college itself would not sign the disclaimer, Carruth continued, and closed by describing the affidavit as both innocuous and, in a community so manifestly committed to academic freedom, meaningless. Carruth’s position received strong pushback from the committee, and the discussion quickly located a dividing line. On one side stood Carruth and Board member William Ward, who maintained that concerns about means had grown picayune, and thus obfuscating the very worthy ends of national need and collegiate access that NDEA Title II represented. The committee’s nine other members expressed in varying degrees the other point of view, which privileged principles of free inquiry and institutional integrity over student choice.²¹⁴

These opposing camps persisted into the third and final committee meeting on January 23. To frame the meeting, Claude Smith suggested that four approaches to the affidavit were available to the college. The first involved non-participation in the program, a protest of the disclaimer, and the availability of student loans through the college. The

²¹³ Minutes of First Meeting of the Disclaimer Affidavit Committee, December 18, 1958, “NDEA 1958-January 1959” folder, box 54, Smith Papers. For more on the idea of the intellectual “egghead” of the cold war era as morally relativist, priggish, and attracted to socialism, see Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, 3-23.

²¹⁴ Minutes of Second Meeting of Disclaimer Affidavit Committee, January 19, 1959, “NDEA 1958-January 1959” folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

second approach allowed participation in the program, with the college protesting the affidavit and supplying loans to those students unwilling to sign the disclaimer. The third proposal was simply a variant on the second, but without supplementary loans from Swarthmore. The fourth and final proposal, after a modification by Courtney Smith, recommended that the college decline participation for one year, while making loan funds available during the period. In the discussion that followed, most committee members asserted that Swarthmore ought to take a moral stance against participation, even if in so doing it stripped the possibility of choice away from current and potential students.²¹⁵ While the committee was never able to achieve the consensus that had been its Quaker aim—Carruth and Ward continued to prefer participation in the program while protesting the disclaimer affidavit—the meetings had persuaded some members “who initially felt that the disclaimer did not raise a sufficiently serious question either of principle or practical effect to warrant non-participation” to change their minds.²¹⁶ In the end, the three meetings produced a recommendation to the Board of Managers that Swarthmore refuse participation in Title II, formally protest the disclaimer affidavit, and use college funds as loans to students who would have applied for NDEA monies.

The recommendation, which was accepted by the Board and the faculty upon its submission, was perhaps less remarkable than the process which produced it. To be sure, Swarthmore was one of a small handful of institutions (joining Bryn Mawr, Haverford, and Princeton) which refused the pursuit of federal funds, even on a provisional basis, and thus helped establish a vanguard position in the dissent against NDEA. It is the

²¹⁵ Minutes of Third Meeting of Disclaimer Affidavit Committee, January 23, 1959, “NDEA 1958-January 1959” folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

²¹⁶ Report of the Board-Administration-Faculty-Student Committee on NDEA, January 28, 1959, “NDEA 1958-January 1959” folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

college's means for achieving this end, however, which demands proper appreciation, especially given the context in which it was practiced. In the winter of 1958, the residual effects of the McCarthy era were persisting in their conspiracy, to both normalize loyalty tests and marginalize concerns about academic freedom. In addition, perceived institutional leaders in higher education—Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Pennsylvania, and dozens of others—had signaled their willingness to participate in the program, whatever the rhetorical reservations of their presidents and faculty. Finally, the window for decision-making was a rather narrow two months during the winter holiday season, a constrained period that could have easily encouraged haste or administrative impatience with democratic procedure; indeed, with applications for the Title II monies due to HEW's Office of Education by December 31, 1958—though Swarthmore would eventually petition for, and be granted, an extension—time was tight.²¹⁷ Faced with the necessity of making a politically-charged commitment while negotiating these challenges, Swarthmore held fast to its institutional saga by appointing a committee which would give voice to an authentic cross-section of the college community. Such an inclusive process would have been impossible to imagine, of course, at schools which understood themselves principally as research institutions, or whose faculty separated the pursuit of knowledge from the pursuit of value, or whose students were not viewed as important interlocutors in an ongoing conversation. At Swarthmore, however, the NDEA controversy became an occasion for a dialogue which represented an enduring, core sensibility that had marked college's culture and practice for decades. The appointed committee embarked upon a patient exchange of ideas under conditions where individual

²¹⁷ Memorandum by Gil Stott and Lew Cook to Courtney Smith on National Conference on the National Defense Education Act, December 13, 1958, "NDEA 1958-January 1959" folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

voices were valued, but also situated within the moral tradition of the Quaker college; indeed, the ultimate recommendation to refuse participation was made to protect the community as a site of dignity, moral discourse, and free inquiry, rather than as a more libertarian project favoring mere individual choice. This preference was consonant with Swarthmore's longstanding narrative identity, and was described by community members in a relatively unhurried process that revealed Swarthmore's—and Smith's—commitment to civic participation and value examination.

Swarthmore made its stance public through an official announcement on February 4, 1959. While finding the loyalty oath “not unacceptable,” the college's statement—which was issued to local media and mailed to dozens of college presidents—did declare its sharp opposition to the disclaimer affidavit, a mechanism it described as something inimical to the nation's constitutional tradition. In addition to sharing its intention to provide surrogate loans to students of “established need,” the announcement offered a powerful statement of the school's fundamental civic purposes and cultural commitments:

As an educational institution, Swarthmore College believes that strong citizens in a democratic society are produced in an atmosphere where ideas do not need to be forbidden or protected. The College has confidence in its students and in the educational process itself, confidence in the efficacy of free inquiry and debate to reveal error.²¹⁸

Both on- and off-campus expressions of support for the college's stance followed shortly thereafter. On February 8, the student council passed an expected endorsement of the Board and faculty decision, with praise for both the college's non-participation and

²¹⁸ *Swarthmore Phoenix*, “Smith Announces Stand Against Loyalty Oath,” February 10, 1959, 1.

the rationale which produced it. The following week, 84 percent of students voting in an on-campus referendum demanded that the Student Council take “political action” against the NDEA disclaimer affidavit. Though some few alumni wrote the administration to express surprise at Swarthmore’s stance—one suggested that communism “must still exert great influence in the management of the college”—most expressed support for the school’s protection of freedom of belief as congruent with the college’s Quaker tradition and principles. Finally, Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, one of the eventual co-sponsors of a bill to overturn the disclaimer affidavit, lauded Swarthmore for its handling of the matter, with particular acclaim for the college’s level of student engagement.²¹⁹

Courtney Smith had approached nascent concern about the law’s loyalty provisions as an opportunity to perpetuate his institution’s ongoing dialogue about community values among all its members. Hugh Borton, on the other hand, was already involved in related moral conversation when the NDEA was passed. By September of 1958, when the National Defense Education Act became law, Haverford’s Board of Managers had already spent half a year sorting through the school’s longstanding refusal to participate in a different government program. The college had always declined research contracts from the military as incompatible with Haverford’s intellectual and moral culture, as well as its commitment to the Friends’ principles of non-violence and peace-seeking. During the 1957-58 academic year, however, chemistry professor Russell Williams had applied for and been awarded financial support from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which had offered grants to research scholars since its inception in 1946. Haverford had

²¹⁹ *Swarthmore Phoenix*, “SC Passes Resolutions on Boycott and College Stand on Education Act,” February 10, 1959, 1; Chuck Miller, “Vox Populi?,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, February 24, 1959, 2; Richard Murfit to Courtney Smith, “NDEA Correspondence March-December 1959” folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Frank W. Fetter to Courtney Smith, March 29, 1959, “NDEA Correspondence March-December 1959” folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Joseph Clark, letter to the editor, *Swarthmore Phoenix*, March 3, 1959, 2.

not participated in the AEC program because of the agency's perceived connection to military and defense concerns, but Williams' petition—which involved non-classified scientific research—prompted the managers to examine the AEC's relationship to the Department of Defense, and to re-evaluate Haverford's policy on research relationships. In early 1958, an ad hoc committee on research grants was culled from the Board of Managers to study the college's approach to the AEC, and to determine if an adjustment was warranted.

The committee's report was clear in describing the moral stakes that attended Haverford's decision. The dilemma, as the group saw it, involved two Friends' principles—peace-seeking and the supremacy of individual conscience—that were brought into tension with one another by the AEC dilemma. Prior to suggesting a manner of reconciling the situation, the committee offered a remarkable statement decrying the manner in which non-academic concerns were impinging upon American social and educational practices:

[Y]our committee sees a clear threat to fundamental concepts of freedom, to its own religious convictions, and to the principles of the Society of Friends in the current encroachment of military influence upon American life in general and higher education in particular.... It seems to us hardly appropriate, therefore, for Haverford College to accept dependence on a philosophy so far removed from that for which it stands, and so inconsistent with the principles of the Society of Friends, in order to get money to support its research program.²²⁰

²²⁰ Report of the Committee on Research Grants, May 5, 1958, box15A, Papers of Hugh Borton, R4/OF, Haverford College Archives, Haverford College Quaker and Special Collections (hereafter cited as Borton Papers).

This articulation of philosophy was no mere preamble to the committee's report, but rather a crucial affirmation of the college's fundamental mission to protect its community ethos, an ethos grounded in certain historical and moral traditions. Whatever choices the college made regarding federal educational policy, the managers were determined that these choices were compatible with Haverford's institutional self-definition.

In a report delivered in May, the committee ultimately recommended that while the college itself should not apply for research funds from the Defense Department and its branches—a violation of Quaker peace commitments—individual faculty members would be permitted to seek funds for on-campus research on non-military, non-classified subjects, regardless of the source. In addition, faculty could also pursue off-campus research of any sort, from any source, so long as the activities did not interfere with the professor's discharge of his or her Haverford duties.²²¹ This revision would allow Williams to accept AEC funding, with the school reserving the right to terminate the contract if the character of the research changed and crossed into a classified realm.

The policy alteration also represented an attempt to harmonize the Friends' commitment to pacifism with its respect for the dictates of individual conscience. Despite this bid for comity, the committee remained clear regarding the college's priorities: when the tension between social mores and individual choice became irreconcilable, Haverford was to err on the side of community. Even if an individual faculty member was untroubled by the pursuit of military or classified research, for example, the committee was adamant that "the violation of the Peace Testimony that would be involved in devoting College resources to carrying on 'military research' on the campus would be so serious as to justify the limitation of individual freedom which its

²²¹ Ibid.

denial involves.”²²² Simply put, the committee defended the idea that the honoring of individual conscience could only proceed from within a community of moral integrity.

While this principle earned universal approbation from the committee and the Board of Managers, the committee members did not unanimously support the report’s final recommendations. A minority, led by alumnus and Friends peace activist Stephen Cary, dissented, and instead argued that a Quaker institution should not, in principle, participate in any program that associated itself with secrecy and classification provisions, even if that participation was undertaken tangentially, through the activities of individual faculty members. In view of this divide, and in the Friends’ spirit of finding “the sense of the meeting,” the board attempted to bring together the competing views during monthly meetings in September, October, and November. The committee’s divided report precipitated discussion among the full board during monthly meetings in September, October, and December, with no consensus reached on the issue. Given this impasse, and to gain a broader sense of the community’s view of the AEC dispute, the Board of Managers asked its two faculty representatives, astronomy professor Louis Green and philosophy professor Francis Parker, to solicit insights from their colleagues. A special meeting of the Board of Managers, dedicated solely to resolving the conflict over the recommendations, was called for December 17.²²³

The special meeting’s discussion proceeded in an attempt to answer three questions: Should Haverford contract with the AEC on any basis? If yes, should the college accept

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Board of Managers Meeting Minutes, September 26, 1958, Haverford College Archives, Minutes of the Board of Managers, 1955-1959, R1/IB, Haverford College Quaker and Special Collections (hereafter cited as Minutes, Board of Managers); Minutes, Board of Managers, October 28, 1958; minutes of Haverford College faculty, November 20, 1958, <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/3711/1958-1959.pdf?sequence=3>; Minutes, Board of Managers, December 5, 1958.

the AEC's normal form of contract? If the AEC contract was unacceptable, what form of contact would Haverford allow? Board conversation eventually revealed that group opinion was strongly in favor of following the committee's recommendation, as was the Haverford faculty (whose position was represented by Green and Parker.) After extended discussion, the two managers who remained in opposition to the committee report signaled their willingness to affiliate with the majority's viewpoint. The board thus came to the consensus that AEC research contracts were not by definition invidious, with the proviso that the college retained the right to terminate agreements that came to involve security regulations. After over half a year of study and deliberation—itsself an exercise in Quaker seriousness and patience—Haverford altered its policy on research contracts, while still retaining an approach that hewed to the standards of the Society of Friends.²²⁴

With this resolution reached, President Borton extended the meeting through the introduction of a related issue: the NDEA loyalty provisions. While Borton had become aware of the implications of the disclaimer affidavit through his meetings with his colleagues McBride and Smith, his managers had not been formally apprised of NDEA's section 1001 (f) (1) and the infringements of personal belief that it entailed. The president emphasized the dangerous constraint on individual conscience that the affidavit represented, and further suggested that such mechanisms might become a regular part of future federal aid to higher education, if not opposed in this iteration. Borton concluded his remarks with a recommendation that Haverford refuse participation in the NDSL program, seek repeal of the offending clause, and offer its own substitute loan program in

²²⁴ Minutes, Board of Managers, December 17, 1958.

the interim. (The school's endowment stood at roughly \$12.1 million.) The Board of Managers gave the recommendation its unanimous approval.²²⁵

This on-the-spot decision may have appeared both abrupt and oligarchic, especially in comparison to the more inclusive, three-month process that Swarthmore undertook to achieve the same end of non-participation in NDEA Title II; indeed, where Courtney Smith built an inquiry committee with members from across his college's community, Haverford's decision regarding the NDEA disclaimer affidavit was carried out solely at the discretion of its Board of Managers. The college's approach, however, ought not to be seen as a betrayal of its institutional heritage, but rather an important expression of it, in two ways. First, the NDEA decision was made at the conclusion of an extended, deep exercise in moral reflection that considered both Haverford's mission and its relationship to a broader American social context. The school's months-long conversation regarding the compatibility of AEC contracts with vital community values was initiated by managers (and supplemented by faculty) and marked by both probity and a capacity for drawing nuanced distinctions. When compared to the ethical dilemmas that the ad hoc committee had encountered in studying research contracts—the circumstantial tensions between commitments to peace-seeking and to respecting individual conscience—the case of the NDEA loyalty provisions was far more straightforward. For a board accustomed to moral deliberation, the choice regarding the disclaimer affidavit was apparently a simple one. Second, while Haverford's decision processes with both the AEC and NDEA may have looked positively paternalistic next to Swarthmore's more democratic approach, the Haverford Board of Managers had a clear sense that certain

²²⁵ Ibid.; "Report of the Treasurer and Comptroller," *Haverford College Bulletin* 58, no.3 (Haverford, PA: Haverford College, 1960), 5.

community goods were, quite simply, inviolate and not subject to discussion. In the case of the AEC, the necessary priority of peace testimony over individual faculty choice on a Quaker campus was averred; with NDEA, the college asserted that protection of the dignity and free inquiry of all undergraduates must prevail over political and societal concerns about subversion. Though neither choice was the product of an all-inclusive campus conversation, each ultimately served Haverford's mission by encouraging among its members both self-reflection and an awareness of the school's longstanding normative commitments. The varied styles utilized by the Board—the lengthy examination of the AEC and the swift decisiveness regarding NDEA— both represented legitimate means to attain culturally essential ends.

On January 22, 1959, Hugh Borton gave a concise public statement explaining Haverford's stance of non-participation: "We believe that to file this required disclaimer is tantamount to signing away one's right to freedom of thought as well as encouraging government action which makes the individual's opportunity for education contingent upon his [sic] personal beliefs." To the college community, Borton delivered a Collection talk explaining Haverford's position. While acknowledging that the school had rules and regulations it demanded that its students obey, the president emphasized an important distinction: "[W]e don't control your beliefs, we don't make you follow a particular pattern of thought." He concluded his remarks with an affirmation of the institution's deeply-held belief that individual education proceeded best in communities of trust, integrity, and free conversation. Paraphrasing the theologian Thomas Merton,

Borton reminded the students and faculty that “man cannot find himself in himself alone, but in and through others.”²²⁶

Like Swarthmore, Haverford found immediate popular support, both on campus and beyond, for its willingness to refuse participation and its commitment to supply loans to applicants affected by the college’s policy. In a full faculty meeting the day after the special Board gathering, the college’s professors had strongly supported the position articulated by the managers, and celebrated the dissent as fully congruent with the school’s intellectual and moral mission. After Borton made Haverford’s position public in January, a slew of supportive newspaper editorials began to appear in cities as varied as Boston, Des Moines, Iowa; Binghamton, New York; San Francisco, and Philadelphia. Similarly, a series of opinion statements from the *Haverford News* praised Borton, the faculty, and the Board for the courageous, principled position the college had adopted. As with Swarthmore, the wisdom of Haverford’s decision was questioned in some alumni and media circles, but in general non-participation won the approbation of students, faculty, and alumni alike.²²⁷

Neither the processes nor the actors that led Swarthmore and Haverford to their positions on the NDEA disclaimer affidavit in 1959 were identical. Swarthmore, under the guidance of a widely-admired president, proceeded carefully in its decision-making, and methodically included a variety of campus stakeholders to best establish a Quaker

²²⁶ *Haverford News*, “Borton Refuses Haverford Participation in 1958 National Defense Education Act; Thought Freedom Seen in Danger,” February 6, 1959; Hugh Borton, collection address, February 3, 1959, box 15A, Borton Papers

²²⁷ Minutes of Haverford College faculty, December 18, 1958, <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/3711/1958-1959.pdf?sequence=3>; Senate Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Amending Loyalty Provisions of National Defense Education Act of 1958: Hearings on S. 819*, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 1959, 82-84; Brownly Speer, “It Wouldn’t Hurt...,” *Haverford News*, February 6, 1959; Speer, “Morality and Expansion,” *Haverford News*, March 13, 1959, 2; Speer, “Un-American Activities,” *Haverford News*, April 17, 1959.

“sense of the meeting” on the issue. Haverford, on the other hand, reserved primary consideration of the NDEA loyalty provisions for its president and Board of Managers, and arrived at its decision for non-participation within the course of one meeting. These procedural differences, however, should not distract from the fundamental principle that these two schools ultimately expressed; namely, the belief—congruent with the ethics of both Quakerism and authentic collegiality—that the silencing of one student, even if self-imposed, was a threat not only to academic inquiry, but to a community integrity essential to both academic and ethical development.

Both colleges had long given narrative significance to campus cultures which nurtured individual reflection, moral examination, and community participation. An unstinting commitment to these sagas and traditions helped guide both Swarthmore and Haverford to moral ground—and to a position of dissent—that it would take larger, more divided, and more uncertain institutions a longer time to discover and claim. In his stand against participation in the AEC research program, Haverford alumnus and manager Stephen Cary had observed that

[u]nlike most colleges, the Haverford campus community has an atmosphere which *does* affect the values of those who are immersed in it.... [T]he reason is surely related to the conscious effort of the Board of Managers, the college administration, and the faculty to make Haverford distinctively Quaker, without regard to whether or not Quaker principles were popular or unpopular at any given moment of time.²²⁸

²²⁸ Memorandum by Stephen Cary on the Problem of Research Grants Sponsored by the Defense Department, December 1958, box 15A, Borton Papers.

Though his point of view regarding the AEC was ultimately defeated, Cary's assertions regarding the meaning of a Haverford education were sound—and they just as readily could have been applied to Swarthmore. By 1958, both colleges had established identities and self-understandings as places of intellectual achievement, to be sure, yet also of social and moral consciousness. In refusing participation in NDEA's Title II, Swarthmore and Haverford re-confirmed their belief—increasingly anachronistic and countercultural in nature—that colleges were not simply sites of research and credentialing, but were more importantly irresistibly moral communities, and thus carried ethical obligations to their respective missions, their campus participants, and to society as a whole. The efficacy and the endurance of this belief would be tested, as the prevailing concerns of the cold war and university era would continue to challenge the ethical, intellectual, and community principles underpinning the distinctive purpose of Swarthmore and Haverford educational programs.

Chapter 7: “Something Sacred in Our Tradition”—Colleges and the Congress

After the flurry of conversation and feedback on the loyalty provisions in the six months after NDEA’s passage, the Swarthmore and Haverford campuses settled down to the more traditional collegiate business of exam preparation, athletic contests and artistic performances, and the usual undergraduate social activity. There were also ongoing moral discussions of localized concern, such as the expulsion of a Swarthmorean who had sent a pair of racist letters to a fellow student, and debate among Haverford’s students regarding the suppositions of the college’s “social honor system.”²²⁹ As the spring semester of 1959 proceeded apace in the classrooms, dining halls, and athletic fields, both Swarthmore and Haverford were seeking allies and cultivating support for their position on NDEA. While resolute in their stand against the disclaimer affidavit, the schools also recognized that there were appreciable costs to non-participation. The colleges had not only refused federal monies through the NDSL, but had also pledged to assist students who would have otherwise qualified for aid through the Title II program. In an era in which colleges and universities did not maintain robust financial aid programs, the nobility of this commitment was countered by its inherent lack of sustainability.²³⁰ As a consequence, the colleges tried to rally others to their cause not only on the basis of moral and political urgency, but also out of imminent economic necessity.

²²⁹ *Swarthmore Phoenix*, “Prentice Expels Hate-letter Author,” April 28, 1959; *Haverford News*, “Students Vote Against ‘Frats’; Borton to Review Question,” May 8, 1959.

²³⁰ For a closer examination of the history of financial aid in American higher education, see Robert B. Archibald, *Redesigning the Financial Aid System: Why Colleges and Universities Should Switch Roles with the Federal Government* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Lawrence E. Gladieux, and Arthur M. Hauptman.. *The College Aid Quandary: Access, Quality, and the Federal Role* (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution, 1995); and Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*.

Even before the position of his institution had been made public—or even settled—Courtney Smith had begun to recruit support from friends and colleagues in the worlds of academe, politics, and the law. On December 22 Smith placed a telephone call to Joseph Clark, Pennsylvania’s first-term senator and a colleague of Smith’s on the Harvard Board of Overseers, to analyze the implications of NDEA’s section 1001 (f) (1). Together, the pair discussed the political steps necessary to overturn the Mundt amendment, with Clark encouraging Smith to recruit academic voices from a broad range of institutions to support the cause. Smith also called upon Patrick Malin, executive director of the ACLU. Malin was not only an activist, but also deeply attuned to Swarthmore and its culture: he was a devout Friend, a former economics professor at the college, and the son-in-law of a Swarthmore manager. Despite his support of the cause, Malin was far less sanguine than Clark about the possibility of overturning the disclaimer affidavit, and mused that the chances of repeal were fewer than one in a hundred. Undeterred, Smith also carried his case to Samuel Gould, president of Antioch College and chairman of the AAC’s Commission on Academic Freedom and Tenure. Smith shared his twin worries that “academic communities [were] perhaps becoming a bit careless about the infringements on freedom represented by the [disclaimer]” and that the NDEA involved colleges “as agents and administrators of certain portions of the act.” He urged Gould to offer a resolution in opposition to the disclaimer affidavit at the AAC’s annual meeting during the first week of the new year.²³¹

²³¹ Smith notes on telephone conversation with Clark, December 22, 1958, “NDEA Senate Hearings 1959 January-April” folder, box 56, Smith Papers; Smith notes on telephone conversation with Malin, December 17, 1958, “NDEA Senate Hearings 1959 January-April” folder, box 56, Smith Papers; Smith to Gould, December 24, 1958, “NDEA Principles 1958,” box 56, Smith Papers.

Smith was a creature of the Establishment, a figure whose experiences at Princeton, the Harvard Board of Overseers, and the American Rhodes Scholar Committee had equipped him with bounteous social capital. He was well-connected, both politically and institutionally, and he would call upon these relationships repeatedly and unreservedly over the nearly five years of protest against the NDSL loyalty provisions. The comparatively diffident Hugh Borton, on the other hand, was much more restrained in the months after Haverford's announcement of non-participation. Unlike his colleague at Swarthmore, Borton was not a natural at generating political support for the anti-disclaimer stance. Though also a veteran of elite institutions (Haverford and Columbia), Borton's unpretentious character and temperament bore the stamp of his strict Friends' upbringing, his experience as a Quaker missionary, and time spent assisting the post-World War II rebuilding of Japan.²³² He neither occupied nor desired the same nexus of influence that Smith enjoyed; as a consequence, while Smith was blanketing the nation with letters to create enthusiasm for a burgeoning NDEA protest, Borton searched for support of Haverford's stance in more limited, lower-key precincts—and was effective, in his understated way. In January of 1959, he, like Smith, also brought deep concerns about Mundt's amendment to the AAC annual meeting. Speaking as a new member of the Commission on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Borton led a lengthy discussion of the nascent controversy, which in turn helped lead the AAC to formally poll its membership on the perceived implications of the loyalty provisions.²³³ He also spent a great deal of time in the first half of 1959 explaining the school's stand to Haverford

²³² Borton, 1-32.

²³³ Minutes, Board of Managers, January 23, 1959. The reticence of the entire AAC to issue a strong statement of opposition to the disclaimer affidavit, despite the urging of Smith and Borton, as well as Antioch's Gould, illustrated again the persistent institutional differences expressed in the face of "oathism."

alumni, as the president enlisted their financial assistance in mustering the necessary funds to support students affected by the school's non-participation in the NDSL program. Borton's efforts were rewarded, as donors contributed enough to the cause to enable Haverford's non-participation for the 1959-60 academic year.²³⁴

The resistance efforts of both Swarthmore and Haverford were augmented on January 29, 1959, when Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts announced Senate Bill 819 [S. 819], co-sponsored by Clark, to repeal the disclaimer affidavit. Kennedy—like Clark, a colleague of Smith's on Harvard's Board of Overseers—declared the provision had been given insufficient attention during NDEA's initial passage, and worried that the test oath was actually working against the stated purposes of the bill by alienating the nation's most talented students from study that could contribute to national defense. In contrast with the Soviets, Kennedy mused, the United States could not “take steps to keep our brightest minds in scientific careers—but we can take steps that keep them out. That is the danger of this provision—and I hope this Congress will strike it.”²³⁵ Swarthmore and Haverford, of course, articulated a different rationale for defeating the loyalty measure. The colleges were concerned about the corrosive effects of a belief test, administered by schools themselves, would have on the meaning of a residential liberal arts community,

²³⁴ Quinn, 36.

²³⁵ *National Defense Education Act of 1958*, S. 819, 86th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 105, pt. 1 (January 29, 1959): 1330. It may be speculated that Kennedy, as a junior senator, was seeking an issue through which to advance his legislative career, but his interest in correcting the NDEA matter does not seem so superficial. As an occupant of Schlesinger's hawkish “vital center” on cold war matters, Kennedy's beliefs on higher learning aligned with those of many NDEA architects; namely, that education—particularly post-secondary education—was fundamental to the nation's military, scientific, and economic strength, and thus constraining access to college training constituted a threat to American well-being. The point was relayed by one of his closest aides, who observed, “The one domestic subject that mattered most to John Kennedy was education. Throughout his campaign and throughout his Presidency, he devoted more time and talks to this single topic than to any other domestic issue. Without notes he would cite all the discouraging statistics: only six out of every ten students in the fifth grade would finish high school; only nine out of sixteen high school graduates would go to college; one million Americans were already out of school and out of work.” Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 358.

and Kennedy also recognized the threat; indeed, he noted that “to submit to [the loyalty provisions] is to submit to an insupportable invasion of educational autonomy, which has grave implications for the integrity of our educational system.”²³⁶ Kennedy’s worries, however, were not merely academic. He also had more instrumental concerns, as he pondered not only the state of higher education, but also of national defense. It was crucial, too, that the Kennedy-Clark measure sought to eliminate the entirety of Section 1001 (f), which contained both the disclaimer affidavit and the loyalty oath. Swarthmore and Haverford were not opposed to the loyalty oath, but rather the disclaimer affidavit, which was Section 1001 (f) (1).²³⁷ This confusion was not, perhaps, fatal, but it would eventually provide rhetorical ammunition—and the capacity to label repeal advocates as “disloyal”—to those who opposed the measure in subcommittee hearings and in full Senate debate.

Despite the subtle difference in motivation and the lack of concord regarding which was the truly obnoxious element of 1001 (f), the possibility of political repeal provided an attractive common cause for both the schools and the senators: the colleges needed to muster what political pressure they could, especially given their financial circumstances, while the legislators needed expert witnesses to support their bill. This partnership between academe and Washington would attempt to shepherd the Kennedy-Clark bill through the Subcommittee on Education, part of the Senate’s Committee of Labor and Public Welfare.

²³⁶ Kennedy, “Remarks on the Loyalty Oath and Disclaimer Affidavit,” Pre-Presidential Papers, Presidential Campaign Files, 1960, Papers of John F. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKCAMP1960-1029-034.aspx>.

²³⁷ Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Amending Section 1001 (f) of the National Defense Education Act of 1958*, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959 S. Rep. 454, 1. See also Appendix A, “National Defense Education Act of 1958—Title X, Section 1001.”

In the wake of Kennedy's announcement, Courtney Smith redoubled Swarthmore's efforts at outreach. Now equipped with his college's statement of non-participation, Smith sent copies to friends, colleagues, and associates throughout the country. In so doing, he opened correspondence with schools such as Wilmington (OH) and Beloit (WI) Colleges, schools that would withdraw from Title II participation prior to hearings on the Kennedy-Clark bill. While it is unlikely that the sharing of Swarthmore's stand represented the *sine qua non* which allowed Wilmington and Beloit to follow suit, it did perhaps provided succor to the leadership at these schools, and Smith was quick to congratulate and encourage his colleagues in taking their stands.²³⁸ More often, however, Smith encountered setbacks in his efforts at building a network, with nationally-recognized private universities such as Johns Hopkins and smaller colleges like Earlham (IN) offering sympathetic ears, but also an unwillingness to withdraw their NDEA participation.²³⁹ Despite the lack of tangible results, however, Smith was committed to the process of advertising and advocating for Swarthmore's position. As he noted in a letter to a supportive judge in Baltimore, shortly after the college's public declaration against the disclaimer:

I have sent the same statement [of Swarthmore's non-participation] that I sent to you to a number of interested congressmen, our own congressional

²³⁸ Smith to W. Brooke Morgan, February 28, 1959, "NDEA Correspondences 1959 February 10-28" folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Smith to Miller Upton, April 10, 1959, "NDEA Correspondences 1959 March–December" folder; box 55.

²³⁹ Smith to Milton Eisenhower, "NDEA 1959 February-December" folder, box 54, Smith Papers; Landrum R. Belling to Smith, February 19, 1959, "NDEA Correspondences February 1959 10-28" folder, box 55, Smith Papers. Earlham, a Quaker institution, may have seemed an obvious ally in the cause, and Earlham did report having some of the same on-campus conversations that had been experienced at Swarthmore and Haverford. As President Belling noted, however, his board and faculty "have all voted to accept the loan funds on the grounds that we had no right to deprive the individual student who might want to accept such a loan of his right to these funds." Where Swarthmore and Haverford gave emphasis to the dignity of community, Earlham appeared to have privileged the Quaker notion of the primacy of individual conscience.

representatives, to the newspapers and press services, and to a good many other college presidents. I think that those of us who feel this way need to strengthen the resolve of others, and the more educators speak out the more hope there is that the public will understand our position. If only a few of us speak out our stand seems to some quixotic.²⁴⁰

This mindset was evident, too, in Smith's communication with Kennedy and Clark in the months prior to the S. 819 hearings. The president was in regular telephone contact and exchanged several letters with both lawmakers in the late winter and early spring of 1959, as Smith both attempted to gauge the political chances of the bill and also offered his services in recruiting academic witnesses to testify before the Senate's education subcommittee. Through these conversations, it became apparent to Smith that S. 819 stood as the best legislative opportunity for repeal, as similar bills in House were almost certainly to be torpedoed by Graham Barden, a staunchly-committed conservative North Carolina Democrat who chaired the junior chamber's Committee on Education and Labor.²⁴¹ Clark promised to cultivate support for repeal among his Senate colleagues, while Kennedy encouraged Smith to solicit the testimony of his fellow administrators, particularly those from South Dakota—residents of Karl Mundt's home state. Smith responded by recruiting the participation of the college presidents of the University of

²⁴⁰ Smith to Judge Emory H. Niles, February 12, 1959, "NDEA 1959 February-December" folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

²⁴¹ Barden had made his feelings on the disclaimer affidavit clear to Swarthmore through an exchange of letters with Robert Mayberry, president of the college's student council. In reply to Mayberry's solicitation of support for repeal, Barden wrote: "It might be interesting for you to know that every civil service worker and every employee of the Congress signs the same kind of disclaimer oath without objection. They work for their money.... Could it be possible that you want to (quoting from the affidavit) 'believe in, and be a member of, and support any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.' [sic] If so, then the Government should not have any dealings with you and you should not have monetary dealings with the Government, and I do not think you should expect it." Graham A. Barden to Robert W. Mayberry, March 19, 1959, "NDEA Correspondences 1959 March -December" folder, box 55, Smith Papers.

South Dakota, Augustana, and Yankton Colleges (though scheduling difficulties would ultimately preclude their attendance at the hearings in Washington).²⁴²

As Courtney Smith broadened his circle of associates in preparation for the subcommittee hearings, the more reticent Hugh Borton continued to tend to unpretentious matters peculiar to Haverford—the day-to-day issues of faculty compensation, curriculum review, and student prizes—rather than proselytizing on behalf of the NDEA repeal movement. Still, whatever his reluctance to assume a larger public profile, Borton remained committed to appearing in front of the Senate subcommittee; indeed, in the weeks before their testimony, he reached out to both Smith and Katharine McBride, his Main Line colleagues, and suggested they share copies of their respective statements and disclose the supporting materials they would be bringing to Washington.²⁴³ In their own ways, then, both Smith and Borton had prepared for their appearances at the Capitol.

On April 29, 1959, Senators Kennedy and Clark convened subcommittee hearings on S. 819. The stated purpose of the sessions—to interrogate Section 1001 (f), both in terms of principle and of consequence—was reified with the senators’ opening statement, which noted that “[t]here is no precise way in which we can measure the harm this section is causing. At least seven colleges have refused to participate in the student loan program solely because of the affidavit requirement.”²⁴⁴ This rhetorical gambit was

²⁴² Clark to Smith, March 27, 1959, and April 14, 1959, “NDEA 1959 February-December” folder, box 54, Smith Papers; Smith notes on telephone call to Kennedy, April 29, 1959, “NDEA Senate Hearings 1959 January-April” folder, box 56, Smith Papers; Smith to Kennedy, May 4, 1959, “NDEA Senate Hearings 1959 January-April” folder, box 56, Smith Papers.

²⁴³ Minutes of Haverford College faculty, April 23, 1959, <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/3711/1958-1959.pdf?sequence=3>; Hugh Borton to Katharine McBride and Courtney Smith, April 28, 1959, “NDEA Senate Hearings 1959 January-April” folder, box 56, Smith Papers.

²⁴⁴ *Amending Loyalty Provisions of National Defense Education Act of 1958*, 2-3. The seven colleges listed in the statement were Reed, Antioch, Goucher, Wilmington (OH), Swarthmore, Haverford, and Sarah

followed by statements from several luminaries within higher education that were read into the record. The introductory declaration came from Harvard's Nathan Pusey, who, while acknowledging his institution's participation in the NDSL, emphasized the discriminatory nature of the affidavit:

This requirement appears to them a direct personal affront. It also seems to them that, in adding it, the legislators have shown a lamentable lack of faith in American youth.... To make this requirement of our young people—and of no others in our country—demanding affidavits that they are good loyal Americans before they may borrow money from the Government or enjoy the Government's fellowships seems both rude and unworthy of the Congress.... Harvard has accepted its relatively small apportionment of loan fund money and has been pleased to have it. Harvard students have complied with the law. But their compliance, and that of students elsewhere, has been obtained at the expense of their own self-respect and of their opinion of the fair-mindedness and wisdom of the Congress.²⁴⁵

In the same vein, President Robert Goheen of Princeton submitted a statement which denounced the addition of “a cumbersome ritual to carefully administered programs,” as well as the affidavit's intimation “that selected young persons upon whom this country depends for its future leadership are peculiarly liable to be disloyal to their country.”

Briefer but similar statements followed from the presidents of Amherst, Drexel (PA), and Colorado College, all of whom declared their objection to subsection (f) (1) of section 1001, and its implication that higher education was especially susceptible to treachery.

Lawrence, which—as noted earlier—speaks to a confusion, both then and now, about “who did what when” with regard to resisting the disclaimer affidavit.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 5-6.

The statement of Yale's Whitney Griswold and the testimony of Pennsylvania's Gaylord Harnwell (a 1924 graduate of Haverford) both broadened the administrative critique of the disclaimer affidavit by noting the manner in which it fundamentally compromised the free exchange of ideas necessary for higher education.²⁴⁶

Finally, Katharine McBride of Bryn Mawr extended the day's critiques by decrying not only the discriminatory nature of the loyalty provisions and the intrusion on free thought and inquiry, but also the deleterious effects they would have on collegiate communities that placed a premium on student-faculty interaction:

The requirement of an oath is a disservice to all members of the educational community, in schools, colleges or universities.... Our relationship with our students is one of trust. To say that we value this relationship highly is not really a strong enough statement. The relationship is basic to the quality of instruction and education at the college.²⁴⁷

In her emphasis on the profound violation of culture that the NDEA disclaimer affidavit signified, McBride identified the manner in which the loyalty provisions were particularly hostile to smaller learning communities such as Bryn Mawr. McBride drew attention to the essential mission of the residential liberal arts college—to provide an optimal undergraduate learning experience. This point of view was affirmed by the sole student statement read into the record on the session's opening day, which came from Swarthmore's student council president, Robert Mayberry. Speaking for the council, Mayberry called for the repeal of the disclaimer affidavit "[i]n order to safeguard adequately the academic freedom of students benefitting from the provisions of the act,"

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 6-7, 8-9, 48-49.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 29.

and reported that Swarthmore's student body had urged "'(1) that the present oath requirement be repealed and (2) that the future Federal-aid-to-education programs be free of such clauses.'"²⁴⁸ While a great deal of thoughtful dissent was shared with the subcommittee on the first day of hearings, the emphasis on preserving the integrity of collegiate culture most clearly emerged from the leader of Bryn Mawr—like Swarthmore and Haverford, a Main Line residential liberal arts school in the Quaker tradition—and the students of Swarthmore. This emphasis, which had animated the community dissent at both Swarthmore and Haverford since the early days of NDEA, set the stage for the testimonies of Courtney Smith and Hugh Borton the following week.

On May 5, Smith sat as the subcommittee's first witness, and used his opening statement to make clear the distinction, often misunderstood outside the halls of academe, between pledging allegiance to the nation and disclaiming belief, the latter of which he represented as "shortsighted and unwise," and the governing reason for Swarthmore's non-participation in the NDSL. He further asserted that the affidavit was un-American, anti-intellectual, and deleterious to the spirit of democracy.²⁴⁹ Finally, in terms redolent of the school's announcement of its non-participation, Smith spoke to his institution's philosophy of using academic inquiry to develop not only scholarship, but also engaged citizens and ethical leaders:

Is not our real question, the fundamental question, the question with which those who favor section 1001 (f) would surely agree, how are strong and capable and constructive citizens produced in a democratic society? Section 1001 (f) is not, in my judgment as an educator, conducive to this end.... As an educational

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 59-60.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 77-78.

institution Swarthmore College believes that strong citizens in a democratic society are produced in an atmosphere of freedom where ideas do not need to be forbidden or protected. The college has confidence in the efficacy of free inquiry and debate to reveal error. Section 1001 (f) is, therefore, in my opinion, contrary to the intent and the spirit of the act as a whole, contrary to anything I know about the proper and effective atmosphere for an institution of learning, contrary to traditional American principles.²⁵⁰

Borton followed Smith, and his testimony proclaimed the same concerns and themes as his counterpart's. While challenging the affidavit's fundamental violation of academic freedom, Borton gave special attention to its incongruity with the nature of higher education and the character of undergraduate culture. Noting that "[s]tudents, even more so than perhaps any other single group, cannot be coerced into believing a certain set of beliefs or dogma," Borton averred that students were most likely to internalize "sacred" values in a community which refrained from "placing restrictions upon them or stating dogmatically what we believe their beliefs should be."²⁵¹ He then framed the issue of an institution's relationship with its students in explicitly moral terms:

These [students] are the very people upon whom our spiritual, intellectual, and physical survival depend. Either we have faith that in their search for truth, truth will prevail over evil dogma and vicious propaganda or we are admitting that we have already lost faith in ourselves and in our youth and the future which is in

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 78.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 80.

their hands. If we are fearful because they are evil and may defeat us, we have lost something sacred in our tradition.²⁵²

The “tradition” Borton referenced was, in this case, the central tenet of the American project, a belief in the capacity of a free, enlightened citizenry to safeguard its own democracy; however, his argument just as readily applied to that which was sacred in a related tradition—the relationships of trust, intellectual engagement, and free moral discourse that formed the foundation of the residential liberal arts college experience.

Borton concluded his testimony by having five editorials from newspapers across the nation read into the record. These commentaries gave full-throated support to Haverford’s non-participation in the NDSL, and called further attention to the principled stand made by the school (and by Swarthmore) in the earliest days of the program. Borton was followed by HEW Secretary Arthur Flemming; William Fidler, the general secretary of the AAUP; and Senator Richard Neuberger of Oregon, who in his lengthy testimony included a statement from Reed College’s student council, which opposed the disclaimer affidavit.²⁵³ (As an institution, Reed had applied for aid upon NDEA’s passage in 1958. It turned down the awarded grant of \$3,349.00 in early February of 1959.)²⁵⁴ Over the course of two sessions, then, an alliance of lawmakers, government officials, college presidents and faculty, and—in the cases of Swarthmore and Haverford, among others—higher educational institutions themselves made the case against the disclaimer affidavit to the subcommittee.

For all the argumentation on behalf of the Kennedy-Clark bill, however, the final word in subcommittee hearings was given to Senator Karl Mundt, the original author of section

²⁵² Ibid., 81.

²⁵³ Ibid., 85-103

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 68

1001 (f) (1). Mundt contended that the removal of either the loyalty oath or the disclaimer affidavit would recklessly compromise the law if not supplemented by language which would subject any applicant enrolled in a “subversive” organization to a \$1,000 fine and up to one year in prison.²⁵⁵ When Kennedy countered that Mundt’s compensatory language would still enable the government’s discrimination against students, which was the real issue at hand, Mundt marshaled the language of cold war anxiety and patriotism in response:

No, the issue is a matter of defense. I do not believe we should stand before the people and say we have an act that provides for our national defense and are not going to do anything to prevent its being used as an offensive mechanism by the communist apparatus using our tax money trying to destroy the country by making this money available to students whose loyalties are demonstrably to some other country than our own.²⁵⁶

In addition, while the statements and witnesses from academia were virtually uniform in their opposition to the disclaimer affidavit, not all adopted a stance of dissent. Norwich (VT) University, as well as the colleges at Wheaton (IL), Del Mar (TX), Alliance (PA), and Mercy (MI), all voiced their antagonism to S. 819’s attempt at repealing the Mundt amendment. Other, non-academic organizations such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, the American Legion, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars also declared their continued support of NDEA’s anti-subversive test.²⁵⁷ Indeed, despite the enthusiasm generated by Smith, Borton, McBride, and others, those legislators sympathetic to the anti-disclaimer

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 105-112.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 112

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 135-136, 138-139, 140-141.

movement would face a challenge in their attempt to dislodge the prevailing political discourse of loyalty, conformity, and acceptance that had produced the Mundt amendments in the first place.

S. 819 would come to full Senate debate on July 23, 1959. After several statements of incredulity from senators that colleges would object to taking a common loyalty oath, supporters of repeal clarified that it was the disclaimer affidavit which was unacceptable to protesting institutions. In the course of debate, Senator Mundt introduced an amendment—first suggested during the subcommittee hearings—which preserved the loyalty oath, but also imposed specific criminal penalties against advocates of forceful overthrow of the Government or members of organizations advocating overthrow. In a moderating measure, Senator Jacob K. Javits, a New York Republican, introduced a surrogate for Mundt’s new amendment. Javits’ amendment proposed retaining the loyalty oath, but made penalties for violation apply under an existing statute, Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States legal code. The Senate approved this proposal—which would effectively eliminate the objectionable affidavit while retaining the loyalty oath—as an amendment to S. 819. Despite this approval, after further debate, the full Senate voted, forty-nine to forty-two, to recommit the Kennedy-Clark bill to committee.²⁵⁸

S. 819 had failed, and its banishment back to committee functionally killed the proposal, a fact which Kennedy drily noted in subsequent remarks on the Senate floor. Senator Everett Dirksen, an opponent of both the original Kennedy/Clark measure and the Javits amendment, responded:

²⁵⁸ *National Defense Education Act of 1958*, S. 819, 86th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 105, pt.11 (July 23, 1959): S 14065-14101.

That may be true, but if it is true, I am sure the columns in this Chamber will not tremble. I do not believe there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth on the sun kissed shores of California or in the waving wheat fields of the Great Plains. I doubt if under the fair skies of Florida there will be weeping if the bill fails to see the light of day again in this session. We have lived with the present law thus far. I think it deserves a further chance.²⁵⁹

This dismissal of the disclaimer affidavit protest as an issue of marginal concern was not the isolated posturing of an ardent cold warrior like Karl Mundt, or a dyed-in-the-wool conservative such as Graham Barden. Dirksen's sense that section 1001 (f) (1)—the disclaimer affidavit—was something that Americans could “live with” seemed to have support not only in the commercial and military organizations of the nation, but also within the great majority of higher education itself. While many leaders and faculty in academe were happy to oppose the NDEA's loyalty provisions rhetorically, in practice the largesse put forward by the federal government was too generous for most institutions to resist. Of all the NDEA programs, it was Title II—the NDSL—which was the most prominent in terms of institutions served, students subsidized, and money spent. Over 1,200 schools applied for a total of \$62 million in grants, a dollar figure more than twice what the NDSL was able to offer. By August of 1959, the month after Dirksen's statement of blithe disregard, the Office of Education announced that it had increased the total monies available under the NDSL by 25 percent, and nearly 150 new colleges and universities had joined the hundreds who had previously sought aid, for a total of 121,000

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 14101.

individual student applications.²⁶⁰ Simply put, if students and schools were troubled by the implications of the disclaimer affidavit, this discomfiture was not precluding their participation in the NDSL.

It would be incorrect, however, to assert that the political efforts of Swarthmore, Haverford, and others had been for naught. While some legislators and community leaders wanted to position the apprehensions about academic freedom and community integrity as the provincial worries of left-leaning eggheads and their boutique colleges, the appearances and messages delivered by Smith and Borton, among others, were crucial in establishing the NDEA non-participants as mainstream educators with legitimate, reasonable concerns. More significantly, the congressional testimonies of Smith and Borton gave greater visibility to the institutional resistance that Swarthmore and Haverford had undertaken. Though the disclaimer affidavit had been an early target of individuals such as Arthur Flemming and Whitney Griswold, and had earned the disapprobation of professional organizations like the AAUP, only a miniscule number of campuses asserted themselves through refusal or withdrawal of participation in the NDSL prior to the congressional hearings in the spring of 1959. The proclamation of that institutional resistance to the very lawmaking body it was resisting carried important symbolic and, in the coming years, political freight. Though other colleges and universities may not have enjoyed the distinctive institutional sagas and missions that both Swarthmore and Haverford had consistently nurtured and expressed, they nonetheless could draw inspiration from the Quaker schools' example of non-

²⁶⁰ Urban, p. 178-180; *New York Times*, "Education News: Varied Activity on the Campus and in the Classrooms," August 9, 1959.

participation, and the clarity and civility with which Smith and Borton defended that non-participation in front of the Senate subcommittee.²⁶¹

This inspiration was made manifest in the decision of several institutions to divest themselves of Title II participation after the failure of S. 819. Schools which had participated in the NDSL on a provisional basis had been keen observers of the hearings and debate surrounding the Kennedy-Clark bill. When it became clear that legislative relief was not forthcoming in the summer of 1959—when the thoughtful positions of Swarthmore, Haverford, and others failed to carry the day—provisional participants were forced to reevaluate their tactical approach to NDEA. As Courtney Smith confided to Kennedy after the hearings, at least three school presidents had told him their schools would withdraw participation if Section 1001 (f) was not overturned. Schools would soon make good on these promises, as Harvard, Yale, Oberlin, and a half-dozen others dropped out of the NDSL by the end of 1959, with scores more registering official protests in the wake of the legislative failure.²⁶²

In the months before their journey to Washington and in front of the Subcommittee on Education itself, Swarthmore and Haverford had defined their understanding of the purposes and priorities not just of academic freedom, but of collegiate community;

²⁶¹ This is not to say that the Swarthmore and Haverford camps were necessarily satisfied with all aspects of their Washington experience. Reflecting upon the legislative defeat, Swarthmore professor (and member of the college's ad hoc committee on the disclaimer affidavit) Charles Gilbert would assign considerable blame at the feet of the Quaker colleges' congressional allies: "[T]he cause was poorly handled by Kennedy and Clark—and by all others on 'our' side... It didn't seem to me that Kennedy or Clark had a grasp of the issues we thought were of principal importance—this, rather than poor statement or tactics, seems to me to have been the problem on our side.... Senator Mundt and others opposed to amendment were able to argue without being contradicted that the issue was of minor importance—too minor for the time being consumed in debate." Gilbert to Smith, September 28, 1959, "NDEA 1959 February-December" folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

²⁶² Smith to Kennedy, May 12, 1959, "NDEA Senate Hearings 1959 January-April" folder, box 56, Smith Papers; *Oberlin Today* 17, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 1959): 1-6; Anthony Lewis, "Eisenhower Hits Student Aid Oath," *New York Times*, December 2, 1959; "Repeal of the 'Non-Communist' Affidavit in the Education Act To Be a Lively Issue in Congress," 488.

moreover, the two schools had tacitly invited other colleges and universities to move past public pronouncements and rhetorical commitments to their students, and instead to act on behalf of an idea that preserved the dignity of the collegiate experience. To be sure, the two Philadelphia schools were not alone in this effort—some few other colleges, plus the lobbying efforts of the AAUP and the stands of high-profile presidents (if not their institutions themselves) had played a crucial role in strengthening resolve and heightening awareness in higher education—but the statement that Swarthmore and Haverford contributed to the conversation was clear, decisive, and vital. In declaring certain aspects of their institutional traditions and narratives inviolate, these schools and their leaders won support that was not only national—witness the increasing number of schools withdrawing from and protesting the NDSL—but also local. At Swarthmore, an alum captured the prevailing community satisfaction with his alma mater’s effort: “Whether or not the stand the college has taken, with others, results in a reversal of this foolishness matters less, in my opinion, than that you took it.” Similarly, Haverford’s student body saluted the principled stand of the school and belatedly praised its quiet, serious president in the pages of the 1959 yearbook. Reflecting upon the year, the student editors acknowledged that

critics were forced to admit that some of their criticism [of Borton] had been unfocused. There was even deserved praise for his stand on loyalty oaths for government fellowships... Thus it gradually becomes apparent, as Hugh Borton finishes his second year at Haverford, that he is not like [past presidents] “Uncle Billy Comfort” or Felix Morley or Gilbert White. He is like Hugh Borton.²⁶³

²⁶³ Richard A. Humphrey to Courtney C. Smith, June 17, 1959, “NDEA 1959 February-December” folder, box 54, Smith Papers; *Haverford College Record* (Haverford, PA: Haverford College, 1959), 10.

The repeal efforts of the Quaker colleges in 1959 were the natural outgrowth of relentless commitments to long-standing institutional narratives. These narratives linked similar beliefs about college community, moral heritage, and respect for individual conscience, and though they were shared in ways specific to the leadership styles at their respective schools, they ultimately brought the colleges to the same moral and political stands. While not universal, the approval that the colleges had earned from their respective expressions of these stands—Swarthmore largely through activism; Haverford, through quiet resolve—was crucial in nourishing further activism. Though the political action of the two colleges had not produced removal of the most obnoxious NDEA loyalty provisions, it did engender enthusiasm on their home campuses, at schools across the nation, and in the halls of Congress. This enthusiasm helped sustain political action over the next three years, and would in due course bring about the elimination of the disclaimer affidavit.

Chapter 8: Eliminated Disclaimer, Enduring Controversy

In commenting on the death of S. 819, bill opponent Senator Richard Russell of Georgia pointed out that no students in his state had seen fit to write him in support of the protest. Similarly, Joseph Clark reflected that “[i]t made a considerable impression [on the Senate] that not many students had even heard of the loyalty provision, and only a few cared enough to write their Senators or Congressmen.”²⁶⁴ While this picture of student ignorance and apathy could not be justly applied to their campus climates in late 1958 and 1959, students at both Swarthmore and Haverford nonetheless seemed to take this senatorial criticism to heart. At Swarthmore, the student council responded by forming a “Special Committee on the Disclaimer Affidavit,” which in turn urged their peers to embark upon a letter-writing campaign to win the support of their elected representatives. This expression of student engagement at Swarthmore was undergirded by extensive coverage of the enduring controversy in the pages of the *Phoenix*, where a series of editorials and essays appeared throughout the 1959-60 academic year.²⁶⁵ Haverford students, on the other hand—perhaps aping the style of their newly-embraced president—were more circumspect in their attention to the matter. They did not establish a campus-wide movement to correspond with legislators, but the students did express their continuing support both for Haverford’s educational project, and the stand that this project had produced. The *Haverford News* noted that through its small size and close relationships, the college had maintained fidelity to its longstanding “moral

²⁶⁴ Joughin, “Repealing the Disclaimer Affidavit,” *AAUP Bulletin* 46, no. 1 (Spring 1960): 56.

²⁶⁵ Student Council Committee on the Disclaimer Affidavit, “Open Letter to Swarthmore Students,” February 10, 1960, “NDEA 1960” folder, box 54, Smith Papers; *Swarthmore Phoenix*, “Disclaiming the Disclaimer,” October 13, 1959; “The Affidavit,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, February 9, 1960; Peter Offenhartz and William Fairley, letter to the editor, *Swarthmore Phoenix*, February 16, 1960; Don Tucker, “A Defense of Freedom from the Disclaimer,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, February 23, 1960; J. Roland Pennock, “Pennock Attacks NDEA’s Disclaimer Affidavit,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, March 8, 1960.

responsibility” to and for the students in its charge. The editors also re-affirmed their enthusiasm for the stance the school had taken in early 1959, and hoped that the college’s leadership would help bring about repeal of the Mundt amendment in 1960.²⁶⁶ As student activity on both campuses suggests, though the legislative defeat of the Kennedy-Clark bill surely caused disappointment on the Main Line, it was not sufficient to quell community enthusiasm for NDEA resistance.

This enthusiasm was also spreading to other precincts. At Harvard, student interest was beginning to catch up with that of its faculty, as in late 1959 the *Crimson* published a pro-repeal pamphlet (“Worse Than Futile”) with an introduction by Kennedy. Like Swarthmore, Harvard began its own letter-writing campaign, with similar efforts beginning at Antioch, the University of Chicago, and Wellesley. The number of institutions formally protesting the affidavit grew to nearly forty, and even President Dwight Eisenhower signaled his dissatisfaction with the disclaimer affidavit, first at a news conference, and a month later as part of his national budget message. Declaring the loyalty oath “sufficient,” Eisenhower empathized with students who were “resentful” at the imposition of a separate affidavit.²⁶⁷

In this climate of burgeoning support for political action, both Senators Kennedy and Clark reintroduced legislation to eliminate the affidavit in late January of 1960. Along with co-sponsor Jacob Javits, the pair put forward S. 2929, a virtual replica of the previous year’s bill, with the notable exception that it asked repeal only of Section 1001 (f) (1)—the disclaimer affidavit—rather than the entire section itself. With the modified

²⁶⁶ Brownly Speer, “Moral Responsibility,” *Haverford News*, November 25, 1959; Alan W. Armstrong, “Loyalty...,” *Haverford News*, February 5, 1960.

²⁶⁷ “Repeal,” *Science*, Vol. 131, No. 3399 (Feb. 19, 1960): 488; Lewis, “Eisenhower Hits Student Aid Oath.”

language, the backing of the popular President Eisenhower, and enhanced cooperation from leaders in higher education, supporters of the bill were optimistic that S. 2929 stood a better chance of passing than its predecessor had.²⁶⁸

There were, of course, still camps which remained implacably opposed to the removal of any of the NDEA's loyalty provisions. Pushing back against the strengthening student resistance to the affidavit, undergraduate organizations at the University of Houston and Ohio State officially endorsed the disclaimer, and a reactionary lobbying group (the National Student Committee for the Loyalty Oath) was hastily formed in early 1960. Of real concern to those seeking repeal, however, was not the comparatively thin ranks of student retrenchment, but rather the political power of the organizations and lawmakers who would frame the debate on the proposed bill in the Manichean terms of the cold war loyalty discourse. Both the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars continued their advocacy on behalf of the disclaimer affidavit, and the legislative path through the House would inevitably be blocked by Education and Labor committee chairman Graham Barden, who had promised to resist any attempts at repeal "with every energy that is in me." Even in the upper chamber, the most prominent opponents of S. 819—Everett Dirksen, Arizona's Barry Goldwater, and Karl Mundt himself—promised contentious debate on the matter when it reached the Senate.²⁶⁹

The floor fight which ensued on June 15, 1960, produced the expected lines of division. Richard Russell of Georgia gave a lengthy disquisition against American higher education, with the suggestions that academicians were insufficiently troubled by "the

²⁶⁸ *National Defense Education Act of 1958*, S. 2929, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* 106, pt. 2 (January 28, 1960): S 1498; Bess Furman, "Hot Fight Likely on Student Oath," *New York Times*, February 7, 1960.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; Furman, "Barden Defends School Oath Law," *New York Times*, February 20, 1959.

system of collectivism and communism that prevail[ed] behind the Iron Curtain;” thought themselves above American oath-taking farmers, professionals, and merchants; were elitists bent on discriminating against the poor students to whom loans would not be available; and were engaging in protest simply to “join the class of Yale, Harvard, and Princeton.” Styles Bridges, a Republican from New Hampshire, claimed to have letters from over 3,700 college students who had taken a stand in favor of the disclaimer affidavit. Finally, Florida Democrat Spessard Holland suggested that the protests of Swarthmore and Haverford should be discounted by trying to attach the schools’ dissent not to the relevant issues of community integrity and freedom of belief, but rather to the Quaker peace testimony of both colleges.²⁷⁰ Despite this rhetorical bombast, however, those in favor of repeal continued to correct the misimpressions and misdirection of those asserting that rejection of the disclaimer was tantamount to disloyalty. These efforts, coupled with the lengthening rolls of non-participating, withdrawn, and disapproving schools and faculty (over 130 in all), helped preserve sufficient enthusiasm for the bill. The measure was also made more palatable to fence-sitting lawmakers through the addition of a modification by Vermont Republican Winston Prouty. Prouty believed “loopholes” would remain for subversives if the disclaimer was simply eliminated; as a consequence, the so-called “Prouty Amendment” excised the affidavit of belief, but also substituted a provision which criminalized those who would apply for NDSL monies while retaining membership in a “subversive” organization within five years of the application. This measure placated senators concerned that the Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill did not do enough to punish those who would undermine the government, and also

²⁷⁰ *National Defense Education Act of 1958*, S. 2929, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* 106, pt. 10 (June 15, 1960): S.12646-12648, 12685, 12662.

attempted to mollify academicians who did not want responsibility for administering and executing loyalty tests to their students. On a voice vote, the Senate passed the amended S. 2929 and thus moved to abolish the disclaimer affidavit.²⁷¹

The bill was sent to the House, where its supporters hoped that the Prouty amendment would protect the proposal from the assaults of Graham Barden and his allies. In the end, however, Barden made good on his vow to obstruct any repeal measures, those in opposition marshaled enough support in his Education and Labor Committee to kill the amended bill as the Eighty-sixth Congress drew to a close. Before it died, though, the bill managed to generate further interest in and extensive debate about repeal among its advocates. Questions regarding the appropriateness of the Senate measure, the contrasts (or lack thereof) between the Prouty and Mundt amendments, and the viability of discovering “subversive” sympathies among applicants animated discussion in political circles and on college campuses in late 1960 and into 1961. The ACLU moved swiftly, with its membership voting on June 20—even before the House killed the Senate measure—to oppose the amended Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill. In a letter to college presidents, ACLU Executive Director Malin and former Columbia dean Louis Hacker asserted that the Prouty amendment was not an appreciable improvement on Mundt’s loyalty measures, and sent letters to over one hundred protesting institutions urging continued activity in resisting the legislation of belief. Similarly, the AAC attempted to keep the issue alive among its membership, with a declaration that even had it become law, S. 2929 was wholly intolerable in principle, and “[i]n order to leave no doubt in the public mind about the attitude of the Association... the time [was] ripe for the adoption

²⁷¹ Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Amending the National Defense Education Act to Eliminate the Affidavit of Disloyalty*, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 1960, S. Rep. 1347, 4-6, 19-20; E. W. Kenworthy, “Senate Votes End of Student Oath,” *New York Times*, June 16, 1960.

of a formal resolution asking the Congress to limit the requirements of the [National Defense Education] Act to the simple oath of loyalty.” Finally, the AAUP also rejected Prouty’s amended Senate bill. Like the AAC, while the AAUP found S. 2929 preferable to existing law, the new measure still offered inadequate definitions of what constituted something “subversive,” and continued to express unwarranted suspicion of students as a class of citizens.²⁷²

At the same time, key figures in the repeal movement indicated a willingness to accept the amended bill. Whitney Griswold of Yale, author of the much-esteemed *New York Times* essay on academic freedom, gave an endorsement of the amended bill to a Congressional subcommittee, and Harvard’s Nathan Pusey offered his own public support of the measure.²⁷³ These stands were noted at Swarthmore, where the persistent financial pressure of maintaining an independent loan program was beginning to take its toll. In reflecting upon the Senate bill, William Prentice, college dean and one of Courtney Smith’s closest counselors, confided that he “would be willing to consider continuing to refuse the money, but the new law seems to me to have certain advantages over the old,” and further wondered if “continued refusal to participate in the [NDSL] program [was] the proper way” for Swarthmore to make its point about the sanctity of its college community. Mindful of the opportunities that accepting the Prouty amendment might bring to the college, Smith nonetheless responded as he had in 1958 by calling for an investigatory committee composed jointly of administrators, managers, faculty, and

²⁷² Leonard Beach, “The Reporter,” *The Journal of Higher Education* 31, no. 9 (December 1960): 512-513; Malin and Hacker to Courtney C. Smith, September 9, 1960, “NDEA 1960” folder, box 54, Smith Papers; Hurst B. Anderson, Report of the Association of American Colleges’ Committee on Legislation, January 1961, “NDEA 1961” folder, box 54, Smith Papers; Joughin, “The Disclaimer Affidavit,” *AAUP Bulletin* 46, no. 4 (Winter 1960): 412.

²⁷³ Malin and Hacker to Smith.

students. The group retained seven members from its 1959 iteration, with two new student members selected from seven applicants, and discussed the issue during its only meeting on December 16, 1960. While the prevailing sentiment was for maintaining non-participation, the committee agreed to meet again in order to get a greater “sense of the meeting.”²⁷⁴

The ad hoc committee would not have this clarifying discussion, as the House laid to rest the Senate bill before the committee could schedule its second gathering. While Swarthmore’s activity in the autumn of 1960 may seem unremarkable—the college had one academic discussion on a bill that would never escape its House committee—the continuity of the school’s approach to questions of cultural and ethical importance must not passed unnoticed. Faced with increasingly challenging financial commitments and the very real possibility that the Prouty amendment would represent the best and final attempt at altering NDEA legislation, Swarthmore held fast to its norms of careful deliberation and community participation. In a circumstance where expedience or political weariness may have carried the day, Swarthmore remained ready to explore what implications the acceptance of S. 2929 might have for the college’s institutional self-narrative. That the bill ultimately failed before this process could be fully enacted should not detract from the school’s expression of moral purpose.

Across the Main Line, Haverford was honoring its own standard approach to the disclaimer question. Just as Swarthmore elected to hew to the procedures which had carried them through the first NDEA controversy in 1958-59, Haverford maintained its posture of quiet resolution as the Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill moved its way through the

²⁷⁴ Prentice to Smith, September 16, 1960, “NDEA 1960” folder, box 54, Smith Papers; *Swarthmore Phoenix*, “College to Consider N.D.E.A. Amendment,” December 9, 1960; Report of the Committee on the Prouty Amendment, December 16, 1960, “NDEA 1960” folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

Congress. Where Courtney Smith's campus was alive with debate and preparation, Hugh Borton presided over calmer circumstances; indeed, neither the Board of Managers nor the administration apparently saw the proposed legislation as an occasion for debate. Though this might be read as an indication of community lassitude, Haverford's past performances and contemporary concerns suggest otherwise. During the period of the Prouty debate, Haverford continued to express a culture of moral engagement in a variety of ways: students marched in demonstrations in solidarity with civil rights sit-ins; Thurgood Marshall was invited to speak at the college's weekly Collection, which grew into an extended dialogue with the community; and the students initiated a successful partnership with the administration to explore the possibility of expanding the school's honor code to include self-scheduled final examinations. In addition, both Borton and the faculty remained attuned to the political conversation surrounding the NDEA controversy, and the president continued to update the faculty on his abiding support for AAC and AAUP resistance to the disclaimer. In short, though it did not produce the same formal inquiry into the Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill that Swarthmore had, Haverford was no less dedicated to moral conversation and meaningful community relationships fundamental to Quaker and residential liberal arts identity; rather, it simply did not find the Prouty controversy persuasive enough to challenge these norms.²⁷⁵

While interest in the disclaimer affidavit persisted, even after the fall of S. 2929, the Eighty-seventh Congress did not present an obvious opportunity for seeking repeal.

²⁷⁵ As will be seen, this argument is further strengthened by Haverford's abiding moral discomfort with NDEA Title II even after the elimination of the disclaimer affidavit in 1962. It would be a full decade before new language in the program made it suitable for the college's participation. *Haverford News*, "Students Act to Support 'Sit-in's,'" April 15, 1960; Haverford College Honor Council, "History of the Code," <http://honorcouncil.haverford.edu/the-code/history-of-the-code/>; minutes of Haverford College faculty, January 19, 1961, <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/3709/1960-1961.pdf?sequence=1>.

NDEA had been authorized through FY 1963, but was eligible for renewal as soon as 1961. With this opportunity, all manner of groups began lobbying for additions and revisions to the law, which had provided federal funding to all levels of American education, and thus was generally very popular. Subcommittees in both the House and the Senate were subject to testimony throughout the summer of 1961 from an assortment of constituencies, who advocated for a variety of measures—federal loans to independent schools, expansion of graduate fellowships for all disciplines (not just those with a short-term “defense” orientation), establishing summer teaching institutes for secondary school teachers of the humanities, and so on. Overall, the Senate and House Subcommittees on Education together received over 1,750 pages of testimony from those seeking new or continued funding. While Senator Carl Elliott (one of the champions of the original NDEA) offered a bill (S. 1726) that would strike Section 1001 (f) (1) from the renewed law, his proposal was crowded out by competing bills from other legislators eager to appease their constituents. In this climate of heightened attention and activity surrounding the NDEA, summoning the requisite political will and organization to attempt a third foray against the disclaimer affidavit proved too difficult a charge. When S. 2393 was passed on September 12, 1961, it extended funding for the NDEA an additional two years, but also left the loyalty provisions intact.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁶ Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *National Defense Education Act of 1958*, report prepared by the staff, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1958, Committee Print, 26; Natalie Jaffe, “Revising the Education Act,” *New York Times*, January 22, 1961; Senate Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *National Defense Education Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare*, 87th Congress, 1st sess., 1961; House Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, *National Defense Education Act: Hearings Before the General Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor*, 87th Congress, 1st sess., 1961; *National Defense Education Act*, S. 1726, 87th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 107, pt. 5 (May 12, 1961): S 6778; *National Defense Education Act*, S. 2393, 87th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 107, p. 14 (September 12, 1961): S 19076.

Disappointment was once more felt in the ranks of those seeking repeal, but Swarthmore and Haverford adhered to their stands of non-participation. Swarthmore was typically vociferous: having received its *pro forma* invitation to apply for Title II funding, the college's vice president, Edward Cratsley, fired off a polite but firm rejoinder expressing his frustration to HEW's Chief of Student Loans, and reminded that his school's "attitude regarding this matter remains constant" while noting his "hope that some change in the particular requirement can be effected at the earliest possible date." Haverford, for its part, gave no sign of abandoning its commitment either to NDEA protest or the necessity of value consideration in its community; indeed, rather than wring its hands over congressional intractability, the school occupied itself with higher-order moral debates about other aspects of the military-industrial complex, such as the school's position on the nation's burgeoning nuclear arsenal. Despite the political setbacks and unorthodox financial arrangements that attended the effort, the two schools would persist in their resistance.²⁷⁷

The rewards for this persistence would arrive sooner than expected, and from an unanticipated source. In 1958, HUAC was investigating the "colonization" of the Gary, Indiana steel industry by the Communist Party, and a steelworker, Edward Yellin, was identified as a Communist by investigators. Called to a public interrogation by the committee, Yellin (who had renounced with Party membership, but remained antagonistic to HUAC) refused to cooperate; he was summarily charged with contempt of Congress, and sentenced to a year in prison. Yellin began serving his prison term in March of 1960, after having finished an undergraduate degree in engineering. Upon his

²⁷⁷ Cratsley to James W. Moore, September 28, 1961, "NDEA 1961" folder, box 54, Smith Papers; Memorandum by Hugh Borton, "College Policy on Civil Defense," minutes of Haverford College faculty, December 14, 1961, <http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu:8080/dspace/handle/10066/3701>.

release from jail in 1961, Yellin applied for and was awarded a two-year fellowship for graduate study through the National Science Foundation. When legislators were made aware that a convicted criminal with communist sympathies had been granted \$3,800 from the federal government, they furiously convened hearings of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics to begin amending the security provisions of the National Science Foundation Act. As the hearings revealed, Yellin had in fact signed Section 16 of the NSFA—its disclaimer affidavit—but had still been granted federal monies. While NSF officials noted that their fellowships were given solely on the basis of intellectual merit and thus did not require disclosure of a criminal record, the principal lesson committee members drew from the episode centered on the ineffectuality of disclaimer affidavits as a mechanism for “catching” subversives. In response, the committee chairman, Congressman Overton Brooks of Louisiana, introduced H.R. 8556 to the full House on August 8, 1961. The bill eliminated the disclaimer affidavit of the NFSA, but also strengthened the security provisions of the law to necessitate the disclosure of criminal records by applicants and punish those found to be “subversive” with up to five years in prison and/or a \$10,000 fine. The bill easily passed on September 6, and was sent to the Senate, whose Committee on Labor and Public Welfare held jurisdiction over NSF legislation.²⁷⁸

During the floor debate over H.R. 8556, Congressman James Corman of California had suggested that just as the disclaimer affidavit made little sense as a security measure

²⁷⁸ *Edward Yellin v. U.S.*, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); John Walsh, “Loyalty Affidavit: Compromise on Repeal Quiets One Controversy,” *Science* 135, no. 3548 (December 28, 1962): 1382-1383; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, *Awards and Fellowships Under the National Science Foundation Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Science and Astronautics*, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961; *National Science Foundation Act of 1950*, H.R. 8556, 87th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 107, pt. 11(August 8, 1961): H 14996; *National Science Foundation Act of 1950*, H.R. 8556, 87th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 107, pt. 14(September 6, 1961): H 18242.

in the NSFA, so too would it fail as a prevention mechanism in NDEA legislation. While not a novel argument—indeed, this position had been widely articulated since the original hearings on the Mundt amendment in 1959—senators who had supported the repeal of Section 1001 (f) (1) now saw an opportunity to use the enthusiasm for the revised NSFA in their favor. Noting that the NDEA loyalty provisions were initially modeled on those of the NSFA, the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee recommended extending the NSFA amendments to include NDEA. At the same time, unwilling to risk pushback from hard-line senators or the even more obstinate cold warriors in the House, supporters of the amended H.R. 8556 arranged to have the measure come to a vote late in the busy closing days of the legislative session, and under conditions where the bill could be passed by unanimous consent, without the necessity of either debate or roll-call vote. Using such delicate means, both the Senate and House approved an updated H.R. 8556 by voice votes, and President Kennedy signed the bill into law on October 17, 1962. After nearly four years of debate and political machinations, NDEA was finally rid of its disclaimer affidavit.²⁷⁹

This final removal, of course, was not without some irony. For all the attention given to the NDEA, the final push for removing its disclaimer affidavit originated from an unlikely source: the Yellin controversy. Similarly, the disclaimer was defeated in large measure because of its ineffectuality, not because of its obnoxiousness to traditions of college community and academic freedom. That said, the contributions made by the protests of the academic community, and particularly the complete non-participation of

²⁷⁹ Walsh, 1382; Senate Committee on Labor and Welfare, *Amending the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, As Amended, and the National Defense Education Act of 1958, As Amended*, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, S. Rep. 2117, 1,3-421, 1962, 1-4; *New York Times*, “Senate Votes End on Students’ Oath,” September 28, 1962; *National Science Foundation Act of 1950*, HR 8556, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* 108, pt.16 (October 2, 1962): H 21729.

schools like Swarthmore and Haverford, must be neither discounted nor minimized.

While the resolution of the controversy may not have come about in the manner institutions had hoped for, this resolution would not have been realized at all were it not for the part they played in recruiting support for repeal, demanding appropriate political attention, and—most importantly—defending fundamental collegiate ideals. Absent the leadership positions taken and sustained by schools like Swarthmore and Haverford, there is no guarantee that the NDEA disclaimer affidavit would have attracted sufficient attention to warrant attachment to the revised NSFA. No matter its origins, or the slow and desultory response of the political system, the repeal served to vindicate the courageous stands of the two Quaker schools.

In an effort to communicate their abiding interest in receiving federal monies, many schools had maintained provisional applications to participate in the NDSL, upon the lifting of the affidavit. With the affidavit's removal in 1962, the provisional applicants immediately signaled their interest in joining the program for the 1963-64 academic year. Institutions like Amherst, Antioch, Harvard, Oberlin, Mills, Princeton, Smith, and others all proclaimed the acceptability of the new legislation, and Yale's typically eloquent Whitney Griswold captured the group's collective sensibility with his claim that the amended acts constituted a "long step in the right direction."²⁸⁰ Still, enthusiasm for the repeal of the affidavit was not full-throated. Both the ACLU and the AAUP retained deep reservations about the legislation. Following the NSFA, the NDEA's new provisions made it a crime for any member of a Communist organization, as defined in the Subversive Activities Control (SAC) Act of 1950, to apply for or to use a scholarship

²⁸⁰ Walsh, 1381; Yale University News Bureau, "Statement of Participation in NDSL Program," news release, October 19, 1962, "NDEA 1962 January-October" folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

or a fellowship, with violators facing a fine of up to \$10,000, and/or imprisonment for up to five years. For the ACLU, these requirements were “not worse than the disclaimer affidavit, but certainly no better.” The AAUP thought the new law an improvement on both the initial NDEA, with its disclaimer affidavit, and even the Prouty amendment to S. 2929, which would have required disclosure of past associations; still, the organization critiqued the federal statute for, among other things, continuing to embody an invidious suspicion of students.²⁸¹ For schools like Swarthmore and Haverford, whose institutional identities were rooted in a culture of intellectual and moral seriousness, the issues raised by the ACLU and AAUP were of particular concern, and entry into the reformed NDSL was by no means a *fait accompli*.

Prior to the passage of H.R. 8556, Swarthmore had filed a provisional application for the 1963-64 NDSL, so that the school might be prepared in case legislative action eliminated the disclaimer affidavit. Even with the new law, however, matters at the school were not at all settled, as the campus renewed the debate over the implications of loyalty provisions for its collegiate culture. Within a week of President Kennedy’s signing of the statute, students began lobbying Courtney Smith for a voice in the school’s response to the NDEA revision, and Smith immediately recalled the ad hoc committee assembled in late 1960 to discuss the Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill, with two new students added to replace their graduated peers. While the government deadline for NDSL application was November 15, Smith—as ever, not wanting to rush the deliberative

²⁸¹ *New York Times*, “President Expected to Approve Repeal of Students’ Oath,” October 6, 1962; Herman I. Orentlicher, “The Disclaimer Affidavit: A Valediction,” *AAUP Bulletin* 48, no. 4 (Winter 1962): 326-327.

process—made a *pro forma* petition for an extension from HEW, which granted Swarthmore an additional two weeks for institutional discussion.²⁸²

With this increased time, Swarthmore once more became the site of considerable debate on the NDEA controversy. On the administrator-manager-faculty-student committee, those in favor of the college's participation pointed to the elimination of the disclaimer of belief, and a contention that restrictions on organizational membership were not the same as infringements on belief. Supporters of the new NDSL also noted that the college no longer had the obligation to administer an oath of any kind, and thus to refuse participation under the new law would simply prevent students from making clear-eyed applications for government loans which could help both the students and the college alike; indeed, Swarthmore had allocated about \$25,000 of loans to students for the 1962-63 academic year, and the hoped-for NDSL award of \$10,000 would certainly aid the institution's bottom line. Finally, a series of editorials appeared in the *Phoenix* which attempted to rally support for the revised NDEA, with essayists pointing out that the college could withdraw from the program at any time if the SAC Act began to intrude upon on-campus freedom of belief, and that the new loyalty provisions did not interfere with the community's search for meaningful values.²⁸³

Those opposed to participation in the NDSL, on the other hand, contended that refusing monies to members of organizations registered with the SAC Board constituted as much an infringement upon freedom of belief and association as the original NDEA.

²⁸² Memorandum by Gil Stott to Smith, October 23, 1962, "NDEA 1962 January-October" folder, box 54, Smith Papers; Memorandum to the Disclaimer Affidavit Committee, October 30, 1962, "NDEA 1962 January-October" folder, box 54, Smith Papers.

²⁸³ Minutes of Committee on the National Defense Education Act, November 19, 1962, "NDEA 1962 November-December" folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Phil Grier, "NDEA Spurs Talk on Campus—Pro," *Swarthmore Phoenix*, December 11, 1962; John Cratsley, "Individuals Should Have Veto," *Swarthmore Phoenix*, December 14, 1962.

Some also worried that the SAC Board, which presently identified a small band of “subversive” groups, could be indefinitely expanded in a replay of the McCarthyist excesses of the previous decade.²⁸⁴ When the Swarthmore student council voted on November 25 to support participation in the revised NDSL, students immediately began a petition drive in opposition, with the assertion that the recommendation had been made before adequate student consideration could be heard. Over 400 Swarthmore students signed the petition, which led the student council on November 27 to rescind its previous position and ask the administration for more time for deliberation. The administration responded by again petitioning HEW for an extension past the November 30th deadline, an extension which the department granted. While December votes of both the ad hoc committee and the Swarthmore faculty recommended that the college join the NDEA Title II program, the Board’s final decision was held in abeyance pending a full student referendum on the matter, which had been scheduled for early January of 1963.²⁸⁵

With the new year came the final resolution of the issue. The student plebiscite, which was marked by a strong turnout, saw those in favor of NDEA participation carry the day by a vote of 349 to 300. Similarly, Swarthmore’s student council again endorsed joining the NDSL program, with the qualification that Swarthmore should “make a strong protest to the objectionable provisions of [NDEA]” while stating publicly that it would withdraw from the program if the revised act was “administered or interpreted in such a

²⁸⁴ Michael Gallantz, “NDEA Spurs Talk on Campus—Con,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, December 11, 1962; Gallantz, “College Can Not Be Neutral,” *Swarthmore Phoenix*, December 14, 1962; “Resolution of the Swarthmore Political Action Club,” December 1962, “NDEA 1962 November-December” folder, box 55, Smith Papers.

²⁸⁵ Robert D. Putnam to Courtney C. Smith, November 28, 1962, “NDEA November-December 1962” folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Petition to “NDEA Committee,” “NDEA November-December 1962” folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Gil Stott to Minard W. Stout, December 1, 1962, “NDEA November-December 1962” folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Richard Barrett, Julie Diamond, and Ollie Fein, “Open Letter to Swarthmore Students,” December 24, 1962, “NDEA November-December 1962” folder, box 55, Smith Papers.

way as to seriously discourage free inquiry.”²⁸⁶ Soon after, the college was ready to make its position public. On January 28, 1963, Courtney Smith issued Swarthmore’s announcement:

Swarthmore College is deeply gratified that the Congress in amending the National Defense Education Act of 1958 has eliminated the disclaimer affidavit of belief. The College is now electing to participate in the undergraduate loan program made possible by the Act. This participation should not be taken to imply approval of all the provisions of the Act, but the College has decided to participate in the program on the assumption that the new legislation will not be so interpreted or so administered as to limit freedom of inquiry or belief. For many years the College has been enabled by the generosity of alumni and others to maintain its own loan program to assist students with established financial need. All students, including foreign students and those who may in conscience have concerns about the National Defense Education Act, will of course continue to be eligible to apply for loans from the already established funds at the same rate of interest as in the government’s program.²⁸⁷

At the time of the announcement, Swarthmore had not reached consensus within its meeting, but it had—once again—confronted a moral dilemma by enlisting the opinion and discussion of all members of its campus. In the end, a majority of those involved in deliberation saw the revised NDEA as appreciably different from its predecessor in terms of the constraints it placed upon members of a Quaker community of inquiry, and this

²⁸⁶ G.A. Wilson, “A Division in Thinking on the Main Line,” *Pennsylvania Guardian*, February 8, 1963; Swarthmore College Student Council, “Statement on Participation in the Revised NDEA,” January 13, 1963, “NDEA 1963” folder, box 55, Smith Papers.

²⁸⁷ Smith, “Statement on Participation by Swarthmore College in Revised NDEA,” January 28, 1963, “NDEA 1963” folder, box 55, Smith Papers.

view was expressed in qualified terms, which could be seen both rhetorically (“participation should not be taken to imply approval of all the provisions of the Act”) and materially (with the continuation of the college’s own loan plan to dissenting students). As with its initial stand against the NDEA, the college had no guarantee that it had “gotten it right;” that is, those arguing against participation in the revised act had themselves claimed reputable moral ground. What cannot be denied, however, was that the seriousness and deliberate manner in which Swarthmore went about making its decision was firmly within the narrative tradition it had established for itself, both in its nineteenth century founding and throughout the NDEA period. When Swarthmore collected \$8,215.00 in NDEA funds for the 1963-64 academic year, it did so without betraying its longstanding saga as a school of intellectual and moral significance.²⁸⁸

Haverford, while expressing a similar heritage and sense of place, charted a different course than Swarthmore in 1963. As had been the case with the original NDEA and the unrealized revision of the act in 1960, the school saw little in the revised NDEA that would catalyze the same type of activity which characterized matters at its neighbor, Swarthmore. Haverford had not filed a provisional application to participate in the program, and thus was not in a rush to meet the November deadline when Kennedy signed the new NDEA into law. In December, Haverford’s faculty deputized its chapter of the AAUP to review the effect that the repeal of the affidavit might have on the school’s position of non-participation. Similarly, the student council created a joint student-faculty conference on the issue, printed an NDEA “information sheet” which it distributed to the student body, and on February 25, 1963 sponsored a referendum on the

²⁸⁸ Kenneth W. Mildenberger to Courtney C. Smith, May 8 1963, “NDEA 1963” folder, box 55, Smith Papers.

college's potential participation in the revised act. After their respective discussions and attempts to educate on the matter, though, faculty and student opinion on the new NDEA was deeply divided, and the lack of consensus seemed to offer little way forward.²⁸⁹

As with the original NDEA, however, Haverford's Board of Managers saw itself as the principal curator of the college's intellectual culture and moral heritage, and—seeing no clear “sense of the meeting” on campus—once more sought a solution through its own investigative efforts. (On this matter, the Board's investigative committee was wryly transparent: “While we have been very glad to have the views of faculty and students, we feel that a matter of principle is involved and that the Board of Managers must make its own decision without too much regard to the opinions of other groups.”²⁹⁰) Yet again, the managers' deliberation on NDEA issues was preceded by an examination of the propriety of faculty research grants emanating from the defense industry. John Chesick, a new chemistry professor, had won a research grant from the United States Air Force while at Yale, his previous institution, and wished to “carry” the grant with him to his new college home. While the project itself was described as “pure science,” the managers cited the college's policy of forbidding on-campus research sponsored by military entities, even if the research in question was non-classified or non-martial; as a consequence, Chesick's request was denied. At the same meeting, the Board called for a study of the revised NDEA, which would be signed into law the next day. This task was handed to a trio of managers—Harold Evans, Garrett Hoag, and Richard Wood—who

²⁸⁹ Minutes of the Haverford College faculty, December 13, 1962; *Haverford Bulletin* 62, no.1 (July 1963): 26; Minutes of the Students' Council Meeting, Haverford College, February 10, 17, and 24, 1963, <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/4004/1962-1963.pdf?sequence=1>; Harold Evans, Garrett Hoag, and Richard Wood, report on Haverford Board of Managers' NDEA policy, March 29, 1963, “NDEA 1963 Folder,” box 55, Smith Papers.

²⁹⁰ Evans, Hoag, and Wood, report on NDEA policy.

were charged with submitting a recommendation on Haverford's participation policy with regard to NDEA, now that the objectionable affidavit had been eliminated from the act.²⁹¹ Having just reaffirmed the college's position regarding on-campus faculty research conducted via military funding, the Board of Managers now chose to hold the line on NDEA as well, in spite of the elimination of the disclaimer affidavit. While acknowledging that their one-time partner Swarthmore had elected to participate in the NDSL, Haverford's managers emphasized that under the new act, it was still the college, not the government, which was making the loans to applicants. If the college would not have been willing to make student loans from its own funds under the conditions of the new loyalty provisions—and, as its moral and cultural tradition revealed, it would not—then the managers saw no reason for Haverford to depart from its previous stance. On March 29, 1963, the school announced its continued non-participation: “While we are gratified that the disclaimer affidavit of belief has been eliminated, other provisions of the NDEA regarding student loans are so objectionable that it is our considered judgment that a College with the tradition and ideals of Haverford should not participate in the program as it now exists.” In essence, Haverford would not abandon the position it had adopted in 1958, and would maintain its own loan program to assist those who might otherwise have applied for NDEA funds.²⁹²

On the Philadelphia Main Line, Haverford was not alone in refusing to join the revised NDSL in 1963. Bryn Mawr remained a notable non-participant as well, but the program's financial incentives would eventually move the college to participate in the

²⁹¹ Minutes, Board of Managers, October 16, 1962; Minutes, Board of Managers, November 30, 1962.

²⁹² Evans, Hoag, and Wood, report on NDEA policy.

NDSL during the 1964-65 academic year.²⁹³ Haverford, however, remained persistent in its stance, and would continue to do so throughout the decade.²⁹⁴ Campus activism across the nation would be radically transformed during the 1960s, of course, as the comparatively apolitical 1950s gave way to the tumult of the 1960s, with its embrace of the civil rights movement and protests of American military involvement in Southeast Asia.²⁹⁵ While some schools—Columbia, Cornell, Wisconsin, and many others—would find student militancy met by administrative and civic pushback, these movements for justice and peace readily segued into Haverford’s collective self-understanding as a community of open inquiry and mutual respect, and the school would not miss opportunities to affirm its commitment to the inherent importance of all its members.

Presiding over these opportunities, and the very continuity of Haverford’s narrative of intellectual and moral purpose, was its new president, John Coleman. Coleman, an economist, had taught at both the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Carnegie Institute of Technology, before assuming the role of Associate Director of Economic Development and Administration at the Ford Foundation in 1965. He held this position until 1967, when he replaced Hugh Borton and became Haverford’s first non-Quaker

²⁹³ Wilson, “A Division in Thinking on the Main Line”; summary of discussion and action on the National Defense Education Act of 1958, April 30, 1970, “National Defense Education Act of 1958” folder, box 20, Papers of Katharine Elizabeth McBride, 1D/B4, Special Collections Department, Bryn Mawr College Library.

²⁹⁴ Haverford was not higher education’s only holdout; indeed, Reed College maintained its non-participant stance as well. The Oregon school would withhold its participation until the early 1970s, and only joined the program under the same circumstances that Haverford ultimately found acceptable as well. Memorandum by Richard H. Sullivan to the Reed College faculty, November 27, 1962, “NDEA November-December 1962” folder, box 55, Smith Papers; Joe Marquez, Social Sciences Librarian, and Gay Walker, Special Collections Librarian, Reed College, e-mail message to author, January 6, 2014.

²⁹⁵ The scholarship on campus activism during the 1960’s in America is voluminous. For a representative sampling of recent work, see Rebecca E. Klatch, *A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Kenneth J. Heineman, *Put Your Bodies Upon the Wheels: Student Revolt in The 1960s* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001); and Kevin Mattson, *Intellectuals in Action: The Origins of the New Left and Radical Liberalism, 1945-1970* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002).

president. A professed Unitarian, Coleman would join the Society of Friends during his Haverford tenure, and his emphasis on the school's Quaker mission matched that of his predecessor, the devout Borton. He spoke often of the institution's responsibility for engagement in both ethical dialogue and positive action, and reaffirmed the crucial place of student presence and voice in the college's community through a series of cutting-edge changes: the inclusion of students in the procession of scholars at his own inauguration, the addition of two student observers at Board of Managers sessions, and the invitation made to nine students to sit in on faculty meetings. Later, Coleman would be at the vanguard of academic protest against the Vietnam War, and in 1972 arranged for Haverford's entire student body to bus down to Washington to converse with political and religious figures about the nation's military excursions into Cambodia.²⁹⁶

Like Borton, Coleman was also unafraid to engage in principled opposition to unwarranted governmental intrusion into Haverford's cultural project. A clear example emerged in 1969, when the Pennsylvania state legislature passed a bill requiring all colleges receiving financial aid from the state Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) to report students who contributed "to the disruption of the activities of the institution." Marshaling logic similar to that used by Borton in protesting the NDEA in the previous decade, Coleman noted that the legislation made Haverford responsible for policing student behavior according to the norms of the capitol, not the collegiate community. Accordingly, the school refused to sign an agreement with PHEAA, and instead challenged the constitutionality of the legislation in federal court. In 1971, the

²⁹⁶ Quinn, 37; Robert G. Schwartz, "The Center Holds: Haverford in the Sixties," in Kannerstein, *The Spirit and the Intellect*, 103-106.

courts ruled in Haverford's favor, and the school was able to again receive state monies without acting as informant about the personal affairs of its students.²⁹⁷

That Haverford would seek to protect the integrity of its community was not surprising, given both its mission and its leadership, but it was not done without cost. By 1970, when the school refused participation in the newly revised PHEAA Act, it had also been conducting its own surrogate loan program for the dozen years of NDEA non-participation. Though Haverford was still, by almost any objective measure, a well-resourced educational institution, this additional financial outlay was beginning to cause internal strains, as the administration at Swarthmore had noted in 1963. In a series of exchanges beginning around the time of the school's PHEAA victory, Haverford's directors of admissions and financial aid both attempted to persuade Coleman that a re-evaluation of the school's NDEA policy was in order. Faced with massive building projects to accommodate increasing enrollment, rising salaries for a growing faculty, and enlarged operational costs, Haverford's financial position—even with its \$25 million endowment—was not as strong as it had been when it had inaugurated its NDEA non-participation; indeed, in both 1970 and 1971 the school had run a deficit in its operations budget of over \$575,000. As admissions official William Ambler put it, bluntly: "Times have changed. We need the money.... The money received [from NDSL participation] could replace some (not all) of the money we now use for loans and free that money for other uses."²⁹⁸ Coleman, for his part, did not rise to the rhetorical bait, and left the

²⁹⁷ Quinn, 37; Minutes, Board of Managers, March 14, 1970; Minutes, Board of Managers, October 23, 1970; Minutes, Board of Managers, September 10, 1971.

²⁹⁸ Ambler to John Coleman, September 2, 1971, "Admissions—NDF" folder, box 1, Papers of John Coleman, R5/IA, Haverford Archives, Haverford College Quaker and Special Collections (hereafter cited as Coleman Papers); Memorandum by William Shafer on National Defense Student Loan Program, September 2, 1971, "Admissions—NDF" folder, box 1, Coleman Papers; "Treasurer's Report," *Haverford*

possibility of joining NDSL unmentioned in either faculty or board meetings throughout the 1971-72 academic year. Whether he was prescient or merely fortunate, political developments in Washington would soon deliver Coleman from the tension between enduring moral commitments and tightening fiscal realities, as legislators moved to amend 1965's Higher Education Act during the Ninety-second Congress. The Education Amendments of 1972, as Public Law 92-318 would be known, have since been most closely identified with Title IX of the statute, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in educational institutions receiving federal aid. Receiving less fanfare—but more significant to Haverford's story—was the modification in how government programs provided financial aid to students through the erstwhile National Defense Student Loan program. Though the school remained the lender, the rationale for aid was no longer affiliated with national defense, but rather with generally expanding access to postsecondary education. Through these adjustments, the need for both loyalty provisions and institutional participation in the loan process was eliminated, and the “National Direct Student Loan” program (today known as the “Federal Perkins Loan Program”) was thus born on June 23, 1972.²⁹⁹

Seeing its opening, Haverford moved quickly. The school's provost, Gerhard Spiegler, noted in a letter to Coleman that the “new” NDSL had eliminated any oaths of

College Bulletin 68, no. 4(August 1970): 4-8, 11, 14; Ambler to Coleman, October 13, 1971, “Admissions—NDF” folder, box 1, Coleman Papers.

²⁹⁹ Martin Kramer, “A Decade of Growth in Student Assistance,” *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 35, no. 2 (1983): 61-71; *Education Amendments of 1972*, Public Law 92-318, *United States Statutes at Large* 86(1972): 235-380; Charlene Wear Simmons, *Student Loans for Higher Education* (Sacramento: California Research Bureau, 2008), 12. For the 1971-72, academic year, the federal government awarded some \$312 million in Perkins Loans to postsecondary students. This figure—tantamount to over \$1.5 billion in current dollars, and more than six times the overall amount awarded by the NDSL in 1959-60—would certainly have motivated those charged with balancing Haverford's operations budget. College Board, *Trends in Student Aid 2004* (Washington, DC: College Board, 2004), 18-19.

belief from its administration, and pointed out the opportunity for financial relief that had emerged. When Haverford returned to classes in the autumn, the president proposed that the college enter into the amended NDSL, and both the faculty and Board of Managers roundly approved the suggestion. On September 19, 1972, Coleman sent a memo to William Shafer, Ambler's deputy in the admissions office, with the happy declaration that "the Board of Managers unanimously approved our entry into NDSL [National Direct Student Loan Program]. You are now free to move ahead with our application just as rapidly as you find possible and wise."³⁰⁰ Like its counterpart, Swarthmore, Haverford had become a full participant in what had once been the National Defense Education Act of 1958, and—again, like Swarthmore—the college had enacted this participation in a way that affirmed its enduring and essential institutional narrative.

³⁰⁰ Spiegler to Coleman, July 26, 1972, "Admissions-NDF" folder, box 1, Coleman Papers; minutes of Haverford College faculty, September 7, 1972, <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/handle/10066/3690>; Minutes, Board of Managers, September 8, 1972; Coleman to Shafer, September 19, 1972, "Admissions-NDF" folder, box 1, Coleman Papers.

Chapter 9: Conclusion—Affirming the Liberal Arts College Ideal

As the twenty-first century marches into its second decade, the “Age of the University” appears disturbed, if not departed, and to speak of the post-war “Golden Age” of American higher education sounds like the nostalgic recollection of an antiquated time. Not fifty years after Laurence Veysey’s *The Emergence of the American University* celebrated the university’s emergence from its purported anti-intellectual roots, the language of deficit, decay, and decadence has come to mark discussion of the nation’s contemporary enterprise in higher education. Critiques of the politics, detachment, and costliness of the academy and its professoriate are not new, of course. As the historian Richard Hofstadter has noted, these rhetorical broadsides have been a prominent part of American discourse so long as increased access to higher education has been an aim of American politics, from snide dismissal of “eggheads,” to polemics against the epistemological lassitude of the academy, to the political and moral radicalism of its scholars.³⁰¹ Today, however, the breadth of critical assessment has expanded, and is no longer the province of right-wing moralists, or of neo-Marxists describing higher education as representative of a capitalist superstructure; rather, university education is regularly assailed not only by mainstream thinkers outside its precincts, but also by those who work within it. Concerns about the state of affairs center on issues of accountability, skyrocketing costs, access, governance, graduation rates, and quality instruction, and critics worry that the system as currently constructed cannot speak adequately to the nation’s intellectual, civic, and economic needs. The overall picture described is one of a system unable, or unwilling, to fix itself, and faced with existential threats in new

³⁰¹ For a sampling of such arguments, see Stanislaw Andreski, *The Social Sciences as Sorcery* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); and Roger Kimball, *Tenured Radicals* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1990).

technologies, spiraling expenditures, and for-profit competitors.³⁰² While it would be reckless to pronounce the American university irretrievably broken—such haste would be redolent of those so ready to dismiss the liberal arts college in the twentieth century—both the tone and the extent of the apprehension expressed by contemporary critics is striking.

The writer perhaps who may most thoroughly express the narrative of higher educational decline is Derek Bok, who has produced a trio of works examining the present state of American universities. Though willing to salute areas of success, in the main Bok, a former president of Harvard, finds much to criticize in what he sees from the postsecondary project. In the modern university, he finds that the chase for research dollars and capital funding—begun in the late nineteenth century and accelerated during the cold war—has continued apace, as has the attendant degradation of the college as an inclusive community of scholars. Bok asserts that students are not taken seriously as thinkers, as moral actors, or as civic participants, largely because these are no longer the clear purposes or missions of institutions of higher learning. If anything, the emphases established by the “Age of the University” now matter more than ever; indeed, the prestige of a school is marked by the influence of its faculty’s research, the size of its endowment and building projects, and the social networking of its alumni, all of which is endorsed and embraced by a segment of the public eager to rank its institutions and claim

³⁰² The literature on the “crisis” of the modern university is extensive. Some thoughtful recent examples include Stanley Aronowitz, *The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling the Corporate University and Creating True Higher Learning* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); Robert Zemsky, Gregory Wegner, and William F. Massy, *Remaking the American University: Market-Smart and Mission-Centered* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005); William G. Bowen, Martin A. Kurzweil, and Eugene M. Tobin, *Equity and Excellence in American Higher Education* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006); Ellen Schrecker, *The Lost Soul of Higher Education* (New York: New Press, 2010); Menand, *The Marketplace of Ideas* (2010); Andrew Delbanco, *College: What It Was, and What It Should Be* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); William G. Bowen, *Higher Education in the Digital Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

the credentials they put on offer.³⁰³ For Bok, higher education desperately requires an extended conversation, prompted by critics both internal and external, to rediscover and clarify its fundamental purposes, and to consider what kinds of institutions can best address serve those purposes.

In a fashion, of course, Bok's concern about the motley and superficial aims of a large segment of American higher education is not new. Clark Kerr anticipated much of Bok's worry during the "Golden Age" of post-World War II academic growth, when Kerr observed that the modern research university—what he termed the "multiversity"—risked institutional incoherence in the effort to accommodate multiple interpretations of its mission. With the benefits of research specialization, campus growth, and financial ties to government and industry of course came the concomitant erosion of the school-as-community. As Kerr initially wrote in 1963:

These several competing visions of true purpose, each relating to a different layer of history, a different web of forces, cause much of the malaise in the university communities of today. The university is so many things to so many different people that it must, of necessity, be partially at war with itself.³⁰⁴

This observation was both trenchant and prescient, as the present-day university has remained a site of competing purposes, with little to suggest that the modern research institution is a "community" in any meaningful sense.

On the one hand, this loss of the college as a unified "community" should not be over-romanticized. Surely, there have long been rival versions of institutional aims articulated

³⁰³ Derek Bok, *Universities in the Marketplace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Bok, *Our Underachieving Colleges* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Bok, *Higher Education in America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

³⁰⁴ Kerr, 7.

on campus as long as there have been campuses. Even prior to the emergence of modern universities, colleges founded as sites of moral education were employed by the upwardly mobile as places to cultivate status and ensure socioeconomic reproduction. In addition, as Kerr noted, the shift to a more comprehensive and broad-ranging institution has not been without its compensations, such as increased access, diversified curriculum, improved faculty research, expanded government funding, and decentralized governance. There remain purposes that higher education serves well.³⁰⁵

Even so, what is lost when a school ceases to be a more-or-less coherent, singular community ought not to be underestimated. With its size, with the balkanized cultural and curricular experiences of its students, and with its faculty incentivized to research rather than teach, the modern university (notwithstanding ceremonial events like commencement and athletic contests) has ceased to be a “community” in a meaningful sense, and is better described as a “society.” Moral philosopher John Macmurray captures nicely the distinction between the two: whereas a community “is a unity of persons as persons,” Macmurray, notes, a society “is an organization of functions.” Institutions of higher education today are largely places where social groups occupy similar space to pursue exclusive, external aims. While there are certainly smaller communities within this higher educational society, they are incidental to the primary purposes sought by most campus constituents: research and publication (faculty), institutional prestige and fund-raising (administration), and credential acquisition to enhance future earnings (students).³⁰⁶

³⁰⁵ Levine, *The American College and the Culture of Aspiration, 1915-1940*; Kerr, 31-35.

³⁰⁶ John Macmurray, *The Personal World: John Macmurray on Self and Society* (Edinburgh: Floris, 1996), 166.

Certainly, the aims of higher education may be myriad, and one can appropriately and comfortably marshal a reasonable defense for including both the creation of new knowledge and the transmission of marketable skills among these legitimate aims. If found persuasive, Laurence Veysey's thesis—that the modern university has consolidated around the treble aims of research, utility, and liberal culture—is not inherently problematic; indeed, it seems to leave available a “big tent” idea of higher educational purpose, one which could accommodate a notion of “collegiate community” under the auspices of “liberal culture.” What is congenial in theory, however, so often falls apart in practice, and mere liberal curriculum cannot produce within the university the overall educational experience of a residential liberal arts college.

When the traditional view of the campus as an authentic community is discarded either by neglect or by design, some of the customary purposes of such institutions, such as moral and civic education, often go along with it. In an “organization of functions,” transacting “liberal culture” regularly involves the efficient acquisition of commoditized answers, rather than a dialogue informed by values, consciousness, and abiding questions. At the same time, when moral deliberation and civic engagement—efforts which are decidedly enhanced by the humanizing influence of the “unity of persons as persons”—are surrendered as legitimate institutional aims, the capacity of a school to enact a sense of community is stunted, and the campus inevitably drifts toward a disassociated functionality. As a consequence, potentially important purposes of higher education, as appropriate and defensible as those of research and job-training, are decisively crowded out of contemporary academic discourse.

The NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy serves as an object lesson in this regard. Surely, the American higher educational project would have survived without the dissenting efforts of Swarthmore and Haverford, and the principle of academic freedom would have found a way to endure, whether through organizations such as the AAUP or via particularly attuned university leaders and faculty. This recognition, however, should not discount the very real, very important role that Swarthmore and Haverford enacted during this period, and the significance that the resolution of this seemingly minor dispute can have for the structure of postsecondary learning.

In the late 1950s, Swarthmore and Haverford were not the nation's final institutional redoubts of civic virtue, but they did represent a very specific idea about what constituted meaningful higher education. These schools asserted that education is an irresistibly moral enterprise, and recognized that all schools, even those pretending toward the "neutrality" of research and knowledge-creation, express views not only on what is worth knowing, but also on what kinds of people they should graduate. This assertion was an essential part of both institutions' internal narratives and sagas, the stories that they told about themselves; consequently, both schools continued to emphasize the primacy of community, the necessity of ethical engagement, the possibility of "safe" dissent, and the importance of encouraging campus culture and practices that would support such aims. Because of these emphases, which remained consistent over time, Swarthmore and Haverford were possessed of the clarity of moral vision and institutional identity to resist

the conventional discourse of politics and education at the onset of the NDEA controversy.³⁰⁷

The point is not that these schools were perfect; indeed, their respective histories are punctuated with moments of both professorial and student disengagement, and confusion or inconsistency in their expressions of purpose. In addition, structural factors almost certainly contributed to the schools' efforts to maintain the integrity of their particular institutional narratives. For example, at mid-century both Swarthmore and Haverford possessed (and, today, continue to possess) a certain social, economic, and cultural security; indeed, throughout the twentieth century, these schools maintained healthy enrollments, found favor with alumni and philanthropic organizations, and developed social capital as Friends' colleges situated in the cradle of American Quakerism. Having negotiated the tremors of the "Age of the University," both Swarthmore and Haverford were comparatively prestigious institutions, even as liberal arts schools, on the eve of the NDEA controversy. This prestige surely gave both colleges more latitude in engaging with the disclaimer affidavit than other, less secure schools might have enjoyed. Swarthmore and Haverford became elite schools, in part, through persuasive institutional narratives, but this elite status, once cultivated, enhanced the schools' capability to retain these same narratives.

Structural factors, then, may have aided the efforts of Swarthmore and Haverford to protect their institutional stories and relationships. What cannot be ignored, however, is that these schools made such efforts, and that their relevant sagas remained fundamentally intact over extended periods of time. Though each school had periods of

³⁰⁷ For an examination of Swarthmore's development of its mission into the twenty-first century, see Matthew Hartley and Lawrence Schall, "The Endless Good Argument: The Adaptation of Mission at Two Liberal Arts Colleges," *Planning in Higher Education* 33, no. 4 (June-August 2005): 5-11.

charismatic leadership, these leaders acted to extend and enhance the extant internal narratives, not to renovate them. While each school evolved to meet changing demands and circumstances, they did so within their traditions, not in opposition to them. Though other schools (Yale, Princeton, Wellesley, Chicago, Dartmouth, etc.) attempted to retain stories of their distinctiveness, they did so with less conviction and less success in their collision with the homogenizing university ethos of the twentieth century. Swarthmore and Haverford were not reactionary, conservative institutions that refused to grow; rather, they were schools that told a clear story of what had historically made them both unique and effective, and they enlisted all campus actors as participants in this ongoing narrative. This effort paid dividends not only to both schools, but to higher education in general during the struggle over the NDEA disclaimer affidavit.³⁰⁸

Within today's higher educational landscape, however, it seems that there is great difficulty in sustaining such narratives, especially those which privilege notions of community, moral engagement, and conscience. If institutional stories are told, they are most usually stories of research and utility, not those of liberal culture and its attendant understanding of ethical and civic purpose. Once more, there is surely nothing wrong with research, with the creation of new knowledge *per se*; indeed, it is an easily legitimated function of contemporary higher education. What is worrisome, however, is the ease with which this effort is decoupled from questions of value, responsibility, and meaning. When the professoriate sees itself (and is incentivized to see itself) as belonging principally to a disciplinary community rather than an institutional one, there is an associated cost. When universities prioritize faculty research over engagement with

³⁰⁸ For a lengthier discussion of the creation, maintenance, and benefits of institutional sagas, see Clark, 233-262.

students, there is an associated cost. When administrators of an institution are encouraged to model positions of value neutrality, there is an associated cost. A campus emptied of authentic moral leadership and engagement impoverishes the student experience, and limits the possibility of a community that transcends the rituals of sporting and social events. While improved access to higher education has been one of the signature efforts of American politics and society over the last seventy years, it has not been complemented by institutional narratives about the significance of both reflecting upon and practicing decency, prudence, and civic virtue. There have been episodes during this period where students and campuses have risen to the moral occasion—the civil rights movement and anti-war protests stand as prominent examples—but higher education should not take solace in these activities. As the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy made clear, moral stakes are not always obvious, and it seems that contemporary academic institutions, for all their collected intellectual talent and curiosity, have not constructed narrative identities sufficient to subtler (yet significant) instances of ethical concern.

Similarly, the modern university's emphasis on utility has been unhelpful to the development or conservation of institutional sagas that emphasize community and ethical engagement. Postsecondary institutions increasingly emphasize not their internal stories, but their "brands," as they insist upon their relevance in (and training for) a dynamic marketplace. In a globalized economy and under conditions of technological triumphalism, one of the real consequences of the "making of the modern university" appears to be a willingness of schools to position themselves, observes one professor, as "career-networking centers for a global managerial work force that answers to no

republican polity or moral code.” In the past decade, Princeton University (ranked first in 2013’s *U.S. News* rating of national universities) has sent between 33 and 46 percent of its employed graduates into the financial services industry. While Princeton should certainly not stand as proxy for American higher education in general, and though its graduates are surely entitled to pursue the employment they wish, one might wonder if a school populated with so many resources and fascinating, talented people might be missing a cultural opportunity to broaden the ambit of its charges.³⁰⁹

The point, again, is not that higher education should divest itself of research and job-training; rather, it must reclaim the legitimacy of civic and moral education as appropriate functions of postsecondary instruction. It must also recognize that these functions are best discharged within institutions where questions of value cannot readily be decoupled from questions of scholarship, and where these institutions consciously and consistently identify themselves—especially to campus constituents—as such learning communities. As Burton Clark observed (in remarks that remain as perceptive as they are trenchant): “All colleges have roles, but only some have missions.”³¹⁰

Of the varied institutions in American higher education, it seems that the residential liberal arts college is the one best disposed to serve as site of this reclamation. Recent scholarship has postulated that any college or university can, with sufficient organizational and administrative will, create a culture that places student learning at the center of the institutional experience. Perhaps, but present data also suggests that schools

³⁰⁹ Jim Sleeper, “Liberal Education in Authoritarian Places,” *New York Times*, September 1, 2013; “National University Rankings, 2013,” *US News*, <http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities>; Catherine Rampell, “Out of Harvard, and Into Finance,” *New York Times*, December 12, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/out-of-harvard-and-into-finance/?_r=0.

³¹⁰ Clark, 234.

committed both to educating undergraduates and to selecting and rewarding faculty primarily for their teaching are in short supply. Rare is the postsecondary institution that does not offer some sort of “general education” or “liberal arts” curriculum, to be sure, but curricular offerings alone are insufficient to produce the type of outcomes—improved moral reasoning, purposefulness, citizenship, civility, and intellectual engagement—traditionally sought after, and realized by schools who create a learning environment which privileges peer and student-faculty engagement around issues of intellectual, political, and ethical consequence. Institutional mission and campus culture are, by far, the most critical elements in meeting these aims, as Swarthmore and Haverford demonstrated throughout the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy. Though Quakerism was important to these schools, effective mission and culture need not be denominational—but they must be central to the school’s narrative understanding and expression of itself. It is the enduring institutional story, not the ephemeral “brand,” which helps schools graduate students prepared to provide the type of scholarship, leadership, and citizenship necessitated by an increasingly interrelated and multipolar world.³¹¹

“Going to college” in the United States has seldom, if ever, connoted a singular, universal experience. Instruction for the ministry, cultivation of gentlemanly status, reintegration of war veterans, education for graduate study, preparation for the workforce—these purposes, and others, have, at one point or another, informed the American rationale for higher education, and this diversity has represented a great

³¹¹ Tricia Seifert et al, “The Effects of Liberal Arts Experiences on Liberal Arts Outcomes,” *Research in Higher Education* 49, no. 2 (March 2008), 107-125; Breneman, 1-18; George D. Kuh and Robert M. Gonyea, “Spirituality, Liberal Learning, and College Student Engagement,” *Liberal Education* 92, no.1 (Winter 2006): 46.

strength of the system. This diversity is also threatened when the residential liberal arts college is marginalized in conventional educational discourse as an extravagant, impractical use of time and resources. Such schools are not a good fit for every student, to be sure, and all colleges and universities must be attuned to industry concerns about affordability, access, and attainment. At the same time, a higher educational project which does not allow sufficient space for the mission-driven college, for the institution informed by an internal narrative or saga, cannot fully protect the intellectual and civic health of its polity. Such schools are not, of course, the only way to bolster the nation's education and citizenship, but they do have a role to play, however subtle. The actions of Swarthmore and Haverford during the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy did not stave off constitutional crisis, but they did confirm the value of respectful dissent, civility, and community obligation at a time when both American democracy and higher education, in thrall to narrow norms of loyalty and consensus, seemed to require the reassertion. If and when either the republican ethos or academic freedom is similarly threatened, one hopes there will still be institutions equipped with the sense of purpose and identity to provide the necessary defense of essential ideals.

Appendix A: National Defense Education Act of 1958—Title X, Section 1001³¹²

TITLE X—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ADMINISTRATION

SEC. 1001. (a) The Commissioner is authorized to delegate any of his functions under this Act, except the making of regulations, to any officer or employee of the Office of Education.

(b) In administering the titles of this Act for which he is responsible, the Commissioner is authorized to utilize the services and facilities of any agency of the Federal Government and, without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (41 U. S. C., sec. 5), of any other public or nonprofit agency or institution, in accordance with agreements between the Secretary and the head thereof.

(c) The Commissioner shall include in his annual report to the Congress a full report of the activities of the Office of Education under this Act, including recommendations for needed revisions in the provisions thereof.

(d) The Secretary shall advise and consult with the heads of departments and agencies of the Federal Government responsible for the administration of scholarship, fellowship, or other educational programs with a view to securing full information concerning all specialized scholarship, fellowship, or other educational programs administered by or under any such department or agency and to developing policies and procedures which will strengthen the educational programs and objectives of the institutions of higher education utilized for such purposes by any such department or agency.

(e) Any agency of the Federal Government shall exercise its functions under any other law in such manner as will assist in carrying out the objectives of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as superseding or limiting the authority of any such agency under any other law.


(f) No part of any funds appropriated or otherwise made available for expenditure under authority of this Act shall be used to make payments or loans to any individual unless such individual (1) has executed and filed with the Commissioner an affidavit that he does not believe in, and is not a member of and does not support any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods, and (2) has taken and subscribed to an oath or affirmation in the following form: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America and will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all its enemies, foreign and domestic." The provisions of section 1001 of title 18, United States Code, shall be applicable with respect to such affidavits.

³¹² *National Defense Education Act*, Public Law 85-864, *United States Statutes at Large* 72(1958): 1602.

Appendix B: Timeline of Events

September 2, 1958	National Defense Education Act (NDEA) signed into law
January 20, 1959	Haverford announces its non-participation in NDEA Title II, the National Student Loan Program (NDSL)
January 29, 1959	Senators John F. Kennedy and Joseph Clark introduce legislation (S. 819) to eliminate disclaimer affidavit
February 5, 1959	Swarthmore announces its non-participation in the NDSL
May 5, 1959	Presidents Courtney Smith and Hugh Borton appear before Senate Subcommittee on Education
July 23, 1959	Senate returns Kennedy-Clark legislation to committee
January 27, 1960	Senators Kennedy, Clark, and Jacob Javits reintroduce legislation (S. 2929) to eliminate disclaimer affidavit
June 16, 1960	S. 2929, amended by Senator Winston Prouty, passes the Senate; House of Representatives does not consider the bill
August 8, 1961	Representative Overton Brooks introduces legislation (H.R. 8556) to amend the National Science Foundation Act of 1950
September 6, 1961	House of Representatives passes H.R. 8556
September 27, 1962	Senate amends H.R. 8556 to include elimination of NDEA disclaimer affidavit
October 2, 1962	Houses passes amended H.R. 8556
October 16, 1962	Public Law 87-835 signed, eliminating the NDEA disclaimer affidavit
January 28, 1963	Swarthmore announces its participation in the NDSL
June 23, 1972	Public Law 92-318 signed, amending the Higher Education Act of 1965 and providing federal aid monies directly to students
September 19, 1972	Haverford announces its participation in National Direct Student Loan Program

Appendix C: Student Newspapers at Swarthmore and Haverford³¹³



³¹³ Swarthmore Phoenix, February 10, 1959; Haverford News, February 6, 1959.

Appendix D: Friends Colleges Founded in the United States³¹⁴

Institution	Location	Founded	Present Quaker Affiliation?
Haverford College	Haverford, Pennsylvania	1833	No
Earlham College	Richmond, Indiana	1847	Yes
Swarthmore College	Swarthmore, Pennsylvania	1864	No
Cornell University	Ithaca, New York	1865	No
Wilmington College	Wilmington, Ohio	1870	Yes
William Penn University	Oskaloosa, Iowa	1873	Yes
Johns Hopkins University	Baltimore, Maryland	1876	No
Bryn Mawr College	Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania	1885	No
George Fox University	Newburg, Oregon	1885	Yes
Whittier College	Whittier, California	1887	No

³¹⁴ *Founded by Friends: The Quaker Heritage of 15 American College and Universities*, ed. John W. Oliver, Charles L. Cherry, and Caroline L. Cherry (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2007). Neither Cornell nor Johns Hopkins were founded as denominational institutions; however, their respective benefactors—Ezra Cornell and Johns Hopkins—were both birthright Quakers, and the founding of each school was at least partially motivated by a spirit of philanthropy rooted in this testimony. As a consequence, both institutions are often considered “founded by Friends,” even if the affiliation was never formalized.

Guilford College	Greensboro, North Carolina	1888	Yes
Malone University	Canton, Ohio	1892	Yes
Friends University	Wichita, Kansas	1898	Yes
Azusa Pacific University	Azusa, California	1899	No
Barclay College	Haviland, Kansas	1917	Yes

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